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Viewing cable 08COLOMBO821, SRI LANKA: IMF CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC POLICY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08COLOMBO821 2008-09-02 01:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO2755
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLM #0821/01 2460159
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020159Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8613
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2244
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1062
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8060
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6234
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2388
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 8665
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000821 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON KMCA CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: IMF CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
REF: A) COLOMBO 491 B) COLOMBO 450 C) COLOMBO 366 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  During a meeting with Econoffs, IMF officials 
visiting Sri Lanka for "Article IV" consultations privately 
expressed concerns about Sri Lanka's persistently high inflation, 
various fiscal problems, and external imbalances.  Taken together, 
these signs from the Sri Lankan economy are troubling and may have a 
negative impact on the country's traditionally high long- term 
growth rates.  The IMF team predicted that fiscal and monetary 
adjustments will be necessary to avoid a future economic crisis. 
However, based on the Central Bank's public announcements, the 
government would appear to be in no hurry to heed the IMF's advice. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
REIN IN HIGH INFLATION, FISCAL 
SPENDING AND EXTERNAL IMBALANCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On August 19 and 22, Econoffs met with a visiting IMF 
Article IV mission in Sri Lanka.  IMF officials visited Sri Lanka in 
late August to gather information for an annual report on the 
country's macroeconomic situation.  The final summary report will be 
shared with the GSL for comment prior to its release in early 
November 2008.  The IMF team noted at the outset that concerns about 
security in connection to the ongoing conflict between the 
government and the LTTE is one of the key risks for Sri Lanka's 
future growth potential.  They identified several vulnerabilities in 
the Sri Lankan economy, including persistently high inflation, 
fiscal weakness, and external imbalances.  Sri Lanka also remains 
exposed to the global economic slowdown and high oil prices. 
 
WATCH OUT FOR FISCAL FISSURES 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Overall, the IMF predicts Sri Lanka's economy will continue 
to grow and assessed that a recession is highly unlikely in the near 
future.  That said, the IMF team outlined several areas of concern 
in the macroeconomy.  They are worried about persistently high 
inflation - currently running over 26 percent according to official 
figures that likely understate inflation - and the prospect of a 
wage-price spiral.  Another major area of concern is the high fiscal 
deficit, largely driven by mounting debt service costs. 
 
4. (SBU) Public debt continues to remain high, around 86 percent of 
GDP, with a large amount of debt maturing in 2009.  The IMF team 
criticized recent GSL moves towards external short-term borrowing. 
In a bid to expand the domestic bond market to non-captive sources, 
the government has encouraged foreign investment in treasury 
bills/bonds, but this has shortened the maturity structure of debt 
and exposed Sri Lanka to external shocks (ref B). 
 
5. (SBU) In addition, the government's fiscal flexibility is further 
restrained due to a huge government wage/pension bill and defense 
expenditure.   According to the IMF, even though the GSL has done 
better than nearly all South Asian economies in passing on higher 
oil prices onto consumers and reducing subsidies, more determined 
fiscal consolidation and revenue generation will be essential for 
debt management.  However, in meetings with the IMF team, the GSL 
officials seem to think otherwise, stressing that necessary 
adjustments have already been taken and no further action is 
required. 
 
GUARD AGAINST A GROWING 
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT 
----------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) On the external economic front, the IMF team outlined 
several key challenges and voiced pessimism about sustained 
long-term growth.   The current account deficit is widening with the 
trade deficit reaching a massive $3 billion in the first half of 
2008 as compared to $1.6 billion in the first half of 2007.  The 
primary reason for the growing trade deficit is the high expenditure 
on imports such as oil, food, building materials and machinery. 
 
7. (SBU) While imports have increased by 36 percent this year, 
exports have grown only by 10 percent.  Over the same period, the 
oil bill has almost doubled, from $958 million to $1.8 billion.  On 
the export front, prospects for garments, Sri Lanka's largest export 
which accounts for 37 percent of industrial output and comprises 4 
percent of GDP, are weakening.  Tea and rubber exports have been the 
only saving grace, noted the IMF team, because of the global 
commodity price boom.  Although foreign remittances continue to be 
 
COLOMBO 00000821  002 OF 003 
 
 
strong at $1.4 billion in the first half of 2008, thanks to 
increasing numbers of Sri Lankans working overseas (ref A), the 
magnitude of the trade deficit implies a strain on the current 
account.  The extent of the trade deficit also raises concerns about 
Sri Lanka's foreign currency reserves: according to IMF estimates, 
official reserves amount only to approximately 2.5 months of 
imports. 
 
