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Viewing cable 08STATE84105, WMD COMMISSION: RUSSIA TRAVEL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE84105 2008-08-05 20:31 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4105 2182034
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 052031Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
UNCLAS STATE 084105 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
PII DATA REMOVED MANUALLY 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED: EMBASSY MOSCOW FOR DOE 
POL 
EST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM PREL RS TRGY
SUBJECT: WMD COMMISSION: RUSSIA TRAVEL 
 
1. This is an action cable - please see paragraph 8 for 
Embassy assistance requests. 
 
2. Summary:  The Commission on Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism will travel to Moscow, Russia 
during the period of September 22-26, 2008 to assess and 
update, as appropriate, the Department of Energy's 
Nonproliferation Programs with Russia.  Drawing on the 
information below, Washington requests that Post apply for 
Russian letters of invitation and site access for the WMD 
Commission to the following sites in order to complete the 
assessment process: the Russian Research Center Kurchatov 
Institute, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, the 
Security Assessment and Training Center, and the Lunevo MVD 
Training Center.  (The Department also forwarded to the 
Embassy's Political Military Section a letter from Commission 
Chairman Senator Robert Graham and Commission Vice Chairman 
Senator James Talent to Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov The 
letter requests the Foreign Minister's assistance in 
authorizing and facilitating the Commission's visit).  An 
e-country clearance request and fund cite will be transmitted 
separately.  End Summary. 
 
3. Background: 
The Commission was established under the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.  The 
members of this bipartisan Commission were appointed by the 
majority and minority leadership of the U.S. House and 
Senate.  Former Senator Robert Graham is the Chairman of the 
Commission, and former Senator James Talent is the 
Vice-Chairman.  The Commission is required to assess the U.S. 
government's current activities, initiatives, and programs to 
prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism, and to provide a 
comprehensive strategy with concrete recommendations to the 
President and Congress.  The Commission's final report is due 
this fall. 
 
4. Travelers include the following: 
 
COMMISSIONERS 
1)    Wendy Ruth Sherman 
      Passport #:   
      DOB:  
 
2)    Daniel Robert Graham 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:   
 
3)    Stephen Rademaker 
      Passport #:   
      DOB:  
 
4)    Robin Cleveland 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
5)    Graham Tillett Allison, Jr. 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
6)    Henry David Sokolski 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
7)    Rahul Verma 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:   
 
8)    Timothy Roemer 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
STAFF 
1)    Neal Allen Pollard 
      Passport #:   
      DOB:  
 
2)    Joseph Jay Helman 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
3)    Evelyn Farkas 
      Passport #:   
      DOB:   
 
4)    George William Look 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
5)    Georgia Anne Adams 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
6)    Maurice Aaron Mallin 
      Passport #:   
      DOB:  
 
7)    Kenneth Damian Ward 
      Passport #:  
      DOB:  
 
8)    Eric Fanning 
      Passport #:   
      DOB:   
 
5. Purpose of Travel: 
As part of its mandate, the Commission is required to assess 
and, where necessary, update and expand upon the conclusions 
and recommendations of the report entitled, "A Report Card on 
the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with 
Russia" (also known as the "Baker-Cutler Report").  The 
purpose of the trip to Moscow and the subsequent site visits 
serves as part of the assessment process pertaining to this 
portion of the Commission's mandate. 
 
6. Travel Destination and General Schedule: 
 
The following is a draft itinerary for the Commissioners' 
trip to Moscow, Russia.  Post is requested to provide 
permission to visit for the following days:  September 22-26. 
 
Draft Itinerary 
 
September 22, 2008: Monday (Washington, DC -- Moscow) 
1230  Depart Washington Dulles Airport (IAD) 
 
September 23, 2008: Tuesday (Moscow) 
1030  Arrive Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO) and recover 
1400  Office Call 
      U.S. Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle 
1500  Embassy Briefings 
      National Security Officials (TBD) 
1700  Return to Hotel 
 
September 24, 2008: Wednesday (Moscow) 
0800  Breakfast at hotel 
0900  Meetings with MFA, Rosatom State Corporation, and MOD 
officials, including ROSATOM Director Sergey Kiriyenko, Armed 
Forces Chief of General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, and 
the newly appointed Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Sergey 
Kislyak (if available). 
1200  Lunch 
1330  Site Visit:  The Russian Research Center Kurchatov 
Institute (KI) 
 
DESCRIPTION:  The Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute 
is the first and the most prominent nuclear institute in 
Russia.  This center was set up in place of the I.V. 
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (former Laboratory No.2 
of the USSR Academy of Sciences founded in 1943) in November 
1991 in accordance with the Decree of President of Russia. 
The first nuclear reactor (F1) in Europe and Asia is still 
operating in the Kurchatov Institute.  The Center is placed 
under the direct authority of the Russian Government and is 
not part of either the Russian Academy of Sciences or any 
branch ministry.  Material, Protection, Control, and 
Accounting (MPC&A) improvements have been implemented at the 
main access gates, perimeter, and six buildings and 
facilities located at the Kurchatov Institute.  These include 
physical protection and material accounting equipment 
upgrades, training, procedural improvements, protective force 
equipment including upgraded communications, and secure 
nuclear material transportation vehicles.  Apart from having 
KI facilities upgraded, DOE also works with the Institute on 
many other activities - MPC&A upgrades at other facilities, 
MOD/Navy RTG recovery, RADON security upgrades, GT-MHR 
reactor development, etc.  The site visit will include 
discussion with top institute managers and scientists on any 
topics of interest to the delegation.  If site access is 
granted, the delegation also will/may see significant part of 
the MPC&A upgrades. 
 
