Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08COLOMBO807, EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 08/27/2008 IN WAKE OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08COLOMBO807.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08COLOMBO807 2008-08-27 10:35 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0807/01 2401035
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271035Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8601
UNCLAS COLOMBO 000807 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA AND SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC CE MARR PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 08/27/2008 IN WAKE OF 
LTTE AIR TIGER ATTACK IN THE EAST 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened a meeting of the 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on August 27, 2008 to 
discuss post's security posture in light of an attack on a 
Sri Lanka naval base in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka. The attack 
occurred during the evening of August 26, 2008. GSL police 
and military sources informed the Embassy that the air wing, 
or "Air Tigers," of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) bombed the base at approximately 21:30 hr. local time. 
The EAC concurred that the actual threat did not, at this 
juncture, warrant revisions to post's security posture or the 
security advice to the general American community. End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On August 27, 2008, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an 
EAC meeting.  Present for the meeting were the Ambassador, 
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, 
Political Officer, Economic Officer, Public Affairs Officer, 
Consular Officer, Management Officer, International 
Broadcasting Bureau Station Manager, USAID Acting Director, 
Officer in Charge of the Office of Defense Cooperation, 
Defense Attach Office's Operations Coordinator and the 
Marine Security Guard Detachment Commander. The agenda items 
for the meeting were: 
 
-- The attack on the naval base in Trincomalee, which the GSL 
attributed to the LTTE Air Tigers 
 
-- Post's security posture in light of the attack 
 
-- Security posture for two groups of USG Amcit personnel who 
were in Trincomalee 
 
-- Possible revisions to post's advice to the general 
American community 
 
3. (SBU) According to GSL sources, the Sri Lanka Navy base in 
Trincomalee (approximately 200 miles northeast of Colombo, on 
the East coast) came under attack at around 21:30 hr. local 
time (12:00 EDT) on August 26. Sources stated that at least 
two light aircraft overflew the base and dropped two 
improvised explosive devices, one of which exploded. GSL 
interlocutors claimed that the aircraft belonged to the "Air 
Tigers," as both the LTTE and the GSL refer to the LTTE's air 
wing. These sources believed that the intended target was a 
troop transport and supply ship. According to Navy officials, 
anti-aircraft fire prevented the Air Tigers from reaching the 
troop ship. The planes vectored toward a barracks for 
enlisted personnel and dropped bombs on the barracks. One 
bomb exploded, while the other reportedly failed to detonate. 
Publicly, the GSL has stated that 10 or 11 people were 
injured. However, some AmEmbassy officers received reports 
that casualty figures were higher and that some seamen may 
have been killed. 
 
4. (SBU) At the time of the attack, there were two separate 
groups of American citizen personnel in Trincomalee on 
official USG business. One group (five people from USAID's 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, or "OFDA") were lodged 
in a hotel located about five miles from the naval base, 
across Trincomalee Bay. The second group (two Raytheon radar 
technicians) was housed on the Navy base itself. The Embassy 
first learned of the attack when the OFDA officers contacted 
their AID control officer to report that a fire fight had 
erupted in Trincomalee. Although the OFDA personnel were not 
endangered by the attack, hotel staff chose to move them into 
another area of the facility. Although the Raytheon 
technicians were actually on the base, Embassy personnel 
learned that the technicians had not been too close to the 
attack site and were apparently in no danger, though they 
heard explosions. As of the morning of September 27, the 
Raytheon technicians had chosen to remain on base to complete 
their work. Meanwhile, the OFDA officers had departed 
Trincomalee, not in response to the attack, but rather to 
continue with their scheduled travel to other areas in the 
Eastern Province. 
 
4. (SBU) The RSO commented that this incident fit the pattern 
of other LTTE attacks - the Air Tigers flew at night and 
were selective in their targeting. The targets were military 
ones, vice civilian, even though there are many potential 
civilan targets located in Trincomalee town and surrounding 
areas. The RSO further opined that it was reasonable to 
assume that as the noose tightens on the LTTE in the Northern 
Province (the Sri Lanka Army reports that it is within 12 
kilometers of Kilinochchi, the LTTE's de facto capital), the 
terrorist organization would conduct reprisal attacks in 
other areas of Sri Lanka. Reprisal attacks and diversionary 
tactics are also standard operating procedures for the LTTE 
when it seeks to relieve pressure on the North. Therefore, 
this attack was another in a long series and did not indicate 
 
a change in tactics or an increased threat to either the 
official or expatriate American communities. 
 
5. (SBU) The EAC concurred that the true threat remains being 
in the wrong place at the wrong time - i.e. in proximity to 
an LTTE attack on a GSL military, political, economic or law 
enforcement target, and thus becoming an unintended victim of 
the attack. The EAC agreed that this attack did not represent 
a change in LTTE tactics. Therefore, there was nothing new to 
report to either the official or expatriate American 
communities. Accordingly, the EAC decided that it was not 
necessary, at this time, to either revise post's security 
posture or amend the security advice that post provides to 
the general American community. The EAC further decided that 
official Americans may continue travel to Trincomalee for 
business purposes without waiting for approval from the RSO 
and DCM. The restricted travel policy will continue to 
proscribe personal travel to Trincomalee for the official 
American community for the foreseeable future. The Ambassador 
agreed with the EAC's recommendations. 
 
6. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment 
and will report further developments, if any, septel.  POC 
for this message is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be 
contacted at 94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after 
regular business hours), perkinsmv@state.gov (unclassified 
email), or perkinsmv@state.sgov.gov (classified email). 
BLAKE