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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA734, Goma Report September 5: CNDP Captures Katsiru

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA734 2008-09-08 07:29 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO7319
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0734/01 2520729
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080729Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8389
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0616
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000734 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
            UN, EUN 
SUBJECT:    Goma Report September 5:  CNDP Captures Katsiru 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  CNDP launched a three-pronged attack at dawn 
September 5 and drove FARDC out of Katsiru.  The International 
Facilitation team has urged FARDC and CNDP to begin urgent military 
talks to get forces back to positions held two weeks ago.  CNDP 
insists on such talks taking place at Kimoka, turning down proposal 
to be helicoptered to the MONUC-controlled airport for talks, while 
FARDC refuses Kimoka.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) After a series of skirmishes in the Rutshuru area 
beginning August 28, responsibility for which was mixed, CNDP on 
September 5 staged a three-pronged attack on FARDC positions in a 
different theater:  the JTN-Katsiru area north of Kitchanga.  North 
Kivu brigade assesses clear responsibility is with CNDP, in the 
larger context of skirmishes since August 28, during which there 
were numerous provocations by FARDC.  It is evident that CNDP's 
preparations for attacks on FARDC positions in and around Katsiru 
were well underway at the time of U.S. discussions with CNDP held in 
Kirolirwe the previous day, September 4, when senior CNDP political 
and military officials promised that CNDP would seek to reduce 
tensions and return to the disengagement working groups. 
 
3.  (SBU) The day opened with a report from 8th military region 
deputy commander Colonel Delphin, passed to Eastern Coordinator 
Alpha Sow, that CNDP forces had launched a dawn attack on FARDC 
positions east of CNDP-held Mweso; that FARDC had withstood the 
first attack, but that CNDP was launching further attacks.  Given a 
series of outlandish claims by Col. Delphin over the past eight 
days, the facilitation team tended to discount this newest report. 
North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General Rawat invited Col. 
Delphin on a helicopter tour of the area.  Within a few hours it had 
become clear that Col. Delphin's claim was largely correct.  The 
brigade sent out patrols from its bases at both Katsiru (then 
FARDC-controlled) and from Kitchanga (CNDP center).  In a pattern 
that has become familiar in the Rutshuru sector, the patrol sent out 
from Katsiru was immediately blocked by the local stone-throwing 
populace (perhaps instigated by FARDC), but the patrol from 
Kitchanga got through to the area of fighting.  North Kivu brigade 
determined that CNDP had launched three platoon-level attacks prior 
to 6:00 am to the northwest and northeast of Katsiru, crossing the 
informal "buffer zone" through and north of the JTN tea plantation. 
FARDC withdrew to the north eight kms. to Kihindo, near the FARDC 
base at Nyanzale, suffering casualties (number undetermined) who 
were evacuated by the North Kivu brigade.  The exchange of fire 
largely ceased by 13:30. 
 
4.  (SBU) North Kivu brigade had more than the usual difficulties 
reaching CNDP telephonically.  Poloff and Deputy Eastern Coordinator 
M'hand Ladjouzi separately reached CNDP Goma representative 
(residing in CNDP-held territory near Kimoka since August 28) 
Bertrand Bisimwa, who said that the CNDP had detected a significant 
build-up of FARDC forces north of Kitchanga and elsewhere and 
decided to react.  He said that CNDP was also outraged that, he 
claimed, the 8th region commander had ordered that cellular contact 
with the CNDP area around Kitchaga and Kirolirwe be cut September 4. 
 He said CNDP would be willing to have discussions with FARDC on 
ways to reduce tensions (not, he said, on the larger issues of 
disengagement), but only at Kimoka.  (Note:  MONUC has built a 
negotiating facility at Kimoka, at the edge of the area of CNDP 
control north of Sake, but the CNDP has not withdrawn four kms. 
north of the facility as it had agreed to do, and the government has 
refused to attend any discussions there.) 
 
5.  (SBU) The facilitation team met on the afternoon of September 5 
and agreed that both sides needed to be pressed urgently to pursue 
talks to reduce tensions and get back to positions held prior to 
August 28.  It was hoped, given the government's objections to 
Kimoka, that CNDP might accept having a military team helicoptered 
for talks at the MONUC-controlled air terminal in Goma, probably the 
most secure place in the Kivus. 
 
6.  (SBU) Subsequently, the team met with General Etumba, 
accompanied by 8th region commander General Mayala, Col. Delphin, 
and a host of other FARDC officers.  MONUC's Eastern Division deputy 
commander Col James Cunliffe and North Kivu commander General Rawat 
reviewed the day's events around Katsiru.  Col. Delphin took issue 
with their low assessment of the number of the forces employed by 
CNDP (a few platoons), saying that CNDP had attacked with three 
battalions (albeit small battalions of only 300 men each, maximum). 
Characteristically, Col. Delphin shared lurid raw intelligence 
suggesting that CNDP was hatching a plan to attack northward as far 
as Butembo.  He said that FARDC had known for five days that CNDP 
was moving two-thirds of its forces located in its southwestern area 
of control (Ngungu to Kingi) north to Kitchanga and, as it had 
earlier communicated to the facilitation team, had supposed that 
 
KINSHASA 00000734  002 OF 002 
 
 
CNDP's intention was to send these forces east to attack the 
Rutshuru corridor via Tongo.  Instead, they had attacked northward 
at Katsiru. 
 
7.  (SBU) The facilitation team proposed to General Etumba that 
military talks be undertaken at once with CNDP to cease hostilities 
and remove forces to where they had been two weeks earlier.  Etumba 
said he was amenable to such talks, so long as they did not open up 
a framework outside the Goma/Amani peace process.  Mayala said he 
was ready to go.  The team said it hoped that the location of such 
talks would not be an impediment, noting that the CNDP sought to 
have them at Kimoka.  Several FARDC officers spoke up in adamant 
opposition to the idea of Kimoka as venue.  The team then proposed 
that talks be held at the MONUC-controlled airport.  FARDC accepted. 
 Etumba said it was high time for the international community to 
condemn CNDP's aggression in the clearest terms. 
 
8.  (SBU) However, several evening conversations with CNDP's Bisimwa 
produced no forward movement from CNDP:  CNDP, he said, would not 
yield on its insistence on talks at Kimoka, or alternatively Addis 
Ababa or Nairobi. 
 
GARVELINK