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Viewing cable 08DILI239, RECENT U.S. SUPPORT FOR REFORMING TIMOR-LESTE'S SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DILI239 2008-09-23 09:04 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO9183
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHHM
DE RUEHDT #0239/01 2670904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230904Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4093
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1206
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0887
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1062
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0967
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3565
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000239 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DOD/OSD FOR DASD CLAD; STATE FOR EAP DAS MARCIEL; PACOM FOR 
ADMIRAL KEATING; PACFLT COMMANDER WILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PMIL MARR TT
SUBJECT: RECENT U.S. SUPPORT FOR REFORMING TIMOR-LESTE'S  SECURITY 
SECTOR 
 
DILI 00000239  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Summary 
----------- 
 
1.  The Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) 
convened a workshop September 8-12 to assist the development of 
Timor-Leste's first national security policy.  The workshop 
brought to Hawaii seventeen Timorese leaders and stakeholders, 
including the vice prime minister and parliamentarians from 
across the political spectrum, as well as observers from key 
partners such as the UN, Australia, Indonesia, and Portugal. 
Utilizing an innovative method of facilitation, the APCSS 
enabled the Timorese to carefully assess their national 
interests, threats and possible responses.  The discussions were 
remarkably free of contention or dispute, and marked by serious, 
sustained and constructive interventions by all participants. 
The Timorese left with a strengthened understanding of their 
national interests and challenges, an intent to move their 
discussions promptly to the national parliament for 
consideration, and with gratitude to the U.S. for organizing the 
conference.  The government will use the workshop's outcomes to 
finalize a national security policy that will provide direction 
to legal and institutional reform of Timor's police and 
military.  There remains great scope for future contributions by 
the U.S. to reform of Timor-Leste's security sector, including 
by the U.S. Pacific Command and APCSS.  Key focal points must be 
the much-needed strengthening and professionalization of the 
military and police, vital undertakings to the establishment of 
lasting stability in Timor-Leste.  End summary. 
 
Background 
--------------- 
 
2.  The security sector has been a major source of instability 
for Timor-Leste since its independence in 2002.  The military 
(F-FDTL) largely constitutes the remnants of the Timorese 
guerrilla force that mounted the armed resistance to the 24 year 
Indonesian occupation that ended in 1999; although enjoying 
substantial confidence and much local prestige (mixed with a 
good dose of fear as well), it has not been able yet to 
transform itself into a small, modern, professional, 
well-organized, well-disciplined force able to protect Timor's 
citizens and positively contribute to the nation's development. 
The police force (PNTL) is an astonishingly poorly resourced, 
badly structured, untrained, ill-led and under-respected 
institution, with correspondingly low morale and weak sense of 
duty.  The roles, missions and responsibilities of the two 
organizations are opaque and civilian control at best uncertain. 
 Institutional rivalries occasionally have found violent 
expression.  In 2006, during a major political crisis that left 
a tenth of the population homeless, the police and military fell 
into open warfare against each other in the streets of Dili. 
The two forces cooperated relatively well following the February 
11, 2008, shootings of the President and Prime Minister, but 
their joint operation was tarnished by a series of human rights 
violations and abuses of authority. 
 
3.  Especially since 2006, security sector reform has become a 
major focus of concern among Timor-Leste's international 
partners.  Support of reform is a key component of the UN 
mandate in Timor, and bilateral partners such as Australia, 
Portugal and New Zealand are making significant investments 
toward strengthening the two security institutions, as well the 
complementary justice sector.  The Timorese leadership also 
recognizes the importance of security sector reform, and upon 
coming to power in August 2007, the Gusmao government declared 
security sector reform to be one of its priorities.  That said, 
the government's actions since have been tentative. 
 
How can the U.S. Assist? 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  Given the critical importance of stability to Timor's 
economic and social development, and the necessity of reforming 
the security sector to achieving stability, Embassy Dili since 
mid-2007 has been exploring how best to enhance our support in 
favor of reform.  The U.S. Pacific Command, beginning with a 
visit by Admiral Timothy Keating to Dili in September 2007, also 
repeatedly has expressed to the Timorese authorities its 
commitment to assist. 
 
