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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1346, AEC PLENARY SESSION OF SEPTEMBER 2, 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1346 2008-09-04 05:48 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4894
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1346/01 2480548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040548Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1808
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001346 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: AEC PLENARY SESSION OF SEPTEMBER 2, 2008 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  The 35th plenary session of the Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission (AEC) was held at AEC headquarters in Khartoum 
on September 2, 2008.  Most of the session was devoted to lengthy 
reports on the current situation in South Kordofan, and preparations 
for national elections in 2009.  The UNMIS head of the Section IV 
office in Kadugli, Mr. Karen Tchalian, said he was "cautiously 
optimistic" that demobilization of SPLM units and reintegration of 
SPLM-controlled areas in the Nuba Mountains was making reasonably 
good progress after a long delay.  He expressed concern at the 
availability of inflammatory misinformation on various internet 
sites about tens of thousands of armed men massed in the area, and 
criticized a recent Small Arms Survey report on the situation there. 
 The UNMIS Chief Electoral Affairs Officer in Khartoum, Ray Kennedy, 
reported on the daunting challenges Sudan faces in attempting to 
hold national elections in 2009, according to the schedule enshrined 
in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  Kennedy refused to be 
drawn into stating as much, but strongly implied that the two sides 
may have no other choice but to postpone the elections from July, 
2009 to December of the same year.  END SUMMARY 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (U) AEC Chairman Sir Derek Plumbly opened the monthly plenary 
session with several administrative issues.  He said the Government 
of Switzerland has offered the services of a qualified individual to 
head up the AEC's office in the Southern Sudan capital of Juba. 
(NOTE:  These offices are funded by the USG.  End note.)  This 
individual should be in place within one month.  He urged the AEC's 
four working groups to continue tackling the various recommendations 
in the AEC's recent Mid-Term Evaluation, suggesting that they aim 
for monthly meetings.  However, he acknowledged that even that 
schedule can be difficult to meet due to the limited availability of 
the two sides. 
 
ELECTIONS 
--------- 
 
3.  (U) UNMIS Electoral Affairs Officer Kennedy presented a lengthy 
briefing on the status of preparations for national elections, under 
the auspices of the CPA.  The CPA says that elections should be held 
by July 9, 2009, but also gives the two parties the opportunity to 
review the feasibility of that timeline and agree on a later date. 
He stated that his office looks forward with great anticipation to 
the appointment of the nine members of the National Electoral 
Commission (NEC).  His GNU contacts have indicated that the National 
Assembly (legislature) will not be called into special session to 
ratify the members of the Commission once the Presidency announces 
the nominations.  Instead, the Assembly will wait until their next 
regular session which begins in October, following the month of 
Ramadan. [Note:  US Embassy poloffs, on the other hand, have been 
informed by various NCP parliamentarians that the President will 
call an extraordinary session of Parliament to review the nine NEC 
candidates if the candidate list is released by the Presidency 
before 13 October.  End note.] 
 
REVIEW OF FEASIBILITY OF ELECTION DATE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Kennedy noted that under terms of the CPA, the NCP and SPLM 
are afforded the opportunity to formally evaluate the feasibility of 
election dates.  That review should have taken place last January. 
He said he hopes the two sides will undertake this review soon. 
Kennedy implied that, due to the immense challenges in preparing for 
elections, and in view of how little has been accomplished to date, 
the two sides may have to postpone the elections until December of 
2009.  He seemed to imply that even the December date may prove too 
ambitious.  The CPA lists the various factors (including 
resettlement, rehabilitation, etc) that can be taken into account in 
setting the election date.  UNMIS reviewed the various factors, and 
concluded that due to logistical challenges and the lack of enough 
dry season time before July 9, 2009, there is more than enough 
justification to postpone the elections until December 2009. 
 
TASKS FACING THE NEW NEC 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (U) Once nominated and ratified, the NEC will face various tasks 
to get up and running, Kennedy said, beginning with setting up their 
offices and bureaucracies in Khartoum, Juba and the various state 
capitals.  They will have to arrange for training for their new 
staffs, and then establish procedures and regulations.  The NEC will 
face an array of policy decisions, including determination of the 
accreditation requirements for national and international observers, 
and determining how IDPs will be dealt with in the elections.  The 
 
KHARTOUM 00001346  002 OF 003 
 
 
Commission will have to draft key voter education messages; it will 
face a tight timeline on procurement of items for voter registration 
and for the election itself.  For example, it will have to determine 
whether photo identification will be required for voter 
registration, and then will have to procure the necessary materials 
to produce the identification cards. 
 
