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Viewing cable 08HANOI1049, DAS MARCIEL AND VIETNAM'S POLICY PLANNING DG DISCUSS KIM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HANOI1049 2008-09-15 00:58 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO2527
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1049/01 2590058
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 150058Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8446
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH PRIORITY 5106
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 001049 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS BLACKSHAW, S/P GREEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VM
 
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL AND VIETNAM'S POLICY PLANNING DG DISCUSS KIM 
JONG-IL, BURMA, ASEAN, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
HANOI 00001049  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a wide-ranging discussion with visiting EAP 
DAS Scot Marciel, MFA Director General for Policy Planning Bui Thanh 
Son offered Vietnam's perspectives on engagement with Burma and the 
difficulties Vietnam faces in coordinating a more robust ASEAN 
position on territorial issues in the South China Sea.  DAS Marciel 
emphasized the importance of continued improvements in religious 
freedom and urged Vietnam to have the confidence to allow its 
citizens to voice disparate political views.  DG Son acknowledged 
the need for ASEAN's nascent human rights dialogue to be credible, 
and said that Vietnam would be prepared to take an active role.  DG 
Son demurred on the question of possible S/P talks, noting that his 
office was already scheduled to meet with the EU on October 31.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
BURMA 
----- 
 
2.  (SBU) DG Son stated that Vietnam's Burma policy has two 
principle objectives: to benefit the people of Burma, and to 
strengthen ASEAN as a whole.  To this end, Vietnam has encouraged 
Burma to implement its roadmap to democracy and to open a dialogue 
with Aung San Suu Kyi.  Son added that Vietnam is in a unique 
position to share with Burma its experience in emerging from 
isolation.  DAS Marciel agreed that Burma's leaders would likely 
listen to messages from Hanoi more readily than from Washington, but 
suggested that Burma's military rulers were much more cut off from 
society than Vietnam's were, even twenty years ago.  The regime's 
insistence that its constitutional referendum proceed even as bodies 
were floating in the Irrawaddy Delta was perhaps the starkest 
example of this.  DAS Marciel cautioned that the junta's roadmap is 
fundamentally flawed because it offers no opportunity for Burma's 
people to meaningfully participate.  DAS Marciel assured DG Son that 
the United States is not pursuing regime change in Burma, but wanted 
to see a broadening of the political process.  The problem is that 
the Burmese regime shows absolutely no willingness to make even the 
slightest opening.  DAS Marciel emphasized that without progress, 
Burma will continue to preclude a U.S.-ASEAN summit.  He expressed 
hope that Vietnam would continue to urge Burmese authorities to 
implement reforms, open up to the world and begin a dialogue with 
their people. 
 
ASEAN AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) DG Son voiced frustration over China's attempts to 
intimidate international companies that might want to work in 
Vietnam's continental-shelf waters, but could see few options for 
Vietnam.  DG Son agreed that in principle it was in Vietnam's 
interest to promote a more forceful, coordinated ASEAN position on 
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.  The problem, he 
explained, was that it was extremely difficult to get ASEAN members 
to agree on anything more than a simple reaffirmation of the status 
quo.  DAS Marciel stated that while it takes no position on the 
legal issues surrounding the competing territorial claims, the USG 
is concerned about pressure on its companies. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) DAS Marciel emphasized that as ASEAN strives to figure out 
how best to approach human rights, any institution that it creates 
to deal with the issue must be seen as credible.  DG Son agreed, 
adding that unlike ten years ago, Vietnam was now in a much more 
confident position and could play an active role within ASEAN on 
human rights. 
 
5.  (SBU) DAS Marciel encouraged Vietnam to be similarly confident 
in allowing its own citizens to voice a variety of political 
opinions, noting that while there had been progress in religious 
freedom, there had not been similar advances in political rights and 
freedom of speech.  He emphasized that in order to be able to do 
their jobs, U.S. diplomats must be able to meet a wide range of 
people throughout society who hold different views. 
 
NON-ANSWER ON POLICY PLANNING TALKS 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) DG Son expressed appreciation for S/P Director Gordon's 
interest in holding policy planning talks, but declined to commit. 
Son noted that his department was already scheduled to hold talks 
with EU counterparts on the proposed date (October 31) and again 
suggested that many of the topics under consideration could be 
covered in A/S Kimmitt's political-military talks October 6.  DAS 
Marciel pointed out that the United States does not hold policy 
planning talks with many countries and was interested in learning 
more about Vietnam's strategic view, particularly on regional 
affairs.  He emphasized that policy planning talks are meant to be 
 
HANOI 00001049  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
longer-term and broader in perspective than the pol-mil discussions, 
which are more narrowly focused.