Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KINSHASA705, Goma Round-Up August 26 -- Plenary of

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KINSHASA705.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA705 2008-08-27 16:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO9856
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0705/01 2401616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271616Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8349
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000705 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: Goma Round-Up August 26 -- Plenary of 
the Joint Commission 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  After five hours of meetings with the 
facilitation team, CNDP agreed to go forward with the concept of a 
working group on disengagement.  Prior to the August 26 plenary of 
the Joint Commission, the team met Malu Malu and Etumba, who bought 
off on the plan and pushed it through the plenary.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The international facilitation team (EU, UK, U.S., MONUC) 
had a four-hour meeting with the CNDP delegation in Goma (minus Rene 
Abandi) on August 25, hoping to get CNDP's agreement on the idea of 
a working group on disengagement, to be presented the following day 
at the plenary of the Joint Technical Commission on Peace and 
Security.  CNDP's Bertrand Basimwa, with Abandi, had put forward the 
concept at a meeting with the team August 20.  However, the larger 
CNDP delegation (seven of the eight) on August 25 raised a host of 
other issues and appeared to be hostile to taking any action on 
disengagement without a simultaneous resolution of all CNDP's 
claims.  Privately, after this excruciating meeting, Bisimwa 
confided to poloff that the role of a negotiator was "extremely 
difficult.  Remember, (LRA's) Koni killed two of his negotiators." 
The following day's plenary was shaping up to be a waste of time. 
 
3.  (SBU) After consultation with what he called his "base" 
(presumably Nkunda) Bisimwa called poloff on the morning of August 
26 to say that CNDP had "moved in your direction."  Another hour's 
meeting with the full delegation -- not free of difficult moments -- 
ended with the CNDP delegation's agreeing to the working group 
concept in full.  The delegation opened with a seven-point position: 
 (1) It accepted creation at the plenary of two ad hoc working 
groups on disengagement, the one in North Kivu composed of FARDC, 
CNDP, PARECO, with MONUC military and the international 
facilitation; (2) It wanted verification of the complete separation 
of PARECO and FDLR; (3) FARDC would have to accept pull-back of 
forces on the same terms as CNDP; (4) Members of the provincial 
"cellules" would have to be accepted as members of the working 
group; (5) The concept of a working group would need to be extended 
to other areas, e.g., brassage; (6) It agreed to a time limit of 15 
days for the working group, after which the provincial structures 
would be established; and (7) The international facilitation would 
sign a memorandum certifying that it would put pressure on the 
government to take the CNDP's list of claims seriously. 
 
4.  (SBU) The facilitation team responded that it took serious note 
of CNDP's claims, but it would sign no memorandum with any single 
group:  its job was facilitation.  It saw no problem with CNDP's 
cellule members being in the working group but other parties would 
name whom they chose.  It expected FARDC to be wholly involved in 
pull-back.  Success of this working group could possibly lead to 
other such working groups being created.  CNDP concluded that it was 
in "basic agreement" with the facilitation team, with the proviso 
that its full set of claims would need soon to be addressed.  The 
facilitation team noted, on the basis of what it had been told by 
Abbe Malu Malu, that the government would ask for one "non-contact" 
armed group (i.e., other than PARECO) to be included in the working 
group, as a way to placate the Mai Mais.  CNDP acquiesced.  The team 
concluded by urging CNDP not to raise inflammatory issues outside 
the agenda of the plenary. 
 
5. (SBU) The facilitation team had hoped for an extensive meeting 
with Malu Malu and Etumba prior to the plenary, but they arrived 
from Kinshasa only briefly before the scheduled start of the 
plenary.  After a 20-minute exchange they described themselves as 
content with the working-group concept as presented by the 
facilitation team in a document with the following points: 
 
-- Objective:  Make the plan of disengagement operational.  The 
working group will submit its final report to the Commission within 
15 days. 
-- Mandate:  Identify front lines; define zones of disengagement of 
armed groups in contact and FARDC, and commit to reciprocal 
withdrawal from these zones; determine means of securing these zones 
(MONUC and DRC); establish rules of managing these zones and a 
system of sanctions for non-respect of these rules. 
-- Composition:  Two technical groups for each province, with a 
limited number of members, to be accompanied by experts of their 
choice: 
(a) North Kivu:  One member from each armed group in contact (CNDP, 
PARECO/FAP); one member from another group to be named by the 
Commission; one from FARDC; one from MONUC; one from the 
international facilitation. 
(b) South Kivu:  One member from each armed group in contact (FRF, 
Mai Mai Yakutumba, Mai Mai Zabuloni, Mai Mai Kapopo); one from 
FARDC; one from MONUC; one from the international facilitation. 
-- Functioning:  MONUC and FARDC will co-preside.  An interim report 
will be submitted within eight days. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000705  002 OF 002 
 
 
6.  (SBU) The plenary opened with a plea from Malu Malu that it was 
time to get down to real work, in particular on the disengagement 
plan.  The first agenda item for the plenary was the presentation 
(but not adoption, due to obvious CNDP objections) of the various 
plans that had been hammered out at the sub-commission level (mostly 
without CNDP and FRF participation), viz.:  Disengagement, 
Integration (with an annex on DDR), Return of IDPs and Refugees, and 
Restoration of State Authority.  With these presentations out of the 
way, Etumba opened discussion of what he called "an idea worked out 
by the co-chairmen of the Commission (i.e., Etumba and MONUC's 
newly-designated Eastern Coordinator, Alpha Sow) to ease concerns of 
all sides about the disengagement plan."  Sow and Malu Malu joined 
in presenting the working-group concept as outlined above.  Malu 
Malu noted that any armed groups which were not eligible for 
participation in this working group would make an important 
contribution, meanwhile, by taking "draconian steps" to reduce the 
claimed number of members (which have been wildly inflated). 
 
7.  (SBU) The concept was accepted by the plenary with no 
significant discussion.  The plenary agreed that eligible parties 
would convene on the next morning, August 27, to get to work.  The 
only major point raised by CNDP was a complaint about an incident 
that had occurred at Mgunga 1 IDP camp (east of Sake) on August 24. 
CNDP commissioner (and Goma delegation chairman) Kambasu Ngeve said 
that a group of IDPs who were trying to leave the camp to return to 
their homes in Ngungu (far southwest of the CNDP-controlled area) 
had been beaten by the police.  This action, he said, appeared to be 
a "politicization" of the IDP-return issue.  Etumba and Malu Malu, 
uninformed about the incident, said that any aggression against IDPs 
was completely unacceptable.  They said that return of IDPs was the 
most important indicator of success of the Amani process, all the 
more reason, they noted, that it was essential to get down to 
serious work on the disengagement plan.  Malu Malu said he 
envisioned that the pull-back would create not only areas of 
military disengagement but, effectively, "real humanitarian 
corridors." 
 
8.  (SBU) The other principal agenda point was an evaluation of the 
humanitarian situation in the Kivus, accomplished with eloquence and 
thoroughness by Mamba Leonard Mashako, co-chairman of the 
Commission's humanitarian sub-commission.  He minced no words in 
reviewing the dire conditions prevailing in much of the Kivus to an 
audience representing groups largely responsible for bringing about, 
perpetrating, and deepening the suffering in the region. 
 
GARVELINK