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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA728, Goma Report September 3 - Stoning of

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA728 2008-09-04 07:25 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO4951
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0728/01 2480725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040725Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8380
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0614
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000728 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
            UN, EUN 
SUBJECT:    Goma Report September 3 - Stoning of 
        Facilitation Team at Rutshuru 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The international facilitation team traveled via 
MONUC convoy September 2 to three sensitive areas along the 
confrontation line between FARDC and CNDP in Rutshuru territory, 
hoping to affirm FARDC withdrawal from two newly occupied positions. 
 FARDC still occupies those positions and appears to have instigated 
crowds near Rutshuru to block the convoy's return and to stone its 
vehicles.  General Etumba stormed out of a meeting September 3 with 
the team when it suggested FARDC responsibility.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) At a meeting with the international facilitation team on 
September 1, Generals Etumba and Mayala gave assurances that the 
positions FARDC had occupied at Ntamugenga and Mutabo in the "buffer 
zone" east of the Rutshuru road in clashes that occurred August 
28-29 had been or would very soon be evacuated.  North Kivu brigade 
had affirmed to the team that there are no positions occupied by 
CNDP in the buffer zone near Kanombe (east of Rumangabo), as claimed 
by FARDC.  Etumba asserted that CNDP and Rwanda were bent upon an 
imminent two-pronged attack on the Rutshuru corridor, with two CNDP 
battalions (500 men) moving in from the west and two Rwandan 
battalions (1,100 men) added to CNDP forces moving in from the east. 
 Deputy Eastern Coordinator M'hand Ladjouzi reported that on the 
previous day FARDC had pointed weapons at North Kivu brigade units 
at Rugari (first major village north of the Congo-Nile divide) and 
instigated the populace to throw stones at the brigade and that it 
appeared that there had been armed FDLR in the crowd. 
 
3.  (SBU) On September 3, the facilitation team (UK, France, U.S., 
and MONUC, led by Ladjouzi) took an all-day road trip to Rutshuru, 
with the objective of determining on the ground whether FARDC had 
withdrawn from the newly occupied positions and the extent of 
popular sensitivities.  North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier 
General Bipin Rawat accompanied the team on the first part of the 
trip, to Rugari, where CNDP forces come closest (only one kilometer) 
to the highway.  Barriers along the track leading half a kilometer 
to the parish (former village center, now moved to the highway) were 
still partially in evidence, having been thrown up by the villagers 
on August 28, the first day of clashes further north.  Rawat noted 
that, just prior to SRSG Doss's visit to Rugari on August 31, FARDC 
had confiscated MONUC cameras when crowds interlaced with armed FDLR 
were photographed.  Rawat pointed to the nearby hill, called Himbi 
(overlooking Rugari and the nearest CNDP position to the highway), 
and said he hoped he would be able to persuade CNDP to withdraw to 
hills somewhat further back where CNDP would not be within such easy 
firing range of the highway. 
 
4.  (SBU) The team proceeded north to Kako, north of Kalengera, 
where the track to Ntamugenga intersects the highway.  There a 
convoy of the North Kivu brigade was parked, having waited since 
August 30 to proceed to Ntamugenga to establish a base but prevented 
by stone-throwing crowds that had barricaded the track.  The team 
called 8th Region deputy commander Col. Delphin, who instructed the 
Rutshuru (6th brigade) commander, Col. Antoine Mushimba, to proceed 
to Kako to open the track.  Col Mushimba was reluctant but obeyed. 
The team eventually passed through the crowd at Kako, suffering a 
few hurled stones.  It drove five kilometers to the largely 
abandoned village of Ntamugenga, near to which an exchange of fire 
had occurred on August 29, and ascertained that it was now occupied 
by FARDC.  Two captains admitted that the area had been a no-man's 
land for some months but asserted that MONUC had had a base there 
until two months previously and since then CNDP had "become master" 
of the area.  FARDC had now occupied it, they said, as a result of 
attacks by CNDP.  The team returned to the highway, again 
encountering minor stoning by the crowd at Kako. 
 
5.  (SBU) At Rutshuru, Col. Mushimba warned the team that it should 
not proceed northeast on the track to Mutabo, as he claimed that a 
CNDP force was moving down the track and was now located only two 
kilometers from Rutshuru.  He was visibly angry, citing losing a 
windshield to stones being thrown at Kako.  The team proceeded to 
Mutabo without difficulty, encountering neither hostile crowds nor a 
CNDP force.  At the eastern side of the village, the team was 
welcomed to the small North Kivu brigade base, whose commander 
explained that there had been no exchange of fire in the Mutabo 
area, but on the morning of August 28 two FARDC platoons had moved 
from their previous position west (3.5 kms. back toward Rutshuru) to 
a new position on the hill the east of the North Kivu brigade base. 
The brigade had attempted to stop the platoons, explaining that they 
were violating the undertakings made to MONUC about the buffer zone, 
but the platoons insisted on going through.  The team proceeded 
eastward, climbed the hill, and met the FARDC commanding officer, 
who admitted that he had received an order just after firing 
commenced further south on the early morning of August 28 to move 
forward, and he had received no order to withdraw.  He pointed to 
 
KINSHASA 00000728  002 OF 002 
 
 
distant positions of the CNDP, on higher hills some four kilometers 
to the east and south, saying that both CNDP and FARDC sent out 
daily patrols much nearer each other's positions. 
 