5.  One area of substantial weakness is the legal infrastructure 
governing the security sector.  As cited in a recent survey by 
 
DILI 00000239  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, major 
gaps include the absence of a national security policy; laws to 
provide a clear separation of missions and responsibilities for 
the police and military; a military judicial system; established 
criteria for recruitment, promotion and retirement; and 
regulations providing for effective discipline by military 
commanders over their troops.  The Gusmao government also 
recognizes these shortcomings and made strengthening the legal 
underpinnings of its security institutions a priority in its 
initial legislative policy program of September 2007.  The 
government said it would begin by drafting the country's first 
ever national security policy (NSP).  The NSP, once it 
articulated the country's national interests, the threats to 
those interests, and how best to counter those threats, would 
provide a guide to defining the roles and missions of the 
Timor's police and military, plus its customs, immigration and 
intelligence services.  Laws and regulations defining the 
functions and operations of these institutions would follow in 
sequence. 
 
Developing Timor's First National Security Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
6.  The secretary of state for security, Francisco Guterres, and 
his staff began work on a draft NSP earlier this year.  In May 
2008, during a meeting with U.S. Pacific Commander Keating, 
Timor's foreign minister asked for U.S. assistance in drafting 
the policy.  PACOM in turn requested the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS) to explore how best to provide support. 
 In extended consultations with both Guterres and Embassy Dili, 
the APCSS proposed convening a workshop for senior Timorese 
leadership and other key domestic and international stakeholders 
targeted at developing a national security policy.  The four day 
workshop took place at the APCSS in Honolulu September 9-12 and 
included members of the Timor-Leste government, including the 
drafter of the NSP; seven members of the national parliament 
representing most major parties, including the main opposition 
party; senior representatives of the military, police and 
immigration service; two Timorese civil society delegates; and 
President Ramos-Horta's national security advisor.  Vice Prime 
Minister Jose-Luis Guterres led the Timorese delegation. 
Ambassadors to Timor from Portugal, Australia, New Zealand and 
the U.S. attended as observers, as did the Indonesian charge 
d'affaires and senior representatives from the UN mission in 
Timor-Leste. 
 
7.  In designing the workshop, the APCSS deliberately chose not 
to simply analyze and edit Timor's draft NSP.  Instead, the 
center facilitated discussions by the Timorese in small groups, 
using key "framing questions" and technology that enabled 
real-time visual display and recording of the proceedings.  The 
process elicited in-depth consideration by the Timorese of their 
country's national interests and goals, the threats/challenges 
facing the realization of those objectives, and how best to 
respond to those challenges.  The delegates were further asked 
to reflect on how Timor's international partners can best 
support strengthening the country's national security and how 
best to improve coordination among the security institutions and 
the civilian leadership. 
 
Workshop Results 
---------------------- 
 
8.  The workshop resulted in an inventory of Timor's national 
interests, challenges and possible policy responses, extending 
beyond the security sector and indeed largely mirroring the 
country's development agenda.  It will be used by the government 
to refashion the draft NSP for submission to its council of 
ministers for approval.  The policy will then be submitted to 
the national parliament for review, either as a standalone 
policy statement, or incorporated into a planned national 
security law.  Once legislative action on the NSP is completed, 
the government has several other security sector related laws in 
the hopper, including an internal security law; a bill to 
improve the investigation of, and define the punishment for, 
human rights abuses by the security forces; and revisions to 
laws governing the police and military. 
 
