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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1428, POST-2011 SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE COULD LEAVE KHARTOUM IDP'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1428 2008-09-21 14:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7764
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1428/01 2651426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211426Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1942
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001428 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, PRM 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV EAID KIRF KPKO SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  POST-2011 SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE COULD LEAVE KHARTOUM IDP'S 
VULNERABLE TO VIOLENCE 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Little attention is being paid to the mechanics of 
an initially non-violent break-up if, as widely expected, Southern 
Sudan votes for independence in the 2011 referendum.  Several IDP 
experts have raised the possibility that Northern anger towards 
Southerners could be directed at the large - and vulnerable - 
community of Southern IDPs resident in the Khartoum area.  Such a 
reaction would probably set off a round of retaliatory violence in 
the South against the large Northern trader community there.  Our 
contacts cite the unhappy examples of the violence that accompanied 
Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, the India/Pakistan partition, 
and the violence directed against Northern traders in Juba when 
Southern Sudanese leader (and Sudan First Vice President) John 
Garang was killed in a 2005 helicopter crash, to warn that the 
country could degenerate into violence as a result of the 
referendum.  However, this will depend on the way Northern and 
Southern political leaders handle the referendum and possible 
secession.  Some in the North, even in the NCP, say they would be 
happy to see the South secede.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) In considering the situation of the Southern IDP population 
in the Khartoum area, Poloff spoke with Mission IDP Specialist, 
Deacon Kamal Said Samaan, the Khartoum Catholic archdiocese's IDP 
expert (and national secretary of the Sudanese St Vincent De Paul 
Society, an international Catholic NGO); and a collection of IDP 
community leaders, at a meeting in Khartoum facilitated by CARE. 
 
PICTURE OF KHARTOUM'S IDP COMMUNITY 
----------------------------------- 
3.  (U) These experts agreed that, currently, there is no clear 
statistical picture of the remaining IDP community in the Khartoum 
area, because no studies have been carried out lately.  Many people 
have gone back  to the south as "voluntary returnees" (at their own 
expense) since studies were last done.  However, these returns have 
not been tracked.  There is a steady stream of people moving South, 
but many then return to Khartoum because of the capital's better 
economic opportunities, and the much poorer infrastructure, health 
conditions, and educational opportunities for their children in the 
South. Non-Muslim Southern Sudanese are now found in every Northern 
town up to the Egyptian border. Additionally, there is a stream of 
Southerners who are not classified as IDPs, but rather move north as 
economic migrants, or due to inter-tribal tensions in the South. 
Also, the recent violence in Abyei sent a new wave of IDPs to 
Khartoum, although some of these have started to return. 
 
4.  (U) The flow of IDPs to Khartoum dates back to about 1985, with 
the first cycle of drought, especially from Kordofan and Darfur.  A 
second wave began in the 1990s, mostly as a result of the war in 
Southern Sudan.  At its peak, around 2003, there were some two 
million IDPs in the Khartoum area, of some four million nationwide. 
Only a small number of the estimated 2.5 million displaced by the 
Darfur conflict that began in 2004, most of whom remained in camps 
there, came to Khartoum.  The United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) estimates that some 2.1 million IDPs have returned 
nationwide, as a result of organized or voluntary returns.  Some 
30-35 percent of that total returned to the Three Areas (Abyei, Nuba 
Mountains, Blue Nile), and the rest to the South.  Our contacts 
estimated that some two million IDPs may remain in the Khartoum 
area, many of them as "squatters," who do not have legal rights to 
the land upon which they reside. 
 
5.  (U) Four IDP camps are situated in the Khartoum area - two in 
Omdurman (across the Nile River from the capital of Khartoum) and 
two on the Khartoum side of the river, but further out in the 
countryside.  The two camps in Omdurman have largely been absorbed 
by the growth of that city, and its residents have to various 
degrees been integrated into the local economy, to the extent that 
some resent being referred to as "IDPs."  People familiar with the 
IDP camps say the camps are notably less crowded than in the past as 
a result of returns; however, it is difficult to quantify the 
remaining IDP population. 
 
INTENTIONS OF KHARTOUM'S IDPS 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (U) The IOM (International Organization for Migration) carried 
out an "intention survey" of Sudan's IDPs in 2006.  That study 
revealed that some 60% of interviewees eventually wanted to return 
to the South or to the Three Areas; about 11% were undecided; with 
the remaining quarter indicating they wanted to be integrated where 
they were.  The IDPs that remain in Khartoum will continue to face a 
number of challenges that require longer-term development approaches 
instead of emergency relief activities.  The Sudanese government 
continues to limit access to the IDP camps and closely controls the 
kinds of assistance provided to these areas.  (Note:  In August, 
USAID was denied camp permits to assess flood damage in IDP areas 
 
KHARTOUM 00001428  002 OF 003 
 
 
and informed that donors have to apply for permits to camps through 
implementing partners.  End Note.) 
 
