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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA719, Goma Report August 31 - Assessing

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA719 2008-09-02 12:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO3103
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0719/01 2461248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021248Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8369
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0609
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000719 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
            UN, EUN 
SUBJECT:    Goma Report August 31 - Assessing 
            Responsibility for Rutshuru Skirmishes 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Exchanges of fire flared up on August 28, 29, 
and 30 along various points east of the Goma-Rutshuru road where 
FARDC and CNDP forces have been separated by a buffer zone and 
relatively quiet for several months.  The spark appears to have been 
a major theft of cattle from the CNDP zone by the FARDC, followed by 
opening of fire by CNDP, and an occupation by FARDC of points within 
the buffer zone.  The North Kivu brigade commander promises a full 
accounting by September 2, although efforts by the brigade to 
investigate have been hampered by persistent hostile actions by the 
local populace, possibly instigated by the FARDC.  CNDP and FARDC 
allot total blame to the other, with FARDC claiming direct Rwandan 
involvement in a plan to cut the vital Rutshuru corridor.  FARDC 
wants a fuller, more aggressive MONUC military presence well to the 
east of the road, while the North Kivu brigade commander asserts 
MONUC is best positioned to monitor cease-fire violations and to 
protect the corridor by keeping its presence principally based on or 
near the road.  CNDP on August 30 promised to return to the working 
groups on disengagement on September 2, assuming adequate guarantees 
of security and barring further hostilities.  However, it is not 
clear at this juncture whether this promise will have been vitiated 
by the continued exchange of fire and by the government's August 30 
decision to close the road to Bunagana to commercial traffic.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (U) The international facilitation team (MONUC, France, UK, 
U.S.) on the morning of August 30 traveled to the "neutral zone" at 
Kimoka, north of Sake, to meet CNDP's Goma delegation chief Kambasu 
Ngeve and five CNDP military officers.  Since the flare-up of 
skirmishes in the Rutshuru area August 28 CNDP had boycotted the 
meetings in Goma of the working groups on disengagement, citing 
fears for its security.  It insisted that the facilitators would 
have to go to Kimoka if there were to be a meeting. 
 
3.  (SBU) Eastern Coordinator Alpha Sow urged CNDP to return at once 
to the working groups, underlining that it was especially to 
diminish the potential for fighting that the working groups had been 
formed.  Kambasu said that the incidents over the preceding two days 
were extremely serious, resulting in CNDP casualties.  He said that 
it was essential that MONUC establish a mechanism of investigation 
and assign responsibility against the FARDC, which had now occupied 
several new positions in the no-man's land east of the Rutshuru road 
(at Rugari, Ntamugenga village a few kilometers east of Kalengera, 
and at Mutobo east of Rutshuru and Rugarama near the Uganda 
border). 
 
4.  (SBU) The CNDP team said that it was outraged that the FARDC had 
stolen 180 cattle from CNDP-held Rukoro (southeast of Rutshuru). 
The territorial administration had now been able to return 69 of 
these cows, but it was likely that many of the remainder had been 
butchered and sold in the market by wives of FARDC soldiers. 
Kambasu said that CNDP would consider returning to the working 
groups if they could be held at Kimoka, but the facilitation team 
negated the idea.  Kambasu said that action should be taken to 
remove barriers on the roads from Kimoka to Goma and on CNDP's key 
demand of liberating political prisoners - two areas where the 
government could hugely improve the atmosphere. 
 
5.  (SBU) The facilitation team noted that National Coordinator Malu 
Malu had repeatedly asked CDNP for the list of prisoners, to which 
Kambasu said that it had provided General Etumba with the final list 
already in April; but he admitted that only in the past few days had 
CNDP also given Malu Malu the list.  Alpha Sow lamented that CNDP 
had sorely provoked the government by raising the CNDP flag at the 
border crossing (controlled by CNDP) at Bunagana.  Kambasu claimed 
that the flag "merely" was raised at a CNDP party headquarters, 
while the national flag still flew over the customs house, but then 
he admitted that the CNDP building was marked, "Territorial 
Administration."  The meeting concluded with Kambasu's promise of 
CNDP's attendance Monday morning September 1 at the disengagement 
working groups, on the condition that its team was provided more 
ample security by MONUC and that there were no further attacks by 
FARDC.  Following the meeting, the team learned that the government 
had banned trucks on the Bunagana road, moving commercial traffic to 
the less-preferred Ishasha road. 
 
