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Viewing cable 08GENEVA661, US EXPERTS DISCUSS FMCT AT CONFERENCE ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08GENEVA661 2008-08-06 12:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED US Mission Geneva
P 061259Z AUG 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6990
INFO GENEVA CD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS GENEVA 000661 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM CDG
 
SUBJECT: US EXPERTS DISCUSS FMCT AT CONFERENCE ON 
DISARMAMENT 
 
REF: GENEVA 00655 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  The U.S. Delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) hosted two U.S experts July 29-31 to 
participate in CD informal discussions and reach out to key 
delegations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 
(FMCT).  The goal of the visit was to reinforce the argument 
that an FMCT is the issue most ripe for negotiation at the CD 
and to explain specific U.S. policy positions related to the 
proposed FMCT to key delegations.  Dr. Stanley Fraley, senior 
advisor to the Department of State and former Director of 
VCI/NA, and Jeffrey Eberhardt, Director of VCI/NA, 
participated in an informal session of the CD on the proposed 
FMCT and a series of outreach events to CD delegations, 
effectively explaining and highlighting key U.S. policy 
elements relative to the proposed FMCT.  Their visit yielded 
sustained substantive discussions of the FMCT, repeated 
positive acknowledgment by CD colleagues of the persuasive 
arguments they deployed to explain the U.S. position on 
verification of the FMCT, and the advantages for 
international security of pursuing a treaty soon rather than 
later.  Numerous CD delegations expressed their appreciation 
for the cogent explanations presented by the two U.S. 
experts.  End Summary 
 
U.S. Experts Reach Openness Disarms CD Delegations 
--------------- 
2.  (U)  Fraley and Eberhardt participated in a series of 
informal discussions with key CD delegations to explain U.S. 
policies on the FMCT and to highlight the importance of 
pursuing a proposed treaty without seeking solutions to the 
most complicated issues up front.  Their expertise and ease 
in explaining complex issues gave them instant and sustained 
credibility, and substantively advanced U.S. arguments on 
these important policy issues.    Fraley, with 30 years of 
experience working on the issue, brought balance and 
expertise to a debate that has acquired considerable 
political baggage over the years.  His frank and thorough 
explanations of issues perceived by many to be complicated 
and contentious, including the issue of effective 
verification, illustrated the compelling rationale for the 
U.S. position.  Eberhardt's concise explanations of the 
policy deliberations leading up to the U.S. decision that 
effective verification of an FMCT was unrealistic were 
appreciated for their candor and clarity, especially by 
delegations who believe the U.S. interagency process to be 
opaque.  Their combined efforts gave the U.S. a powerful 
platform to reinvigorate an issue that many consider to have 
been flogged to death over the past several years. 
 
Indians Seek Assurances on Stocks 
---------- 
3.  (SBU) At a luncheon hosted by Ambassador Rocca for the 
Indian delegation, Fraley and Eberhardt responded effectively 
to numerous questions from the Indian delegation about U.S. 
intentions for an FMCT.  Insisting that they attach no 
linkages to commencing negotiations of an FMCT, the Indians 
professed they have supported negotiations since 1993. 
Welcoming the detailed explanation of how the U.S. reached 
its conclusions that effective verification was not possible, 
the Indians focused on the issue of stocks of fissile 
material, and it clearly took them time to fully grasp that 
the U.S. would not yield on its opposition to including 
stocks in an FMCT.  Reassured, the Indians left the lunch 
with a greater appreciation of the U.S. position and more 
confident that they would not be isolated on the issue of 
stocks.  As for verification, the Indians continued to 
believe that some form of international verification was 
preferable, even after Fraley's effective arguments that 
IAEA-type verification were not sufficient for an FMCT. 
 
4.  4. (U) DCM Larson also hosted a roundtable discussion 
with several delegations, including Netherlands, Turkey, 
Chile, Indonesia, Canada, and Romania.  All delegations 
remained engaged throughout the meeting and expressed their 
gratitude for the candor and clarity of Fraley and 
Eberhardt's answers.  On the subject of verification, 
Eberhardt again outlined the USG decision-making process, 
using the Shannon Mandate to U.S. advantage as a 
demonstration of its initial advocacy for verification.  They 
reminded participants that the US would welcome proposals for 
effective verification, but clearly explained why anything 
less would be rejected as counterproductive (Note: namely, 
that it  would undermine attempts to improve the NPT 
verification regime by accepting a lesser regime as 
effective. End note.)  As a demonstration of their openness, 
they patiently listen to various proposals by the 
participants, giving specific explanations of why the 
proposed regimes were impracticable (releasing 
proliferation-sensitive information) or ineffective (failing 
to account for diversion).  Fraley helpfully reminded the 
delegations that the draft FMCT would still be legally 
binding and subject to compliance procedures.  Responding to 
questions about stocks, Fraley unequivocally rejected 
proposals to include stocks as a diversionary tactic, since 
stocks are a known non-starter for states possessing nuclear 
weapons.   Delegations doubtless left the meeting with a 
stronger sense of U.S. dedication to an FMCT, as demonstrated 
by its long-standing moratorium and its voluntary safe-guards 
measures, which were outlined by Fraley and Eberhardt. 
 
5.  (U)  See Geneva 00655 for detail on India,s 
participation in the CD informal on the FMCT and related 
events that week. 
 
6.  (U) Comment:  Fraley and Eberhardt were just what the 
doctor ordered for the CD.  Their expertise, willingness to 
engage, and openness added renewed energy to the CD's 
discussions of the FMCT, and again confirmed that an FMCT is 
the issue most ripe for negotiation.  Fraley's emphasis that 
a treaty with a straight-forward normative ban on fissile 
material production would advance international security 
interests quicker and more effectively than protracted 
negotiations won recognition (if not necessarily support0 
from many delegations, especially since the message came from 
a person with years of hard earned experience in the issue. 
The U.S. CD Delegation would welcome the chance to host these 
experts again at a time suited to most effectively leverage 
their expertise. 
 
Rocca sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text