9.  The Timorese participants clearly demonstrated their 
commitment to the workshop, as not a single delegate missed a 
single minute of the program.  Indeed, most came early every 
morning to caucus before the sessions began and a group 
 
DILI 00000239  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
deliberated until late in the evening one night.  Despite 
expectations of disagreement, the discussions remained 
constructive throughout, enabling a remarkable unity to emerge. 
Crediting the process employed by the APCSS with great success, 
one senior Timorese delegate told the ambassador that although 
he had spent twenty years working on national security concepts, 
never before had he seen his colleagues tackle these issues with 
such breadth and clarity.  Another noted that it had proved 
impossible to bring together key stakeholders in Dili to discuss 
the government's draft NSP.  By assembling them instead in 
Hawaii, including senior representatives from across the 
political spectrum, the workshop contributed to developing broad 
ownership of the NSP.  IN the workshop's final session, several 
delegates, applauded the generosity of the U.S. in hosting the 
workshop, and urged that the group reassemble in Dili to 
continue its work. 
 
10.  The conference was not without its shortcomings.  Embassy 
Dili, working with the President and Prime Minister, labored to 
ensure the selection of the best possible group of Timorese to 
participate in the workshop.  Despite our efforts, a couple of 
key stakeholders were not able to join, in one case due to a 
serious illness contacted on the eve of the meeting.  The 
outcome of the workshop, while enjoying full and broad support 
from the participants, suffers from a relative lack of 
prioritization (this was noted, in a positive sign, by several 
of the Timorese in the workshop's closing session).  And, there 
may have been an expectations mismatch among some participants, 
with one observer expressing disappointment that reform of the 
police and military had not been explicitly and more thoroughly 
tackled. 
 
Next Steps 
------------- 
 
11.  This latter observation points to possible next steps. 
First, Embassy Dili, working together especially with Australia, 
Portugal and the UN, whose representatives in Honolulu left as 
enthusiastic supporters of the process, will continue to 
facilitate the development of the NSP.  To begin, we will 
convene in Dili on September 25 a meeting of all the workshop 
participants to encourage both the viability of this group, and 
the completion and full ratification of the NSP.  Next, our 
focus must turn to exploring how best we can support the reform 
and professionalization of the military and police. 
 
12.  Embassy Dili believes the APCSS can again play a vital 
role.  The NSP workshop reaffirmed to the Timorese that the U.S. 
is a constructive and neutral partner in the field of security 
sector reform, able to bring together key domestic stakeholders 
and international partners to make progress on a highly 
sensitive national issue.  Both the foreign minister and 
secretary of state for security have suggested future U.S. 
organized workshops, with the latter suggesting either civilian 
control of the security institutions or integrated crisis 
management (which would feature the delineation of roles and 
responsibilities among the police and military) as possible 
future topics.  Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, the 
emphasis of any future facilitation by the U.S. should be the 
transformation of these institutions into effective protectors 
of the citizens of Timor-Leste, and contributors to regional 
stability, firmly under civilian control. 
 
13.  We will be eager to explore with PACOM and APCSS how best 
to focus their expertise, in concert with partners including 
Australia, Portugal and the UN, to realize security sector 
reform and the maintenance of peace and stability in 
Timor-Leste.  As part of a separate exercise initiated by the 
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, we welcome the dispatch in 
November 2008 to Timor of an assessment mission, possibly in 
conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard, to review Timor-Leste's 
maritime security capabilities and requirements.  We also would 
welcome a similar assessment of Timor's ground forces being 
considered by the Commander of U.S. Marine Forces in the 
Pacific.  Embassy Dili is also working with State/INL, the FBI 
and DEA to explore new programs aimed at strengthening Timor's 
police and justice sectors. 
 
14.  Embassy Dili wishes to extend sincere gratitude to U.S. 
Pacific Commander Admiral Keating and his staff for responding 
so quickly and constructively to Foreign Minister Da Costa's 
request for assistance in developing Timor's national security 
 
DILI 00000239  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
policy.  And we wish to especially thank Director E. P. Smith 
and his team at the APCSS for hosting the Timor-Leste NSP 
Development Workshop.  Their rapid deployment of an innovative 
facilitative mechanism will make a substantial and lasting 
contribution both to national security policymaking in Timor, 
and to our ability to be a constructive and influential partner 
to Timor-Leste, a struggling and still-vulnerable democracy. 
KLEMM