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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1314, GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN REQUESTS UN ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1314 2008-08-29 14:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1801
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1314/01 2421425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291425Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1753
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001314 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG SHORTLEY/SMALL, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, IO/PHO 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS EAID KDEM UN SU
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN REQUESTS UN ELECTIONS 
ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1247 
 
1. (SBU) Acting on direct orders from Government of Southern Sudan 
(GOSS) President Salva Kiir Mayaradit, Vice President Riek Machar 
formally requested elections assistance from the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) SRSG Qazi on August 16.  This request 
allows UNMIS and UNDP to begin expedited delivery of technical and 
strategic elections support to government institutions and entities 
across Sudan's South, in accordance with UNSCR 159, and in advance 
of a formal request by Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU). 
Machar's move sidesteps continued NCP/SPLM wrangling over 
composition of the National Elections Commission (NEC).  Although 
Presidents Bashir and Kiir agreed on Abel Alier and Idris Abdullah 
as NEC chair and vice chair respectively (reftel), the parties 
remain divided over who should fill the remaining seven seats, 
delaying the establishment of Sudan's elections-policy arbiter. 
 
2. (SBU) The GOSS' request follows nearly one year of sustained 
pressure by Juba's diplomatic corps to focus GOSS attention on 
elections.  The USG co-chaired Southern Sudan Elections Donor Group 
(SSEDG) commissioned UNOPS in September 2007 to carry out a 
multi-sectoral "gap analysis" assessment to identify possible 
impediments to elections in the South.  The SSEDG successfully 
pushed for the creation of an elections taskforce within the 
Ministry of Presidential Affairs, and with direct assistance from 
ConGen Juba, has worked to speed the SPLA's and Southern Sudan 
Police Services understanding of South-specific elections security 
challenges.  By April 2008, the SSEDG, with the assistance of 
USAID-partner NDI, had given two separate briefings to broad-based 
civil society groups in the former garrison towns of Wau and Malakal 
to enhance elections awareness and build networks between otherwise 
disparate grassroots organizations.  The June Juba-based meeting 
hosted over 100 local NGOs, and set the stage for the creation, with 
SSEDG support, of an independent civic education forum that links 
elections-minded organizations in the South's Equatoria, Bahr el 
Ghazal, and Upper Nile regions. 
 
3. (SBU) Despite UN-specific language on Sudanese elections in UNSCR 
1590, the absence of a functioning NEC had thus far prevented UNMIS 
from securing funding and political support from UN Headquarters in 
New York for its elections programming.  UNMIS Elections Chief Ray 
Kennedy and UNMIS-Juba Resident Coordinator David Gressly repeatedly 
have noted to ConGen Juba staff the UN's New York-based 
bureaucracy's skepticism of Bashir's commitment to elections. 
According to Kennedy, the absence of a NEC only intensifies that 
view -- deepening bureaucratic resistance to Qazi's and Kennedy's 
requests for UN "anticipatory action on elections" in advance of any 
formal request by the GNU. 
 
4. (SBU) Unaware of Machar's August 16 request, Kennedy regaled the 
Juba-based diplomatic corps on August 28 with news of a bureaucratic 
breakthrough:  UN Department of Legal Affairs had ruled that, given 
dual competencies awarded to Khartoum and Juba by the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) and the language in the existing UNSCR, UNMIS 
was authorized to act on a unilateral GOSS request.  That same day, 
VP Machar queried Acting UNMIS/Juba Civil Affairs Chief Diane De 
Guzman about New York's response to his letter, bringing to 
UNMIS/Juba's attention for the first time both the existence of a 
formal GOSS request and the realization that UNMIS/Khartoum had 
misplaced it.  De Guzman has since confirmed that UNMIS Elections 
Chief Ray Kennedy now has a second copy of Machar's request and is 
forwarding it to New York for immediate action. 
 
5. (SBU) UNMIS/Juba Civil Affairs staff and Kennedy believe the GOSS 
request to UNMIS will strengthen UN agency support for 
SSEDG-generated initiatives in the South.  Aside from the UNOPS 
assessment, UN participation in previous SSEDG initiatives was 
wholly dependent upon personal relationships within the Juba 
diplomatic corps and the personal (occasionally un-sanctioned) 
efforts of UNMIS/Juba's David Gressly.  (COMMENT:  More 
significantly, New York's endorsement of unilateral UNMIS elections 
support to the GOSS ahead of a GNU request may improve the 
occasionally fractious relationship between UNMIS/Khartoum and 
UNMIS/Juba.  UNMIS/Juba staff, including Gressly, routinely complain 
to ConGen staff that their initiatives are undervalued and 
undermined by a UN bureaucracy "overly focused on Khartoum."  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT: The GOSS's request also represents a shift in the 
SPLM's political elections calculus, and Juba's growing recognition 
of its responsibility for free and fair elections in the South - 
despite the formal oversight responsibilities of the National 
Elections Commission. Unlike their compatriots in the North, 
including those in Darfur, two generations of Southerners have never 
participated in elections.  With a UNFPA-estimated literacy rate of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001314  002 OF 002 
 
 
only 37% (male) and 12% (female) for the South, and region-specific 
security challenges that already are proving taxing for the Southern 
Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and Sudanese People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA), South-specific electoral challenges are numerous.  Minister 
for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng previously eschewed the 
possibility of Juba's unilateral movement on elections in 
discussions with ConGen Juba PolOff, believing it would provoke NCP 
ire toward the SPLM, and increasingly paint the party as "overly 
focused on secession" -- draining votes away from the SPLM in the 
North.  While a valid risk, UNMIS personnel have repeatedly stressed 
that the GOSS must enhance its capacity to overcome region-specific 
challenges imposed by the North/South civil war if it is to deliver 
elections in the South.  It appears the GOSS is beginning to agree 
with them. 
 
ASQUINO