1630  Return to hotel 
1900  Dinner hosted by Rose Gottemoeller, Director of the 
Carnegie Moscow Center 
 
September 25, 2008: Thursday (Moscow) 
0730  Breakfast at hotel 
0830  Depart for Site Visit: Joint Institute for Nuclear 
Research (JINR) 
1030  Site Visit:  Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) 
 
DESCRIPTION:  JINR was established as an international 
scientific center in 1956 and conducts research in physics, 
radiation biology, nuclear medicine, and experimental 
instruments and methods.  It employs over 6,000 people and is 
comprised of eight major laboratories.  JINR had two 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled reactors 
and a Central Storage Facility (CSF) for fresh reactor fuel. 
The reactors have been decommissioned.  The JINR project is 
funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's 
(NNSA) Office of International Materials Protection and 
Cooperation and MPC&A cooperation began in 1996.  Initial 
physical protection system upgrades were commissioned in 1998 
and involved improvements to the CSF, relocation of the 
Central Alarm Station (CAS), and provision of a new radio- 
communication system.  CSF security upgrades focused on 
personnel access control areas, the guard station, and the 
storage area.  Initial MPC&A upgrades and capabilities were 
completed in 1998.  These included a computerized Material 
Accounting System, Tamper Indicating Devices, Non-Destructive 
Assay equipment, a Physical Inventory Taking system, and 
fresh fuel measurement system.  The project team initiated 
sustainability activities with the site in fiscal year 1999 
and for the last 9 years, JINR has simultaneously received 
reduced U.S. support to replace old and obsolete systems and 
limited additional MPC&A upgrade work scope. 
 
1300  Lunch 
1400  Depart for Site Visit: Security Assessment and Training 
Center (SATC) 
1500  Site Visit:  Security Assessment and Training Center 
(SATC) 
 
DESCRIPTION:  The SATC compound includes an access control 
point, a test bed, a simulated bunker facility, a simulated 
access control building, testing and evaluation laboratories, 
teaching and training rooms, administrative buildings, a 
maintenance building, a proof-of-concept AICMS (Automated 
Inventory Control and Management System) facility, a Small 
Arms Training System (SATS), a live-fire shooting range, and 
a drug  testing laboratory used for the Personnel Reliability 
Program.  The SATC provides a joint location to identify 
enhancements for MOD,s nuclear weapons storage structures. 
This has been accomplished by testing and demonstrating 
various commercial (off-the-shelf) security equipment in the 
SATC's simulated site environment.  The types of security 
equipment procured for testing include command and control 
systems, exterior sensors systems, rapidly deployable sensor 
systems, fire and safety systems, access control systems with 
hazardous material detection systems, access delay systems, 
and guard force equipment, and engineering upgrades to those 
systems.  It is envisioned that the SATC, in conjunction with 
the Kola and Siberian Technical Centers provided by DOE and 
the Far East Training Center to be provided by DoD, will be 
used as a training facility and depot-level maintenance 
facility to sustain security systems installed at all 
facilities securing weapons of mass destruction across Russia. 
 
1900  Return to hotel 
 
September 26, 2008: Friday (Moscow -Washington, DC) 
0800  Breakfast at hotel 
1000  Check-out and depart hotel for airport 
1255  Depart Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO) 
1942  Return to Washington Dulles Airport (IAD) 
 
7. Other options for site visits: 
 
Lunevo MVD Training Center 
 
DESCRIPTION:  In the beginning of 2006 the Duma passed an act 
that shortened the enlistment for conscript troops from two 
years to only one year.  This effectively doubles the 
training requirement for the MOD and MVD.  The MVD-IT which 
is responsible for the security at MPC&A sites in conjunction 
with Rosatom agreed to establish training centers that train 
only the conscripts and contract forces that will be assigned 
to the special sites.  The Lunevo Training Center (LTC) is a 
MVD-IT training center for all conscripts, contract troops 
and commanders assigned to protected the nuclear and 
sensitive assets of the Russian Federation.  The center has 
indoor and outdoor classrooms and training laboratories that 
address all facets of guards' duties at a nuclear facility 
and some aspects of the transportation of nuclear assets. 
The classrooms were equipped with the furniture, computer 
hard and software, simulators, and the electronic shooting 
range.  Funding for the Lunevo training center was jointly 
shared by the MVD-IT, ROSATOM and the U.S. MPC&A program. 
 
8. Action Request: 
 
The Department requests Embassy Moscow's assistance in 
facilitating ground transportation, providing rates for 
hotels, and passing clearances for access and use of 
classified space.  Furthermore, the Embassy's assistance is 
requested in coordinating requests for site visits and 
submitting a letter of invitation request.  Please designate 
a POC at Post for further communication regarding Embassy 
assistance. 
RICE