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Viewing cable 08PANAMA660, PANAMA: DICHTER & NEIRA RESEARCH POLL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PANAMA660 2008-08-07 21:23 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0660/01 2202123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 072123Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2386
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000660 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: DICHTER & NEIRA RESEARCH POLL 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS BRIAN R. NARANJO. REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
------- 
 Summary 
 ------- 
 
1. (C) In April 2008, Dichter & Neira published a public 
opinion poll that generated shock waves in Panama's political 
scene. Since then, this leading market research firm produced 
another poll conducted from June 06 to June 08 that indicated 
who could be the front runners for the presidential election. 
As the primary elections come to a close, the opposition 
parties have chosen their presidential nominees and the 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) will soon select its 
candidate. The Dichter & Neira poll provided insight to which 
presidential candidates will be left standing in the general 
election. 
 
--PRD presidential candidate Balbina Herrera maintained the 
lead over Democratic Change (CD) candidate Ricardo 
Martinelli. Herrera continued to widen the gap as the PRD 
favorite with a 20 point lead over PRD contender and Mayor of 
Panama Juan Carlos Navarro. 
 
--Panama's public believed that a PRD presidential candidate 
would win the general elections due to the party's intrinsic 
advantage granted by their large membership. With over 
600,000 registered members, PRD remained the largest 
political party in the country. 
 
--Martinelli remained the favored candidate for the 
opposition and maintained 41 percent support compared to Juan 
Carlos Varela who drew in 24 percent. 
 
--President Torrijos' numbers continued to decline with less 
than a 47 percent approval rating. The Panamanian public was 
also dissatisfied with the President's cabinet and the 
National Assembly. 
 
Dichter & Neira completed a subsequent poll in early July, 
but Post has not yet acquired a copy of it.  Press reports 
regarding this more recent poll indicated that Herrera had 
opened an even wider lead, 31-point lead over Navarro.  While 
Herrera stayed more or less steady in July polling about 54%, 
Navarro slipped to 23%.  In the national polls, Herrera, 
Varela, and Martinelli were all three essentially tied in the 
low 20s between 21 and 24 percent.  In addition to Herrera's 
growing lead in the PRD primary, the big news from Dichter & 
Neira's July poll was that post-primary Varela closed the gap 
with Herrera and Martinelli.  Post will endeavor to acquire a 
copy of the July poll.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Herrera, Front Runner in General Elections 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Were the presidential elections held in June, 26 
percent of respondents say they would have voted for PRD 
candidate Balbina Herrera. Herrera continued to lead with a 1 
percent increase from April levels. Democratic Change (CD) 
candidate Ricardo Martinelli slipped from 20 percent in April 
to 19 percent in May but remained steady through June. PRD 
challenger Juan Carlos Navarro gained traction with a 2 point 
increase to 15 percent from April to June. Panamenista 
candidate Juan Carlos Varela remained static at 7 percent. 
Polling results showed that all candidates have maintained 
steady popularity among their supporters. In contrast, PRD 
candidate Laurentino Cortizo received minimal backing with 
less than 1 percent. Of the respondents interviewed, 16 
percent were undecided. 
 
Candidate           April       May    June 
---------           -----    ---    ----- 
Balbina Herrera       25      26     26 
Ricardo Martinelli    20      19     19 
Juan Carlos Navarro   13      15     15 
Juan Carlos Varela     7       6      7 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Voter Confidence in the Candidate 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) When respondents were asked how certain they were 
that they would vote for their present candidate of choice on 
election day, Balbina Herrera polled the strongest voter 
confidence among her supporters with 88 percent affirming 
that they were "very certain" or "certain" to vote for her. 
Loyalty among Martinelli supporters increased 6 points to 85 
percent from 79 percent. Juan Carlos Navarro remained steady 
among his voting base with 84 percent. Juan Carlos Varela 
enjoyed an increase in voter confidence by 5 points to 89 
percent. However, it is interesting to note that while most 
presidential candidates remained steady or experienced a 
slight increase among voters that were "very certain" to 
support their candidate, Balbina Herrera's numbers dropped 17 
percent in this category to 32 percent from 49 percent in 
May. 
 
----------------------------- 
Herrera Remained PRD Favorite 
----------------------------- 
                                                   . 
 
4. (SBU) Balbina Herrera maintained a strong lead over Juan 
Carlos Navarro with 57 percent compared to Navarro's 34 
percent. Supporters of the governing PRD party continued to 
assert that Herrera was their preferred presidential 
candidate. Herrera's significant 22 point gap over Navarro 
appeared unbreakable between May and June. 
 