6.  (SBU) On return to Goma, on the afternoon of August 30, the 
facilitation team met Brigadier General Bipin Rawat, the 
newly-arrived commander of the North Kivu brigade.  Rawat had been 
in Kinshasa at the outbreak of the clashes on the early morning of 
August 28 but immediately had traveled to the Rutshuru area, from 
which he had returned earlier in the day to meet General Etumba.  He 
said that the spark for the clashes appeared to have been a major 
theft by FARDC of cattle over the night of August 27-28, which 
 
KINSHASA 00000719  002 OF 003 
 
 
produced an outburst of firing by CNDP, first, in the early morning 
at Kanombe and Gasiza (a few miles east of Kalengera and Rumangabo, 
then a little further north at Rukoro (the CNDP "frontier" along the 
Burai-Bunagana road) and near Mutabo, east of Rutshuru.  Similar 
exchange of fire took place at Ntamugenga (also along the line of 
confrontation east of Kalengera) late on August 29. 
 
7.  (SBU) The facilitation team asked Rawat to confirm CNDP's claim 
that FARDC had now occupied four areas that had previously been in 
the buffer zone.  Rawat said he did not believe that there had been 
any change of relative positions at Rugari (the southernmost of 
significant towns along the Rutshuru road north of the Congo-Nile 
divide).  However, he said, the North Kivu brigade deemed Rugari to 
be the most sensitive place along the road, since it was there that 
CNDP positions were nearest (a mere kilometer) from the road, with 
FARDC positioned only along the road itself and a MONUC base located 
in the village itself between the two sides. 
 
8.  (SBU) Rawat said that CNDP was, however, correct about 
Ntamugenga, further north.  FARDC had moved east into the buffer 
zone there and occupied the village of Ntamugenga (which had some 
months earlier been occupied by CNDP, but MONUC had persuaded CNDP 
to evacuate the village and withdraw to the heights overlooking it). 
 Similarly, CNDP was correct that FARDC had moved east to occupy 
some of the buffer zone at Mutabo, where MONUC had a small base.  As 
for the fourth area, Rawat said it was true that FARDC had recently 
newly occupied Rugarama, near the Ugandan border.  However, he said, 
Rugarama was north of the CNDP-controlled area, and FARDC had 
occupied it as part of the campaign to deal with FDLR, which was 
active there.  Rawat noted that, in the exchanges of fire August 
28-29, there had been at least one FARDC killed, with 11 wounded, 
now at the Rutshuru hospital.  He had no figures on CNDP casualties, 
nor did he know where CNDP wounded were being treated. 
 
9.  (SBU) Alpha Sow told Rawat and the facilitation group that he 
saw several steps that needed to be taken at once.  First, 
responsibility had to be ascertained as accurately as circumstances 
would permit.  Both sides were stoutly assigning responsibility to 
the other and directly challenging MONUC.  Rawat promised that he 
would have a report by Tuesday, September 2.  Rawat noted, however, 
that his brigade had been blocked from travel and from pursuing any 
investigation in several areas by angry crowds, whipped up to 
anti-MONUC fervor.  Sow's assistant, M'hand Ladjouzi, observed that 
it had long been a pattern of FARDC to block MONUC investigations by 
whipping up the populace. 
 
10.  (SBU) Sow said that, secondly, MONUC must pressure FARDC to 
withdraw from places (Ntamugenga and Mutobo) it had newly occupied 
within the buffer zone.  Third, it needed to try to help recover 
stolen cattle (if any remained not yet butchered).  Fourth, it 
needed to consider carefully how and whether it could meet FARDC's 
demand that MONUC stage a more robust military presence not just on 
the Rutshuru highway but in the buffer zone to the east of it. 
Fifth, it should reestablish the cease-fire violation monitoring 
mechanism (set up after the Goma conference but allowed to cease 
activity).  Sixth, it needed to check on CNDP casualties - transfer 
to Rwanda would be a negative development.  Seventh, the government 
closure of Bunagana could have significant repercussions (CNDP 
further boycott of the peace process or military action) which would 
need to be taken into consideration.  Sow described this decision as 
either ill-considered or an intentional provocation.  Eighth, the 
government authorities needed at once to intervene with the populace 
to cease blocking MONUC.  Finally, it would be useful for the 
international facilitators to join an investigation on the ground. 
 
11.  (SBU) In the evening, Sow conveyed to the facilitation team new 
reports of firing taking place in the highly-sensitive Rugari area, 
which however subsided after a few hours.  In a telephone 
conversation with poloff, Kambasu did not appear to be aware of the 
newest clashes (but certainly aware of the closure of the Bunagana 
road) and asserted that CNDP still planned to come to the working 
groups in Goma on September 1. 
 
