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Viewing cable 08HILLAH80, BABIL'S BUDGET EXECUTION RATE HIGH BUT NEEDS IMPROVED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HILLAH80 2008-09-19 14:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED REO Hillah
VZCZCXRO6950
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0080/01 2631437
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 191437Z SEP 08
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0947
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 1179
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL'S BUDGET EXECUTION RATE HIGH BUT NEEDS IMPROVED 
ALLOCATION FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 
HILLAH 00000080  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.      (U) Summary:  Budget execution rates for Babil Province 
are among the highest in Iraq, but is not likely to 
significantly improve absent central government reform of the 
budget process that allows earlier and more predictable release 
of funding during the fiscal year.  Pressure to increase the 
rate of spending is not likely to produce results as commitments 
are already running ahead of the availability of funds. 
Provincial budget formulation could be strengthened and project 
selection systematized.  The PRT is exploring a closer 
partnership to build capacity in this area.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
2.      (U) Since the implementation of the Accelerated 
Reconstruction and Development Program (ARDP) fund in 2006, 
capital investment budget execution rates for Babil Province 
have consistently been among the highest in Iraq and continue to 
improve, especially in relation to the investment allocations 
actually released by the Ministry of Planning and Development 
Cooperation (MOPDC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
received by the Province. 
 
 
 
3.      (U) Provincial officials have been diligent in their 
efforts to commit and expend ARDP funds, as well as to request 
replenishments in a timely manner.  For 2006, Babil Province 
expended 87% of the allocations received, improving to 103% for 
2007 (carry-over funds allowed the Province to expend more than 
it received in 2007).  As of 31 July 2008, this measure stands 
at 96%.   The province has consistently and repeatedly submitted 
project cards and release applications, but without apparent 
effect on the timing of replenishments - often they get no 
response at all from Baghdad. 
 
 
 
4.      (U) In relation to commitments (the ratio of the value 
of executed contracts to total budgeted allocations), Babil 
Province's record for  2006 and 2007 is 100%.  The mid-year 2008 
rate is already at 80%. 
 
 
 
5.      (U) Babil's success in relation to budget execution is 
largely attributable to:  effective procurement and project 
management by its Provincial Reconstruction and Development 
Committee (PRDC); the positive relationship the PRDC has with 
MOF officials at the provincial level; and the financial and 
construction capacity of area contractors.  The PRDC and the 
Project Management Unit (PMU) in the Governor's Office have 
efficiently pursued the solicitation and execution of contracts, 
while the PRDC's cooperative relationship with MOF officials has 
eliminated many potential obstacles in a complex budgetary 
process.  Area contractors have also been willing and 
financially able to initiate project construction without 
advances or mobilization payments and to continue project 
construction even when progress payments have been slow or 
delayed. 
 
 
 
6.      (U) The most significant remaining barrier to improving 
budget execution rates is the time it takes MOF and MOPDC to 
release the capital investment funds to the Province.  As of 
mid-year 2008, Babil Province had received only 20% of its total 
2008 allocation. 
 
 
 
7.      (U) Since the inception of the ARDP fund, provincial 
allocations have consistently been released by the MOPDC and MOF 
in a slow and unpredictable manner.  For example, during 2007, 
Babil Province received 10% of its total allocation in March, 
20% in June, 10% in August, and the final 60% on December 31 
(the last day of the fiscal year).  Thus far in 2008, an initial 
20% was received in April, with a second tranche of  40% 
released in August.  As of the date of this cable, Provincial 
officials have no indication as to when they will receive the 
remaining 40% of their 2008 allocation or whether it will be 
received in one or more additional releases before the end of 
the year. 
 
 
 
8.      (U)  Under pressure on budget execution (not least by 
the PRT), Babil Province has entered into contracts and 
committed funds prior to those funds actually being released by 
the MOPDC and MOF.  Ironically, the USG does not normally allow 
its own agencies to commit funds before they are appropriated 
and allotted. 
 
 
HILLAH 00000080  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
 
9.      (U)  ARDP Funds Received and Committed, 2008 
 
a.      March:                  Received = 0% 
  Committed = 47% 
 
b.      April:                     Received = 20% 
   Committed = 61% 
 
c.      May                       Received = 20% 
  Committed = 68% 
 
d.      June:                     Received = 20% 
  Committed = 78% 
 
e.      July:                      Received = 20% 
    Committed = 80% 
 
f.        August:                 Received = 60% 
  Committed = 89% 
 
 
 
10. (U)This slow and jerky pace also applies to the 2008 
supplemental budget.  In March-April 2008, the MOF informed 
Babil Province it would receive between 250 and 300 BID in 
supplemental allocations by mid-year,and the Province proceeded 
with its budgetary planning on this basis.  As of September 15, 
no funds had been released and no new date had been given for 
when they might be. 
 
 
 
11. (U) Under these circumstances, Babil Province has run into a 
wall in its efforts to improve its budget execution. 
Implementation of a system of predictable quarterly releases, 
taking into consideration the liquidity needs of the GOI, as 
well as the budgetary performance of each province, is the 
single most important action that could be taken to improve 
provincial delivery of the goods and services paid for by ARDP. 
Decentralization of the procurement process by the GOI is 
another action that could significantly improve government 
expenditure of ARDP. 
 
 
 
12. (U) In addition to these two critical pieces, the PRT and 
Provincial Council have identified several other areas in the 
budget cycle that could use some work.  Budget formulation is 
weak, project selection is haphazard, and the burden of ARDP is 
dramatically increased by the proliferation of smaller projects, 
Existing capacity-building efforts to improve the ability of 
provincial budgetary staff to perform the required technical and 
economic project feasibility studies should result in 
improvement of the procurement process, and reduce the time and 
effort involved.  The PRT plans to explore the feasibility of 
assigning one of its staff with budget expertise into provincial 
budget office to help improve performance in this area.  Better 
feasibility studies would result in more detailed tenders and 
specifications, reducing the need for project scope 
modifications and related conflicts with contractors. If 
combined with a more rational allocation of funds from the GOI, 
these actions would improve the quality of budget execution. 
 
 
 
13. (U) The continued focus on budget execution rates, combined 
with steadily increasing funding levels, is stretching 
provincial resources to the limit, and will eventually have an 
adverse impact on the whole process, including budget execution. 
 The multiplying projects and tenders exceed the implementation 
capacity of provincial procurement and project management staff, 
as well as the absorptive capacity of the construction industry. 
 In short, a situation is being created where provincial 
officials are attempting to contract and execute too many 
projects at any one time; resulting in more projects of 
substandard quality and financial and monitoring vulnerability. 
The slow and unpredictable releases increase the pressure, 
since the bulk of the funds arrive during the last half, if not 
at the end, of the year.  Budget execution is affected by 
various factors, some indirectly related to the budget process, 
and these will also need to be addressed if there is to be 
improvement in the capacity of the Babil authorities to 
effectively deliver essential services and infrastructure. 
CHIAVENTONE