Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD2736, PML DEBATES MUSHARRAF'S OPTIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ISLAMABAD2736.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ISLAMABAD2736 2008-08-16 04:50 2011-06-06 15:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
O 160450Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8358
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002736


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: PML DEBATES MUSHARRAF'S OPTIONS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

1.  (C)  Summary.  In an August 15 meeting with Ambassador,  Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leaders outlined their realistic  best case scenario for Musharraf.  He resigns with an  indemnity package guaranteed by the Chief of Army Staff  (COAS), the Army provides him and his family lifetime  security, and a successor is chosen allowing Musharraf to  pass the baton of power to someone trustworthy.  The last  condition is unlikely to happen until day 29 of the 30  allotted by the constitution to choose a new president.

However, the other conditions mirror what COAS Kayani told  Ambassador in a conversation (septel) earlier in the day.

PML leaders believe it is in their interest to delay the  process to set Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif against each  other; they will use parliamentary tactics if necessary to  slow things down.  They confirmed the safe parachute option  of Musharraf seeking refuge in the UAE is still being  discussed.  End Summary.

2.  (C)  Ambassador and Polcouns met August 15 with Pakistan  Muslim League (PML) President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and  Opposition Leader Pervaiz Elahi, at their request.  The  discussion  centered around President Musharraf's options; no  doubt the same debate is being repeated in all of Pakistan's  political salons this week.

3.  (C)  Shujaat said that Musharraf had not yet decided what  to do.  It was down to two choices:  resign before charges  are filed or resign after having defended himself.  Shujaat  argued that it was better for Musharraf, the PML and the U.S.  if Musharraf defended himself against what would be baseless  charges.  Even if Musharraf had to resign immediately after  defending himself (i.e. before an impeachment vote he would  lose), this would remove any stain against his name and the  party's image.

4.  (C)  Elahi disagreed, saying it would be better for  Musharraf to resign before impeachment charges are filed;  however, there were conditions.  There should be a broad  indemnity (that did not equate to pardon for crimes that  Musharraf had not committed).  The Army should provide  security for Musharraf and his family for their lifetime so  Musharraf could live out his life in Pakistan.  The Chief of  Army Staff should be the guarantor of the indemnity agreement  because neither Asif Zardari nor Nawaz Sharif could be  trusted to abide by their promises.  And, the decision on who  would become President should be made before Musharraf  resigns so that he could hand over power in good conscience  to someone trustworthy. The key for Elahi was the wording of  the indemnity package and the guarantor.  Shujaat agreed that  if Musharraf had to resign it should be on the grounds  outlined by Elahi.  There was some discussion of whether it  would be possible to extend any immunity guarantee to PML  party leaders, but Shujaat dismissed this idea.

  U.S. Views
----------

5.  (C)  Asked what the U.S. wanted or feared, Ambassador  said that we did not want Musharraf humiliated; he should be  able to live in Pakistan as an elder statesman with the  benefits that accrue to former presidents.  The U.S. would  not encourage Musharraf to resign but equally we would not  try to convince him to fight.  We had made this position  clear, she said, to both major parties in the coalition.

6.  (C)  Ambassador said it would be far better for  Pakistan's image if Musharraf were allowed to remain in  Pakistan rather than flying off in the night to a third  country.  Shujaat agreed, but said that ISI interlocutors  were working on the UAE option.

  Time Factor
-----------

7.  (C)  Shujaat argued that time was on the PML's side; if  they waited long enough, Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif would  turn on each other.  Elahi agreed, saying that the coalition  had not yet decided on the charge sheet.  They faced a  difficult balancing act--if they included charges like  Musharraf's action on the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) or military  action in the tribal areas, they would invite opposition from  the Army.  Elahi argued that Musharraf's extra-constitutional  actions in both 1999 and 2007 had been blessed ex-post facto  by the courts so they could not fairly be listed on the  charge sheet.  Citing Zardari's Sunday Times accusations that  Musharraf had siphoned off U.S. Coalition Support Funds,  Elahi worried that the coalition would make unsubstantiated  allegations about corruption by Musharraf or his family.

Ambassador said she hoped she had ended Zardari's attempts to  make that unfounded allegation.  Elahi indicated that  Musharraf was planning to sue for libel over the Sunday Times  piece.

8.  (C)  Elahi, a former Speaker of the National Assembly,  also said the PML had a few parliamentary tricks to play that  would prolong the process.  For example, they could file a  motion calling for a confidence vote on the Speaker.  The  Speaker would have to win that motion before any further  impeachment action could be taken.

  Next President
--------------

9.  (C)  Shujaat and Elahi would not identify a candidate  they would support to replace Musharraf. ""That will be up to  the coalition,"" said Shujaat.  But they agreed it should be a  non-political elder statesman.  They agreed that Nawaz would  never accept Zardari as President and insisted that the Army  would also oppose Zardari.

10.  (C)  Comment:  The Chaudhrys seemed resigned to  debating, not if but how and when Musharraf would leave  office, and they see the value of slowing the process down as  much as possible.  As always with the Chaudhrys, the  discussion was frank, practical and aimed at keeping their  options open for the future.  Pakistani history has taught  them to expect payback for the last eight years of their  political maneuvering, and they are bracing for  disintegration of the party and defection of many PML members  in the coming days. Still, these are a couple of canny  politicians, and there are many second acts in Pakistan.

PATTERSON