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Viewing cable 08FREETOWN416, STAFFDEL VISIT TO SIERRA LEONE REVEALS CONSTANT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08FREETOWN416 2008-08-25 12:20 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Freetown
VZCZCXRO7871
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHFN #0416/01 2381220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251220Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2135
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 FREETOWN 000416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS SL
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL VISIT TO SIERRA LEONE REVEALS CONSTANT 
STRUGGLE FOR PROGRESS 
 
1. Summary: The three-day visit of Shannon Smith from the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and Sarah Margon from 
Senator Russ Feingold's office highlighted both Sierra 
Leone's development accomplishments and major obstacles to 
further progress. Visits with Government of Sierra Leone 
(GoSL) officials, UN representatives, members of the 
Diplomatic Corps, and civil society demonstrated that while 
the country yearns to move past the post-conflict rebuilding 
era into one of entrenched peaceful prosperity, the lack of 
economic security and infrastructure impedes substantive 
movement towards this goal. It also impacts the GoSL's 
ability to combat internal and external security threats. The 
result could be the erosion of Sierra Leone's hard-won 
stability, as well as its ability to advance human rights and 
democratic principles. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
TINY PIE FOR A BIG APPETITE: BEMOANING COMPETING PRIORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2. Rising commodities prices, lack of labor-intensive 
industry, the exorbitant cost of investment capital, and 
crippled or non-existent infrastructure create an environment 
in which economic security at macro- and micro-levels is 
nearly impossible to achieve. An August 19 meeting with 
Deputy Minister of Trade and International Development Momodu 
Kargbo touched on these issues and their impact on the GoSL's 
budget. He stated that the government currently generates 
54-56% of their revenue, relying on a sometimes fickle donor 
community for the rest. This hand-to-mouth existence, he 
said, makes it hard for the GoSL to make substantial progress 
towards the goals of government reform and decentralization. 
The informal economy is continuing to grow, but is nearly 
impossible to tap into effectively for taxation purposes. 
Even formal business sector, in his opinion, are largely ad 
hoc and unprofessional. The Deputy Minister stated the 
priorities for the ministry are addressing high unemployment 
by supporting light industry, encouraging small enterprises, 
particularly in the area of food generation and processing, 
to develop and grow, and finding funding for physical 
infrastructure. He also identified a need for infrastructure 
and funding in major provincial cities, to support further 
government decentralization. 
 
3. Despite a clear outline of goals, Deputy Minister Kargbo 
was concerned that the resources didn't exist to achieve 
them.  He did say that a goods and services tax is in the 
works, but tempered that discussion with a reminder of the 
competing priorities and obligations facing the GoSL. With a 
small and somewhat unpredictable pie to divide many ways, a 
number of needs will go unmet. Visits with the Human Rights 
Commission, medical facilities, the country's only sexual 
assault response center, and members of civil society 
underscored this reality. Though the political and social 
will exists to support the establishment of a social safety 
net that protects citizens' rights and addresses their needs, 
the Leones in the government's coffers can only be stretched 
so far. Committing to long-term economic goals means that 
immediate social needs can only be partially met, if at all. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: PROGRESS, BUT IS IT SUSTAINABLE? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
4. Meetings with the Ministry of Defense, the UK's 
International Military Assistance Training Team, and 
UNIOSIL's Senior Police Advisor reflected positive gains in 
security sector reform (SSR), but a tenuous grip on those 
gains in the face of constant internal and external threats. 
All interlocutors pointed to the overall professionalization 
of the security forces, as evidenced by their involvement in 
supporting two election cycles with only pockets of localized 
violence and relatively strong handling of the largest 
cocaine bust in the country's history. The military, 
currently downsizing from its post-war numbers, is eager to 
join peacekeeping forces: both U.S. and UK experts agree that 
with training and equipment, they will be ready to serve 
regionally and globally. The Office of National Security and 
the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were noted for strong 
leadership and structures, and many feel the low crime rate 
in the country can largely be attributed to their improved 
abilities. 
 
5. Despite these successes, lack of resources jeopardizes the 
security sector's ability to maintain the improvements made 
to date or progress further. Crumbling buildings, vehicles 
with no fuel, and officers without equipment are the norm. 
Salaries, though paid on-time and with regularity, fall well 
below what is needed to support a family. Ironically, the 
dearth of resources prevents the security forces from 
 
FREETOWN 00000416  002 OF 002 
 
 
substantially contributing to the government's revenue.  The 
failure to control illegal fishing vessels, for example, 
costs the GoSL millions of dollars per year. 
 
6. In the immediate post-conflict period, security was 
envisioned as a means through which to make room for economic 
development. Problematically, however, SSR occurred a vacuum 
from larger development strategies. Interlocutors indicated 
that the SSR process should have occurred in conjunction with 
the creation of the poverty reduction strategy, because of 
the need for simultaneous, complementary progression in both 
the economic and security arenas. With the economy failing to 
develop at the same pace as the security sector improvements, 
financing its continued improvement, or even maintaining the 
status quo, appears impossible. With the increased threat of 
narcotics trafficking and other types of organized crime, 
fragile states on all borders, piracy and smuggling, and the 
drawdown of international community support and oversight, 
the security sector is facing significant tests that it may 
be unable to handle in the long-term. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
U.S. TAX DOLLARS AT WORK: THE PAE DEPOT AND SPECIAL COURT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
7. The delegation paid visits to two considerable USG 
investments: the PAE ECOWAS Logistics and Logistical Training 
Depot, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The 
Depot houses equipment as well as maintenance and training 
facilities, with a fleet of vehicles that can be deployed 
with ECOWAS and USG approval to support peacekeeping 
missions, elections, and other major events in ECOWAS 
countries. Though the delegation had heard from ECOWAS 
officials in Abuja that there is interest in relocating the 
facility to Nigeria, PAE representatives cited Sierra Leone's 
central location and nearness to relatively unstable 
countries as good reasons to remain in place. The 
impracticalities and expense of relocating were also noted. 
 
8. A visit to the SCSL included a tour and roundtable with 
representatives from each section of the Court. The 
delegation were briefed on the progress of the cases, funding 
challenges facing the SCSL, and the residual and legacy 
issues currently being grappled with. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. The Staffdel visit came at a prescient time for Sierra 
Leone's development. Though the prevalence of peace, 
optimistic attitude, recent fair and free elections, and 
GoSL's stated intentions to become regional leaders in 
supporting democratic principles and human rights 
demonstrates how far the country has come since wartime, 
economic and security realities also demonstrate that Sierra 
Leone continues to be on tenuous ground. The growing pains 
related to moving beyond post-conflict reconstruction and 
into development are being keenly felt, and fear of 
backsliding given the lack of resources is very real. Sierra 
Leone's economic, social, and security sectors continue to be 
highly vulnerable, despite recent improvements and successes. 
Continued U.S. support at this time is desperately needs to 
preserve hard-won gains, create opportunities for further 
progress, ameliorate internal and external security threats, 
and cement Sierra Leone as a stable, prosperous leader in the 
Mano River Union. Post welcomed the opportunity this visit 
provided to demonstrate that Sierra Leone is a bilateral 
partner worthy and in need of notice and support. End Comment. 
FEDZER