6.  (SBU) The team returned most of the distance back toward 
Rutshuru without incident.  However, it was blocked at the outskirts 
of the town by hostile crowds (interspersed with some FARDC) that 
had felled a large tree over the track and built a bonfire.  The 
North Kivu brigade escort soldiers (Indian) dismounted from their 
vehicles, covered themselves with shields, and, when the crowd began 
throwing stones and rocks, their commanding officer fired five 
shots.  The team called Col Mushimba to get the 6th brigade to 
ensure its safety and clear the barricade.  A group of young men 
came forward as spokesmen, and, in a heated and confused discourse, 
accused MONUC of doing nothing to combat CNDP and indeed, of being 
an ally of CNDP.  The men knew that Col. Mushimba's windshield had 
been broken and appeared to blame MONUC for it.  Within half an 
hour, the 6th brigade cleared the obstruction but, when leading the 
convoy through the crowd, halted long enough for the convoy to be 
showered with stones and rocks, some large.  Closer to the center of 
Rutshuru, at the 6th brigade headquarters (located on the same 
track), the FARDC escort insisted that the team enter the 
headquarters, where they were treated to a harangue by Col. Mushimba 
along similar lines to that offered by the village spokesmen, i.e., 
that MONUC was doing nothing to use its perceived considerable 
capabilities to combat CNDP, and the populace was fed up.  On 
driving away from the compound the convoy again suffered a shower of 
stones and boulders, with the result of nine windows shattered in 
MONUC vehicles.  There were, however, no significant injuries.  By 
now much delayed, the convoy returned to Goma at nightfall, without 
further incident. 
 
7.  (SBU) On the following day, September 3, the facilitation team 
met General Etumba, with General Mayala, Col. Delphin and other 
officers, at MONUC.  The team reviewed its findings and experiences 
of the previous day, noting that FARDC still occupied Ntamugenga and 
Mutabo despite assurances of withdrawal, and lamenting that crowds 
at Koku and particularly at Rutshuru had been stirred up and had 
stoned the convoy.  The team noted that armed FDLR elements appeared 
to have been present at Rugari and Ntamugenga.  Etumba said that any 
attacks on MONUC or the facilitation team were unacceptable, but any 
insinuation that FARDC was manipulating the population needed to be 
verified.  There was no doubt that the populace was very 
disappointed in MONUC's unwillingness to use its force to assist in 
dealing with CNDP.  He lamented that the Indian-dominated North Kivu 
brigade mainly spoke Hindi and English and had difficulty 
communicating with the populace or FARDC.  He said he hoped MONUC 
and FARDC could do a better job of communicating MONUC's objectives 
and limitations, in a public-awareness campaign.  Etumba promised to 
give orders to ensure that there would be no possibility of FARDC's 
stirring up crowds in the future. 
 
8.  (SBU) General Mayala and Col. Delphin claimed they had needed to 
proceed carefully in any withdrawal of forces from Ntamugenga and 
Mutabo, as the populace was so angry that it would also react 
against FARDC if it tried to withdraw, particularly when there were 
continued exchanges of fire.  M'hand Ladjouzi pointed out that there 
had only been minimal continued exchange of fire over the past three 
days.  Delphin claimed that CNDP was still occupying two positions 
in the area of Kanombe and resented the facilitation team's focus 
only on the two positions occupied by FARDC.  The team explained 
that it had understood from the North Kivu brigade that there were 
no positions in the buffer zone occupied by CNDP.  The discussion 
moved to the apparent FDLR presence at Rugari, at which point Etumba 
changed his tone.  He claimed to be outraged and said that he could 
only conclude that the facilitation team was bent on hurling 
accusations at FARDC and not CNDP.  He stood up, took off the belt 
of his uniform as if to hurl on the table (but did not), and stormed 
out of the room. 
 
9.  (SBU) Meanwhile, on September 3, Eastern Coordinator Alpha Sow 
received a CNDP delegation led by Betrand Bisimwa, coming to Goma 
for the first time since August 27.  The delegation condemned the 
government's August 30 decision to close the Bunagana frontier post 
(controlled by CNDP) and FARDC's move into the buffer zone at 
Ntamugenga and Mutabo, and called for a declaration of ceasefire by 
the government.  It claimed not to have closed the door to future 
CNDP attendance at the working groups on disengagement.  Note:  The 
North Kivu working group has so far done little, on account of CNDP 
non-participation.  End note. 
 
GARVELINK