Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08YEREVAN653, TFGG01: ARMENIAN FRUSTRATION MOUNTS OVER

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08YEREVAN653.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08YEREVAN653 2008-08-15 12:58 2011-02-18 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Yerevan
Appears in these articles:
http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/11/29/wikileaks_docs_02/
VZCZCXRO1697
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHYE #0653/01 2281258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151258Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7899
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000653 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV GG AM
SUBJECT: TFGG01:  ARMENIAN FRUSTRATION MOUNTS OVER 
PERCEIVED GEORGIAN SNUBS, IN THE FACE OF SINCERE ARMENIAN 
AIMS TO...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000653 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018 TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV GG AM

SUBJECT: TFGG01: ARMENIAN FRUSTRATION MOUNTS OVER PERCEIVED GEORGIAN SNUBS, IN THE FACE OF SINCERE ARMENIAN AIMS TO BE HELPFUL REF: YEREVAN 649 Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 

ΒΆ1. (C) SUMMARY: Top Armenian officials are growing increasingly offended by Georgians's non-responsiveness to Armenian efforts to reach out. The most discourteous, perhaps, was the Georgian FM's refusal even to meet FM Nalbandian for a few minutes in Yerevan airport, as she passed through en route overland to Georgia in the early morning of August 15. President Sargsian is starting to take domestic criticism for his presumed "failure" to call Saakashvili, after he did call President Medvedev. Armenians feel their good intentions have been met with an undeserved cold shoulder. Both the president and foreign minister remain new enough in their jobs for such perceived slights to sting more than perhaps would be the case of more seasoned hands. END SUMMARY> 2. (C) AN ATTEMPT AT BALANCE: Armenian officials are growing increasingly agitated, in private meetings with CDA, about the continuing refusal of their Georgian counterparts to take their calls, whether at the presidential, prime minister, or foreign minister level. A key presidential aide confided to CDA that President Sargsian had wanted to call Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev on the same day, so as to avoid any appearance of Armenian bias between the two sides, but that when Medvedev took the call and Saakashvili did not, the appearance of pro-Russian preference was created. After repeated attempts to get a call through, Sargsian finally just sent a letter to Saakashvili, in a substitute effort to show support for the Georgian side. Local opposition newspapers have already sharply criticized President Sargsian for calling Medvedev and not phoning Saakashvili, and have accused him of sacrificing Armenia's national interests in a misguided effort to cozy up to Russia. This is galling to Sargsian after his efforts to get Saakashvili on the telephone to offer condolences and assistance. The Prime Minister, likewise, was frustrated (reftel) by his inability to reach his Georgian counterpart to discuss trade and transportation issues which are of critical importance to the Armenian economy. Meanwhile, Armenian officials have kept their public statements about Georgia determinedly positive, even as their private exasperation mounts, though they have begun to suggest that they will take a sharper public tone if the cold shoulder from Tbilisi continues much longer. 3. (C) FM'S PIQUE: The Foreign Minister called in CDA August 15 for a one on one meeting, in which he vented his own simmering frustration, over what he termed Georgia's "hostile attitude." Visibly agitated, FM Nalbandian noted that Armenia is trying to help Georgia by taking in more than 4,000 refugees and offering to serve as a humanitarian corridor for international relief efforts. He stressed that Armenia needs a good relationship with Georgia not only for economic reasons, but also for its contribution to regional stability. Nalbandian added that the GOAM had meticulously avoided any statements that could be construed as siding with the Russians. Despite these efforts, Nalbandian fumed, Saakashvili has refused to return repeated calls from President Sargsian, an the Georgian PM has ignored calls from his Armenian counterpart "for more than a week." The final indignity, according to the FM, was when FM Tkeshelashvili arrived at Yerevan airport at 4:00am on August 15 en route overland to Tbilisi and declined Nalbandian's proposal for a short airport meeting at that hour. Tkeshelashvili said she was "under instructions" to return to Tbilisi immediately. "What more do they want from us?" Nalbandian asked rhetorically. He said that the GOAM is "avoiding any negative public statements about Georgia," and warned that were such a statement to be issued, the reaction of ethnic Armenians in Javakheti would be "very dangerous" for Georgia. Despite the obvious threat behind his words, Nalbandian insisted that "this is not a card we could play" with Georgia, but "just a reality." 4. (C) GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR TRYING: CDA spoke briefly with the Georgian Ambassador August 15, after signing the embassy condolence book. When CDA gave a brief synopsis of the meeting with Nalbandian, the Georgian ambassador said he had been working the phones with Tbilisi for several days to try to set up a Saakashvili-Sargsian call, but to no avail. Although he expressed frustration at Tbilisi's lack of responsiveness, he attributed the failure to the exigencies of the current emergency rather than to any desire to slight the Armenians. The Ambassador added that he would inform Saakashvili's office in his next communication that the American Charge had been called in by Nalbandian about this issue. 5. (C) MEDIATION IDEA UNANSWERED: Polchief spoke several YEREVAN 00000653 002 OF 002 times this week with Major General Hayk Kotanjian, a strongly pro-Western thinker in the MOD, who retains close ties to President Sargsian from the latter's long tenure as defense minister. Kotanjian was eager to position President Sargsian as a potential U.S. and Georgian back-channel to PM Putin to help defuse the conflict, noting that Sargsian has good access to Putin and other senior Russian leaders. Kotanjian said he had spoken to President Sargsian, and the president was primed and ready to act in this capacity. Post conveyed this offer to Embassy Tbilisi by classified e-mail. 6. (C) COMMENT: Armenian leaders initially accepted the (very valid) arguments of Georgian preoccupation with urgent crisis management, but are beginning to suspect that the GOG is snubbing the GOAM on purpose. This hypothesis is only fueled by the still-unexplained temporary hold-up of Armenian goods at Poti and Sadakhlo, while at the same time, Armenians insist, Azerbaijani cargo passed through unimpeded. While we consistently try to soothe Armenian pique and point out that Georgia is in severe crisis mode, receptivity to this explanation has waned. The suspicion is that the Georgians are taking out their anti-Russian rage on neighboring Armenia, counting Armenia a close friend of Russia, and one that can be more easily snubbed. This is particularly upsetting to Armenians because they believe they have bent over backward to be even-handed, to reach out in good faith to Georgian leaders, to insist that Russia not use Armenian-based forces in Georgia, to welcome Georgian refugees with open arms (waiving passport and document requirements, dispatching the Migration Agency chief to the border to smooth every difficulty), and to facilitate any kind of humanitarian aid shipment to Georgia via Yerevan. In truth, Armenian leaders do not want to be purely dependent on Russia, and see Armenia's strong strategic interest in maintaining strong, good-neighbor relations with Georgia. If Georgia's cold shoulder treatment continues, Armenian leaders may start to complain publicly in the press, partly out of anger and partly out of political self-defense, to head off opposition criticism. Another aggravating factor in the Armenian reaction, we suspect, is that top Armenian officials are all new in their jobs, still taking their first steps on the world stage, and not yet feeling fully comfortable or secure in their new roles. Perceived slights are probably being felt more keenly than would be the case with more seasoned officials. PENNINGTON