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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA713, Goma Report August 28 -

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA713 2008-08-29 09:39 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO1510
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0713 2420939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290939Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8362
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0608
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000713 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
            UN, EUN 
SUBJECT:    Goma Report August 28 - 
            Clashes in Rutshuru Area 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  By the end of the day, MONUC had not ascertained 
responsibility for the clashes that occurred in the Rutshuru area 
August 28, nor the extent of casualties or collateral damage. 
Political damage was clear:  CNDP did not attend the North Kivu 
working group on disengagement.  However, the South Kivu group went 
forward, despite FRF fears for safety.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The energy in the Amani process which was so palpable in 
the preceding days, with the establishment of working groups to 
flesh out disengagement zones, hit a rock wall with the news of 
prolonged exchanges of fire beginning in the early morning August 28 
in the Rutshuru sector.  At opening of day, CNDP announced through 
text messages that it had been attacked by FARDC and that "the death 
of Amani will be the entire and exclusive responsibility of the 
government."  Citing fears for their security, CNDP members 
boycotted the working-group meetings which were to have gotten down 
to the concrete work of drawing pull-back lines on maps.  The South 
Kivu working group was considerably delayed because of FRF 
derivative concerns for safety, but the international facilitation 
team allayed some of its concerns and the meeting eventually went 
forward, with the satisfying prospect of FRF, FARDC, and various Mai 
Mai groups poring over maps at the same table. 
 
3.  (SBU) Admiral Didier Etumba, co-chairman of the Joint Technical 
Commission, twice convoked the facilitation team during the course 
of the day for lengthy meetings, the purpose of which was to pin 
blame for the attacks on CNDP and to assert the government's 
continued adherence to the Amani process.  He said that CNDP had 
attacked FARDC positions east of Rumangabo (halfway between Goma and 
Rutshuru) and near Burai (just south of Rutshuru) but was repulsed 
with a successful "counter-offensive" which produced serious CNDP 
casualties but only one FARDC killed.  President Kabila called 
Etumba during the first of these meetings, and Etumba relayed that 
Kabila had given instructions to "cease the counter-offensive 
immediately."   Etumba insisted that MONUC and the facilitation team 
must publicly and clearly fix responsibility on CNDP.  He said that 
the day's clashes showed the importance of making progress on the 
disengagement plan, with the Rutshuru road being the single most 
important pull-back corridor, one where he hoped MONUC would 
establish a much stronger presence. 
 
4.  (SBU) At the end of the day, poloff called on acting North Kivu 
Brigade commander Col Jaiveer Negi for a review of the day's 
military events.  (Newly arrived brigade commander Brigadier General 
Bipin Rawat was in Kinshasa.)  Negi said that MONUC did not know 
which side was responsible.  The MONUC mobile base at Rugari heard 
firing in the early morning in the direction (north) of Rumangabo 
and sent out a patrol to investigate, which was briefly impeded by 
FARDC.  At 8:30 the small MONUC base at Mutabo (10 km east of 
Rutshuru) also heard firing in the area of Matebe, located between 
Rutshuru and Mutabo, and also went to investigate.  In the course of 
the morning, FARDC dispatched six BMPs, a multi-barrel rocket 
launcher, and attack helicopters to these areas, although none of 
them were actually used in the clashes.  Firing ceased at Matebe by 
11:00 am, and both CNDP and FARDC returned to their areas of 
previous control at Matebe.  Firing east of Rumangabo eased by 
mid-afternoon, but MONUC had not confirmed that FARDC had returned 
to its previous position there.  (Etumba and 8th Military Region 
commander Mayala vehemently insisted to the facilitation team that 
it had.)   Negi said that it had been exceedingly difficult for 
MONUC military to make contact with FARDC, either at brigade or 
region level, throughout the day, whereas it had had more success 
coordinating with CNDP's Col. Makenga.  Eastern Coordinator Alpha 
Sow pointedly complained about this lack of communication to Etumba, 
who admitted FARDC should have done better.  Negi said that he had 
no reliable information about casualties or humanitarian collateral 
damage from the clashes. 
 
5.  (SBU) CNDP has informed facilitation team that, assuming it 
MONUC assures fullest security guarantees for its travel from Kimoka 
into Goma, it will meet the team early August 29.  CNDP's aim for 
the meeting is apparently to give a fuller account of its version of 
events, rather than to participate in the disengagement working 
groups. 
 
GARVELINK