6.  (U) Two of the most time-consuming processes that lie ahead on 
the road to elections are voter registration, and determination of 
boundaries of the many single member districts.  The NEC will have 
to determine boundaries for 270 single member districts for the 
National Assembly, 100-150 seats for the Southern Sudan Legislative 
Assembly, and approximately 750 districts for the various state 
assemblies.  Based on UNMIS experience in other countries, such as 
Liberia, drawing constituency boundaries will take from three to six 
months.  Then the NEC should allow time for public hearings and 
comment.  Determining single member districts containing 
approximately the same number of voters in turn must await results 
of the recent national census; Kennedy said latest indications are 
that the census results may not be available until January 2009. 
Following the initial determination of constituency boundaries, the 
country's political parties will need about one month to select 
their slates of candidates. 
 
7.  (U) The Commission will also require sufficient time to review 
the estimated 1300 various "ballot styles" that will need to be 
produced for the elections.  This review must be completed before 
the ballots are sent to the printer.  One month will be required to 
move the ballots from the warehouse to the country's many voting 
centers. 
 
ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (U) The UK Ambassador inquired about the various other 
legislative reforms stipulated by the CPA to create a suitable 
political context for free and fair national elections, such as a 
new Media Law, Security Act, etc.  Kennedy merely observed that if 
the election date is postponed until December 2009, the National 
Assembly would have time to hold a Spring 2009 session to pass the 
required legislation.  The SPLM representative asked directly 
whether UNMIS deems the current target election date, July 9, 2009, 
to be feasible.  Kennedy replied that his office has been warning 
for some time now that to achieve the July 9 date, "the NEC would 
have had to be in place for some time now." 
 
SOUTH KORDOFAN 
-------------- 
 
9.  (U) The AEC next heard a detailed report from the UNMIS Office 
Head for Sector IV (stationed in Kadugli), Mr. Karen Tchalian.  The 
official pronounced himself "cautiously optimistic" that 
developments were tending in the right direction.  Three years into 
the CPA, the redeployment and demobilization of SPLM armed units in 
South Kordofan and the re-integration of the SPLM "closed areas" 
into the State was long overdue, he said.  He reviewed the progress 
to date of naming SPLM candidates to the State's civil service corps 
(some 4,000 have been identified).  The process of GOS police taking 
over previously SPLA police stations was "going well, with no 
reports of any unpleasantness," he said.  Tchalian said a big 
challenge was avoiding a security vacuum in the closed areas.  The 
JIUs, for all their faults, are trying to fill the vacuum in the 
areas vacated by the SPLM police, he said. He added that much 
remains to be done, specifically citing the challenge of integrating 
the two judicial and educational systems. 
 
10.  (U) Tchalian addressed the issue of "spoilers," or individuals 
or political formations trying to take advantage of the changing 
political and security situation in the State.  He specifically 
rebutted the most recent Small Arms Survey report (No. 12), titled 
"The Drift Back to War."  Tchalian said that while SAS analysis "is 
usually quite good," this particular report is "a wealth of 
misinformation" and "highly irresponsible."  (Note:  The SAS report 
is quite critical of UNMIS performance in South Kordofan.  End 
note.)  He noted the challenge posed by various web sites reporting 
such misinformation as up to 40,000 irregular armed forces "prancing 
around Kadugli," as he put it.  He said he could guarantee that such 
reports are not true, but they are "unhelpful, irresponsible, and 
quite dangerous." 
 
IMPORTANCE OF NUBA MOUNTAINS TO THE CPA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (U) Concluding his briefing, Tchalian stressed the importance 
of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains region for the success of the CPA. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001346  003 OF 003 
 
 
The Abyei problem is fairly simple in comparison.  In contrast, "the 
Nuba Mountains (region) is the linchpin of the CPA - if we succeed 
there, the CPA will succeed," he said.  "The reintegration of South 
Kordofan is the only way to establish peace in the Nuba Mountains." 
US DCM Asquino stated that the USG wants to encourage continued 
integration of the police, public health services, judicial system 
and teacher corps in Southern Kordofan.  Chairman Plumbly agreed, 
asking that the international community consider "how they can 
support this (integration) process" in South Kordofan. 
 
12.  (U) Plumbly brought the meeting to a close, saying that the 
next AEC plenary session would be on or about Tuesday, October 7, 
2008. 
 
13.  (U) COMMENT:  The September 2 session was particularly valuable 
for the briefings on preparations for the 2009 national elections, 
and the state of play in South Kordofan.  The AEC was left with the 
impression that a long, complicated and time-consuming process 
remains ahead before elections will be held, and that, realistically 
speaking, the two parties will have little choice but to agree on 
delaying the election date until at least December 2009, after the 
end of the 2009 rainy season.  The two CPA partners were put on 
notice of the urgency of their task, and that the international 
community is watching and is concerned.  The AEC international 
partners, and the donor community generally, stand ready to help, 
but little can be done until Sudan finally establishes a National 
Electoral Commission.   Free and fair elections also cannot take 
place without radically different National Security and Press Laws, 
both of which have yet to be taken up by the legislature. Similarly, 
much remains to be done in process of reintegration of the state of 
South Kordofan before the area can be declared one of the CPA's 
success stories.  Emboffs plan a visit to that region the week of 
September 14, and will report their observations. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