7.  (U) At a meeting with IDP community leaders in Khartoum on 
September 7, a woman from Eastern Equatoria  said members of her 
community are "tired of Khartoum, and they want to go back."  Most 
of the community registered for voluntary return in 2005, but since 
then, she added, "the IOM hasn't helped.  We are very frustrated. 
Many people are trying to raise money to return on their own." 
Several of the other leaders seconded those sentiments, expressing 
frustration that the expected assistance from IOM has not 
materialized.  (Note:  In FY 2007 and FY 2008, USAID funded the 
organized return program through IOM.  The organized return program 
is geared to assist the most vulnerable IDPs to return home, 
particularly to remote areas.  IOM prioritizes organized return 
routes based on a number of criteria, including safety of the return 
destination, number of registered families, and route security. 
While it is not uncommon to hear complaints about unmet expectations 
for assistance, IOM is providing a critical service through its 
organized return operation and helping many people return to 
Southern Sudan and the Three Areas.  End Note.) 
 
PROSPECT OF VIOLENCE IN 2011? 
----------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) When asked what they expected might happen in 2011 , should 
the South vote for independence, none of the IDP leaders raised the 
possibility of violence.  Several said that as Sudanese, they have 
the right to live wherever they want to in Sudan, and they expected 
that situation to continue even past 2011, regardless of the vote. 
 
9.  (U) However, both of the two IDP experts agreed that an outbreak 
of hostility and violence was a distinct possibility.  The Mission's 
IDP expert said he hoped political leaders from both sides would 
show wisdom and restraint in the future, but the example of Eritrean 
independence from Ethiopia after the UN-supervised referendum in 
1993 led him to believe there was a danger of violence.   In a 
recent meeting with econoff, the World Bank Country Manager, a 
Pakistani national, compared the failure to plan for a post-2011 
breakup to the similar failure to plan adequately for the partition 
of India and Pakistan in 1947 and said it was likely to lead to 
similar, horrific results. 
 
10.  (SBU) Deacon Kamal Samaan (protect) of the Catholic diocese of 
Khartoum was much blunter in saying that he believed an outbreak of 
violence against the Southern IDP community was quite probable.  He 
stressed that many Northerners - and the deacon being a Northern 
Arab Christian - harbor great hostility for Southerners, basically 
still thinking of them as "slaves" and "infidels," he said.  He 
stated flatly that "Sudan will never accept secession" of the South; 
renewed warfare was one possibility, as well as inter-communal 
violence, he said. 
 
11.  (U) Samaan said that if the infrastructure improves in the 
South in the run-up to the 2011 referendum, that most Southerners 
would return.  However, he added that because of widespread 
corruption and inter-tribal tensions in the South, he did not expect 
the Southern infrastructure to improve to any appreciable degree 
before 2011.  Samaan also emphasized that Sudan's "islamization" 
campaign remains in full force, despite the North's commitment in 
the CPA to protect the rights of non-Muslims in Khartoum: children 
have to study Islam in public schools; Christians are prevented from 
building new churches in the North; many Southern IDP women are in 
prison for brewing alcohol.  He noted his office had recently been 
successful in getting the death sentence commuted for a Southern 
Christian woman convicted of adultery. Islamic intolerance will only 
increase if the regime will no longer need to pay lip service to the 
SPLM and CPA after 2011. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12. (SBU) The parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and 
their international partners are only beginning to consider the 
implications of the likelihood that the South will vote for 
separation in the referendum in 2011.  Under prodding from some 
members of the international community, there is minimal attention 
to the possibility of working out a post-2011 oil revenue sharing 
agreement.  However, numerous other questions - the status and 
security of Southerners living in the north and Northerners in the 
south not the least of them - remain to be resolved in the rapidly 
diminishing time remaining.  Encouraging the two sides to think 
about these issues now will not only help avert political violence 
in 2011 if the South does choose independence, but  also may serve 
to make the referendum itself less threatening as it approaches. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001428  003 OF 003 
 
 
Unfortunately, as always in Sudan, there are simply too many 
simultaneous crises that require constant tending and negotiation, 
and prevent Sudan's leaders from planning ahead on other difficult 
but critical long-term issues.  While many in Sudan believe that 
secession is inevitable and many in the North tell us they would 
even welcome it, much will depend on the political environment in 
2011 and how Sudan's leaders plan for and respond to these 
challenges. 
 
FERNANDEZ