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Viewing cable 08USUNNEWYORK745, SUDAN: UNMIS SRSG DEFLECTS CRITICISM ON ABYEI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USUNNEWYORK745 2008-08-19 23:41 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO4284
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0745/01 2322341
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 192341Z AUG 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4836
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000745 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: UNMIS SRSG DEFLECTS CRITICISM ON ABYEI 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On August 18 Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi briefed the Security 
Council on the situation in Sudan.  He maintained that CPA 
implementation remained on track and that cooperation between 
the parties "shows signs of improvement" despite recent 
fighting in Abyei, the Omdurman attack and an increase in LRA 
violence.  Qazi deflected accusations that UNMIS mishandled 
the Abyei conflict and requested approximately $400m for 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. 
 He singled out border delineation and demarcation as the 
single most critical issue between north and south and said 
that preparations were on track to allow elections to be held 
by the end of 2009.  Many Council members questioned whether 
UNMIS's military assets and mandate were sufficient to the 
task of protecting civilians and overseeing the 
implementation of the CPA.  In this vein, UNMIS's military 
experts are preparing a military capability study whose 
findings and recommendations will be included in the next 
UNMIS report.  Russia and South Africa took the opportunity 
to repeat their position that the Council should promptly 
revisit the ICC prosecutor's action against President Bashir. 
 End summary. 
 
Abyei - not our fault 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In his briefing to the Council, Qazi defended 
UNMIS's conduct during the May 14-20 violence in Abyei, which 
he described as the most severe violation of the cease-fire 
since 2005.  Qazi emphasized UNMIS's role in sheltering 100 
civilians from the fighting and said that the displacement of 
approximately 50,000 residents from Abyei town was 
"fortunate" as it spared more lives from being lost in the 
fighting.  The SRSG attempted to preempt any questioning of 
UNMIS's deployed force levels in Abyei by claiming that no 
number of troops would have been sufficient for UNMIS to 
interpose itself between two armies intent on waging war. 
Moreover, he said, as a Chapter 6 mission, UNMIS was forced 
to operate in "the space given" by the parties, and had no 
mandate to protect civilian property.  While a military 
capability study was underway, Qazi said it was not yet clear 
if there would be a recommendation for more troops.  He 
indicated that three options were under consideration: 
expanding the scope of the mission, fully deploying to the 
authorized 10,000 troops, or returning to the Council to seek 
an increased mission with more forces. 
 
3. (SBU)  The SRSG hailed the "cordial" relations between the 
parties, but said that any progress would be hampered by the 
extreme lack of trust between the SPLM and the government. 
Regarding the Abyei roadmap, Qazi welcomed the establishment 
of an interim administration in Abyei.  He told the Council 
that over 97% of Sudanese government troops had been 
redeployed consistent with their obligations, while 
approximately 90% of the SPLA troops had yet to redeploy. 
Qazi was skeptical of the prospects of redeploying all of 
these troops, indicating that DDR programs might be a more 
practical solution as the troops in question were local 
people who would be hesitant to redeploy away from their 
land.  Qazi said that approximately $400m was needed for DDR 
programs, asserting that programs could not begin to disarm 
and demobilize former combatants until funds had been 
identified for their reintegration. 
 
4. (SBU) Qazi termed the delineation and demarcation of the 
north-south border the "most critical outstanding issue" 
between the two sides and indicated that progress was 
contingent on the release of the Technical Working Group's 
report on the border.  He also claimed that it would still be 
possible to hold elections in 2009, but not by the scheduled 
date in July.  The SRSG said that the results of the national 
census will not be released until early 2009 and are likely 
to be hotly contested.  According to him, the census 
timetable and the effects of the rainy season (which would 
make nationwide elections impractical) meant that elections 
could be held at the end of 2009 at earliest. 
 
5. (SBU) In national statements following SRSG Qazi's 
briefing, Libya spoke out against non-signatory rebel groups, 
while Burkina Faso stressed that peace in southern Sudan was 
linked to peace in Darfur.  France stressed the importance of 
UNMIS's freedom of movement.  China urged full implementation 
of the Abyei roadmap.  South Africa warned of the possible 
negative consequences of a decision by the ICC pre-trial 
chamber, while Russia urged that the Security Council 
"revisit this issue promptly" and Italy reconfirmed its 
commitment to the ICC's independence.  Indonesia and Croatia 
stressed UNMIS's role in working toward elections in 2009 
while the UK urged UNMIS to work on arrangements for sharing 
oil revenue.  Speaking for the U.S., Amb. DiCarlo expressed 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000745  002 OF 002 
 
 
strong concern over the May conflict in Abyei.  She 
emphasized the importance of UNMIS taking stock of lessons 
learned -- including a reassessment of troop levels in Abyei 
-- in order to do all possible in its mandate to defuse 
future crises and mitigate their effects. 
 
 
Khalilzad