THINK TWICE ABOUT 
INFLATING THE RUPEE 
------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The IMF is concerned about the exchange rate peg to the 
U.S. dollar, noting that the Sri Lankan rupee (SLR) is over-valued. 
Despite high inflation and the growing current account deficit, the 
Central Bank has maintained a soft peg at approximately SLR 108 to 
one USD in 2008, keeping the SLR artificially inflated.  During 
2007, the rupee depreciated to about SLR 114:USD 1 before the 
government floated the first sovereign bond issue and increased 
short-term borrowing.  GSL moves to finance the current account 
deficit by attracting short-term capital inflows have helped the 
Central Bank maintain the peg thus far in 2008.  Moreover, Sri Lanka 
has also postponed currency adjustment by purchasing oil on credit 
terms from Iran.  The IMF team speculated that the state of the Sri 
Lankan economy may prevent the GSL from successfully maintaining the 
soft peg over the longer term. 
 
CENTRAL BANK REMAINS CONFIDENT 
DESPITE IMF CONCERNS 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Despite these concerns, IMF officials commented that none 
of these developments seem to worry the Central Bank.  Instead, the 
bank has been actively defending its exchange rate and external 
financing policies in recent months.  For example, on August 15, 
Central Bank officials claimed that the balance of payments is in 
surplus, partly due to higher foreign financial inflows.  In another 
announcement, the bank also asserted that interest rates on 
government bills had begun to ease due to foreign financial inflows. 
 
 
10. (SBU) The Central Bank has also stated the SLR would have 
appreciated more sharply due to financial inflows if not for its 
intervention in the market.  In early July, at an economic summit 
organized by the Ceylon Chamber of, the Central Bank Governor argued 
against currency depreciation.  He said the SLR decline had expanded 
the foreign debt stock and the time was ripe to change the exchange 
rate policy.  He warned the business sector not to expect a 
depreciating SLR as it seeks to remain competitive.   According to 
the IMF, both the government and the business sector are also 
bullish about an impending peace dividend or ceasefire between the 
government and LTTE which would allow Sri Lanka to defer difficult 
financial adjustments. 
 
11. (SBU) The IMF team told us that many of their GSL interlocutors 
assured them that government forces were well on the way to 
eliminating the LTTE and ending the conflict within the next several 
months.  GSL officials, it said, appeared to be banking on a "peace 
dividend" that would resolve the lion's share of whatever economic 
problems Sri Lanka may be facing currently. 
 
ROADMAP TO AVOID ECONOMIC CRISIS 
-------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) COMMENT:  While the Sri Lankan economy overall appears 
headed for continued growth, though at lower rates than in years 
past, the IMF review highlighted important areas of concern.  In the 
near-term, the IMF's concerns, which are also shared by a senior 
economist at the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, will have a limited 
impact on this year's growth figures.  Sri Lanka is not headed for a 
recession but medium-term economic prospects depend critically on 
the pace of fiscal consolidation, policy adjustments to reduce 
external risks, and peace between the government and LTTE.  The GSL 
and Central Bank appear to be ignoring alarm bells to reduce 
inflation and step up their efforts to tighten macroeconomic 
policies.  Thus far, Sri Lanka has been able to manage by relying on 
foreign commercial borrowings but for long-term, sustained growth, 
the GSL will have to improve economic fundamentals that encourage 
investment.  While an end to the conflict would likely result in 
some sort of peace dividend, the GSL's inability to produce a 
realistic proposal for a political solution means that there is 
little chance for real peace in Sri Lanka in the medium term.  We 
 
COLOMBO 00000821  003 OF 003 
 
 
share the concern of the IMF and other observers that a genuine 
improvement in Sri Lanka's economic fundamentals would come via 
policies that encourage investment, rather than simply by 
eliminating the Tamil Tigers as a conventional military force. 
 
BLAKE