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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1253, BRAZIL VIEWS ON BOLIVIA CRISIS, EXPULSION OF US

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA1253 2008-09-19 22:04 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO7321
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1253/01 2632204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 192204Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2479
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 7061
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 5802
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 4241
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 6584
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3947
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 7513
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2591
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0579
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 8466
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 6619
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 2760
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL BR BO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL VIEWS ON BOLIVIA CRISIS, EXPULSION OF US 
AMBASSADORS 
 
REF: A. STATE 99473 
     B. SANTIAGO 851 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, Reason 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
1. (C) PolCounselor delievered ref A demarche September 19 to 
Ambassador Marcel Biato, foreign policy advisor at the 
Brazilian presidency (Planalto).  Biato asked if the decision 
to expel the Bolivian and Venezuelan ambassadors to the U.S. 
was "considered" or "reciprocal."  PolCouns responded the 
decision was taken reluctantly, and intended both to be 
proportional and to show that expulsions of our Ambassadors 
were not taken lightly.  Biato commended the U.S. decision to 
avoid negative rhetoric and, over the course of the 
discussion, indicated that the GOB understands that both 
Bolivian President Morales and Venezuelan President Chavez 
are using the expulsion and broader complaints against the 
United States for their own political purposes.  He pointed 
to the fact that this week's UNASUL declaration (ref B) had 
avoided any anti-US rhetoric as an indication that there was 
little support for view the United States was to blame for 
the conflict.  Commenting on Lula's September 17 remark to 
the effect that Morales's expulsion of the U.S. ambassador 
was appropriate "if he had met with the opposition," Biato 
insisted that Lula was using "shorthand" and of course meant 
that such an expulsion would only be appropriate if the 
ambassador had become involved in internal politics.  Biato 
added that Brazilian officials are clear when they visit 
Bolivia that they will be meeting with Bolivian officials on 
both sides of the divide.  In accusing the U.S. ambassador, 
he said, Morales was simply looking for an excuse. 
 
2. (C) Biato said that UNASUL had been the unexpected winner 
from the Bolivia crisis, after what Brazil considered a 
successful outcome from the emergency meeting September 15 in 
Santiago.  He confirmed that President Lula had offered 
Morales assistance from the "Group of Friends" when they 
spoke the week of September 8.  However, after they had lined 
up Argentina and a reluctant Colombia, the Bolivians had done 
an about-face and rejected a mission.  This was why Lula had 
only agreed to go to the UNASUL meeting when Morales 
confirmed his attendance.  According to Biato, Brazil had 
rejected requests by Bolivian opposition leaders to be 
present at the UNASUL meeting.  In Brazil's view, it was 
essential for Morales to have an expression of full support 
for constitutional government, so as not to give Morales any 
excuse for not negotiating.  Lula had exercised "strategic 
patience" as Chavez took the floor first and spoke for an 
hour, steering the conversation away from anti-U.S. rhetoric 
and toward providing support for Morales.  Concerned that the 
meeting might either be seen as interference in Bolivia's 
internal affairs or provide an excuse for regional 
intervention, Lula had insisted that Morales be asked what 
support he needed.  Behind the scenes, Biato said, Brazil has 
pushed Morales to the negotiating table, and the arrival of a 
delegation from Brasilia in La Paz on September 19, as well 
as the presence of Brazilian embassy officials at the talks 
in Cochabamba, is intended to send a message of support for 
continued dialogue. 
 
Chilean Ambassador Praises Brazilian Performance at UNASUL 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
3. (C) Chilean Ambassador to Brazil Alvaro Diaz told poloff 
September 18 that the UNASUL emergency meeting in Santiago 
produced a very positive outcome because it committed the 
Morales government to negotiate with the opposition, the 
declaration did not mention the U.S., and Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez was not allowed to dominate to meeting. 
 He noted that Brazil,s non-interventionist stance had 
helped depressurize the situation and the USG also acted 
correctly by not inflaming the atmosphere.  Diaz also said 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe had played a very important 
role toward the success of the Santiago meeting. 
 
4. (C) Commenting on Brazilian non-interventionism, Diaz said 
Brazil,s current policy is in stark contrast to the 
interventionist policies of the Brazilian military 
dictatorship, and probably is a direct result of it.  Poloff 
noted that the USG encourages the GOB to assume greater 
 
BRASILIA 00001253  002 OF 002 
 
 
leadership responsibilities, but the GOB is reluctant to take 
the controversial stances that go with leadership.  Diaz 
replied that Brazil cannot assume leadership alone in the 
region, it must have partners, which would naturally be 
Argentina and Colombia, just as Germany and France are 
essential to each other in Europe.  As a result, Brazil must 
continue to act in harmony with them and other regional 
players. 
SOBEL