12.  (SBU) On Sunday morning August 31, Etumba convoked the 
facilitation team, preparatory to the arrival of SRSG Doss and 
Defense Minister for a helicopter tour of the zone of clashes. 
Etumba admitted that FARDC had occupied Ntamugenga and "would see 
how" to withdraw its forces from that village.  Meanwhile, he 
claimed, the CNDP on the previous evening had occupied "two small 
positions" near Kanombe, east of Rumangabo, perhaps a tit-for-tat 
for Ntamugenga.  Etumba underlined his earlier request for a much 
more robust and aggressive MONUC military presence in the buffer 
zone east of the Rutshuru highway.  Called upon by Etumba, Col. 
 
KINSHASA 00000719  003 OF 003 
 
 
Delphin, deputy commander of the 8th Military Region,  rehashed 
DRC's claims of Rwandan involvement in a master plan to cut the 
Rutshuru road, claiming that the Rwandan army chief had been at 
Bunagana on August 21 and two Rwandan battalions had crossed into 
the area.  It was this CNDP-Rwandan plan to cut the Rutshuru road, 
Delphin added illogically, that had prompted the government to cut 
the Bunagana road.  As for theft of cattle, Etumba and Delphin 
ridiculed the idea that any cattle-rustling could justify military 
action.  However, Delphin admitted knowing that the theft of 80 (not 
180) cattle had taken place. 
 
13.  (SBU) Etumba claimed that, in an earlier meeting with Rawat, 
Rawat had "completely endorsed" DRC claims of a CNDP-Rwandan plan to 
cut the Rutshuru road.  Sow called Rawat to join the meeting, and 
Rawat said that he had merely noted to Etumba that, from a military 
standpoint, he could well imagine that CNDP would wish to cut the 
road and thereby join its eastern and western sectors now truncated 
by that road.  However, Rawat said that (1) it was the North Kivu 
brigade's assessment that CNDP did not have the necessary military 
resources to be able to accomplish that goal, (2) in any case, MONUC 
stood with FARDC all along that road and had made it clear to CNDP 
that it would defend the road, and (3) it had absolutely no proof 
that any Rwandan battalions had crossed into DRC.  Ladjouzi 
suggested that if DRC had proof of such allegations, which had 
repeatedly been made in the past and never backed up with believable 
evidence, it would be appropriate for DRC to submit it to the 
Security Council, as it involve a grave international violation by 
Rwanda.  Col James Cunliffe, deputy Eastern commander, noted that 
MONUC had an observation post well within CNDP territory near 
Bunagana and that it would have been "inconceivable" for two Rwandan 
battalions to enter unobserved. 
 
14.  (SBU) Rawat said that when FARDC withdrew from Ntamugenga, as 
he hoped it would do at once, he would move a mobile base to that 
village, as had already occurred at Mutobo.  He said that it was his 
understanding that the firing the previous evening had occurred at 
the CNDP-controlled height (called Himdi) above Rugari, and he was 
not aware that any FARDC positions had been taken by CNDP either 
there or at Kanombe.  Ladjouzi asked, if the firing had taken place 
within a CNDP area, who had attacked whom? 
 
15.  (SBU) On the issue of the North Kivu Brigade moving its center 
of focus in the Rutshuru corridor off the road into the buffer zone, 
Cunliffe observed that the brigade's concept had all along not been 
a static buffer zone but a capability to deploy quickly well inside 
the buffer zone and inside CNDP territory as necessary.  Rawat 
emphasized the importance of quick movement along the road itself, 
as well as the necessity of also keeping an eye on CNDP's actions to 
the west of the road.  Etumba said FARDC only saw a threat from the 
east, where CNDP was supported by and had room for fallback into 
Rwanda. 
 
16.  (SBU) Delphin, visibly angry, issued a blunt warning:  if the 
CNDP attacked again later in the day, "it will be very bad tomorrow 
- it will be too much for us - it will be uncontrollable.  We will 
have to react in full.  It could be war tomorrow if MONUC does not 
respond now." 
 
17.  (SBU) Rawat said that, in fact, the North Kivu brigade had been 
trying to bring in reinforcements, e.g., by bringing up two BMPs to 
Rugari.   However, civilians were blocking the entrance to Rugari, 
as they had been demonstrating against MONUC elsewhere in the area. 
Etumba agreed that the populace seemed increasingly to have turned 
against MONUC.  Ladjouzi observed that the population was evidently 
being manipulated.  Etumba said, "We will try - it is our 
responsibility - to calm them down and to explain that it is not 
MONUC's mission to fight in our place." 
 
18.  (SBU) Sow reviewed for Etumba the nine actions he had discussed 
the previous day with Rawat, noting that if CNDP were now holding 
any positions at Kanombe or elsewhere that they had not held prior 
to August 28, it, like FARDC, would need to withdraw at once. 
 
GARVELINK