Poll          Herrera      Navarro 
----          -------      ------- 
May   2008      58%          36% 
June  2008      57%          34% 
 
--------------------------- 
Martinelli Leads Opposition 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)   Martinelli held as the number one candidate for 
president among opposition voters. The candidate experienced 
a slight 3 point decrease from 44 percent in May to 41 
percent in June. Strong support for Martinelli existed 
outside of Panama City with 53 percent of residents in 
Chiriqui and Bocas supporting the candidate compared to 39 
percent in Panama City and Colon. Martinelli also received 
solid backing from the youth demographic (ages 18 to 29) with 
53 percent of youth voters supporting Martinelli compared to 
44 percent of Panamanians aged 30 to 49. Opposition 
challenger Juan Carlos Varela polled a steady 24 percent in 
both May and June. The percentage of undecided voters within 
the opposition party decreased 4 points to 9 percent. 
(Comment: The evaporating percentage of undecided voters 
could suggest that Martinelli would remain the opposition's 
candidate of choice.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The Governing Party vs. The Opposition 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU)  When asked which political party was most likely to 
win the election, 44 percent of respondents believed that the 
PRD's candidate would secure the presidency. Confidence in an 
opposition victory increased 4 points from 33 percent in May 
to 37 percent in June. However, confidence in a PRD victory 
remained static at 44 percent in May and June. Noteworthy is 
that 20 percent of respondents interviewed remained 
uncertain, a number large enough to have a definite impact on 
the 7 point gap between the PRD and the opposition. 
 
7. (SBU) Of the respondents that stated a PRD presidential 
candidate would win the general election, 32 percent 
considered that the party's advantage as the country's 
biggest political organization would be the determining 
factor to win the election. In contrast, the primary factor 
that secured support for the opposition was the party's 
"vision for the future". Among opposition sympathizers, this 
dynamic increased 7 points from 19 percent in May to 26 
percent in June. In comparison, 14 percent of PRD supporters 
believed their political party had a "vision for the future". 
 
8. (SBU) Another important factor noted by respondents is the 
level of organization within the parties. 19 percent of PRD 
supporters felt that the party was tightly organized compared 
to 16 percent within the opposition. Overall belief in the 
PRD's organization decreased 5 points from 23 percent to 19 
percent, while the opposition decreased from 19 to 16 
percent. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Continuing Waning Government Approval 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Torrijos' approval ratings continued to decline, 
falling from 51 percent in May to 47 percent in June. Along 
with the President's depleting popularity, his 
administration's approval rating dropped by 6 points from 46 
percent in May to 40 percent in June. 
 
10. (SBU) The GOP's legislative branch, the National 
Assembly, also received poor performance reviews. When asked 
to rate the quality of the National Assembly as excellent, 
good, bad, or very bad, 52 percent of respondents believed 
the quality of the National Assembly was bad and 10 percent 
viewed the legislative branch performance as very bad. 
 
--------------------- 
Technical Information 
--------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Dichter & Neira conducted this poll from June 6 to 
June 8. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. Only 
adults over the age of 18 were interviewed in their homes. 
Homes were selected randomly, and the number of homes 
selected in a particular area was in proportion to general 
population distribution according to socio-economic standing. 
 Interviews were distributed evenly between men and women. 
No interviews were conducted by telephone, at places of work, 
public places, or on the street.  Interviews were distributed 
by age group, socio-economic status, and education in 
proportion with general population distribution.  A total of 
1,200 people were interviewed across the country, excluding 
the Darien province and the Camarcas. The company asserted a 
95 percent level of confidence with a margin of error of 2.9 
percent. 
 
-------- 
Comments 
-------- 
 
12. (C) Polling in Panama indicates a high degree of voter 
apathy and general disinterest in politics. Of the 1,200 
respondents interviewed 56 percent were not affiliated with 
any political party. When respondents were asked which 
presidential candidate they would vote for in the general 
election, 16 percent were undecided and 10 percent stated 
they would not support any of the candidates. In addition, 20 
percent of those interviewed were uncertain whether they 
supported the governing PRD party or the opposition. This 
dynamic could indicate that independents would decide the 
2009 general elections.  Absent an enormous surged in the 
final six weeks of the PRD primary campaign, Herrera appears 
to have sewed up the PRD's presidential nomination.  Press 
reports of Dichter & Neira's July poll, a copy of which Post 
is endeavoring to obtain, indicate that Herrera has opened up 
an even wider lead over Navarro.  While in this poll, 
Martinelli also secured a 16 point advantage over Varela, 
Dichter & Neira's June poll was conducted about one month 
before Varela trounced Alberto Vallarino in the Panamenista 
Party's July 6 primary.  Press reports of Dichter & Neira's 
July poll, conducted a couple of days after the Panamenista 
Primary, indicated that Varela leapt forward in the national 
polls closing the gap with Martinelli and drawing more or 
less even with Martinelli and Herrera.  At this stage in the 
race, it appears that a three-way race for president is 
forming:  Martinelli, whose CD has formed an alliance with 
Patriotic Union (UP), Varela, whose Panamenista Party is 
expected to align with the Movement of Liberal Republican 
Nationals (MOLIRENA), and Herrera. 
STEPHENSON