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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1069, NEXT STEPS ON ABADIA EXTRADITION CASE AND OTHER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA1069 2008-08-06 20:58 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO5011
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1069/01 2192058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 062058Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2236
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE IMMEDIATE 8343
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE 6480
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE 2575
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR L JOHNSON AND L/LEI, WHA/BSC, WHA/CHRIS MCMULLEN, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR SWARTZ AND OIA, DEA FOR OGC JOHN 
WALLACE, DEA REGIONAL DIRECTOR US EMBASSY LA PAZ PATRICK 
STANKEMP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 
TAGS: KJUS KCRM CJAN PREL CVIS SNAR BR
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON ABADIA EXTRADITION CASE AND OTHER 
EXTRADITION ASSURANCE REQUESTS 
 
REF: A. AUGUST 5 2008 EMBASSY 
        BRASILIA-STATE/WHA-STATE/L/LEI-DOJ/OIA 
        CONFERENCE CALL 
     B. BRASILIA 01035 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske for reason 1.5 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary and Action Request.  Post appreciates 
Department and DOJ assistance in determining next steps on 
securing the extradition of Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadia 
("Chupeta") and requests the guidance discussed ref A on an 
urgent basis, as ongoing investigations into Abadia's 
activities in Brazil could halt extradition proceedings 
indefinitely.  Post agrees that the Abadia case should be 
considered exceptional with regard to the assurances the 
Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) is seeking, and that the 
problems associated with providing such assurances should be 
addressed separately.  Post looks forward to working with 
L/LEI and DOJ to engage the GOB on this issue.  It is 
important to note that contacts are unanimous with regard to 
the constitutional authority of the STF to require such 
assurances, and stress that the GOB would consider 
extradition without complying with the STF order to be 
unconstitutional.  End summary and action request. 
 
2. (SBU) Post appreciates assistance of WHA, L/LEI, and DOJ 
(Ref A) in determining next steps on securing the extradition 
of Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadia ("Chupeta") (Ref B). Post 
understands that State/L/LEI, in consultation with DOJ/OIA is 
preparing language for a new diplomatic note, as the 
Brazilian Government has informally requested, renewing the 
United State's request for Abadia's extradition, as a way of 
prompting immediate extradition, rather than after Abadia 
serves his sentence in Brazil.  Post further understands that 
we may be able to offer, in this particular case, the 
assurances the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) has 
demanded as a condition for extradition.  These assurances 
include a commitment on the part of the United States that 
Abadia will not serve more than 30 years in prison, as well 
as the commitment that the United States will credit Abadia 
with any time served in Brazil. 
 
3. (C) Our Ministry of Justice and Federal Police contacts 
have stressed that time is of the essence in the Abadia case. 
 Abadia was questioned over the weekend regarding a planned 
escape attempt from the prison where he is serving his 
sentence.  Further, he continues to be investigated by the 
Federal Police for crimes he may have committed in Brazil and 
new reports of his illegal activities while in prison are 
surfacing each day.  Either of these investigations could 
lead to further charges being filed against him in Brazilian 
courts within days, making it bureaucratically and 
politically significantly more difficult for President Lula 
to approve his extradition.  Moreover, the longer the 
extradition process takes, the more likely the reasons for 
the delay will be leaked to the press.  In either case, the 
result could be an indefinite delay in Abadia's extradition 
to the United States. 
 
4. (SBU) Post agrees that actions we take with regards to 
Abadia should be considered unique and exceptional, and that 
we will need to discuss separately with the GOB the broader 
issue of assurances.  We have made known to our Brazilian 
interlocutors at every opportunity that the United States is 
extremely uncomfortable with requests for assurances that 
fall outside the extradition treaty imposed by the Brazilian 
Government as conditions for approving U.S. extradition 
requests.   Furthermore, we have noted that if the United 
States does decide to provide the assurances in the Abadia 
case, Brazil should consider it an exceptional circumstance 
and that it should not expect the United States to routinely 
provide these assurances. 
 
5. (C) It is important to note that Embassy contacts have 
unanimously stressed that the Brazilian constitution gives 
the STF full authority to impose the conditions it has placed 
on extradition. Minister of Defense Jobim, a former Federal 
Deputy, Minister of Justice, and Chief Justice of the STF 
personally insisted to the Ambassador that there is no 
constitutional means around the STF ruling.  Ambassador 
Oswaldo Portella, a Ministry of External Relations detailee 
 
BRASILIA 00001069  002 OF 002 
 
 
to the Ministry of Justice and the Minister's international 
advisor, told our FBI Legal Attache that he recognized that 
these assurances fell outside the extradition treaty, but 
that the Government's hands were tied.  Any suggestion on our 
part that the GOB work around the STF order will be seen as a 
request for the GOB to take unconstitutional action. 
Moreover, the STF condition regarding assurances pertaining 
to a maximum penalty of 30 years is based on STF precedent 
going back several years.  As far as Post has been able to 
determine, the STF started applying the Brazilian penal code 
-- which limits to 30 years the maximum amount of time 
someone can serve in prison -- to extradition cases in a case 
involving an extradition requested by Chile in 2004.  Since 
then, the STF has included these requests for assurances as a 
condition for granting extraditions in their orders approving 
extraditions. 
 
6. (C) With regard to other assurances that will have to be 
provided before the Brazilians will approve Abadia's 
extradition -- including those required under Article 91 of 
Brazilian 6.815/80 -- it is Post's understanding that 
Washington also is preparing guidance for Post to submit to 
the Brazilian Government.  It is important to note that 
although these fall outside the Extradition Treaty, they are 
required under Brazilian law and Brazil requires them of 
every country.  Furthermore, when pressed to explain why 
Brazil is imposing extra-treaty commitments as conditions for 
extradition, our Brazilian contacts have responded that 
Article XI of the bilateral Extradition Treaty guarantees 
that the law of the requested state is the one that shall 
apply when deciding if an extradition will be approved. 
Nevertheless, our Brazilian contacts at the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ), including the National Secretary of Justice 
(an Under-Secretary level official within the MoJ), the chief 
of the MoJ's Department of Foreigners, and the chief of the 
MoJ's Extraditions Division have all indicated that they are 
amenable to working with the United States to come up with 
compromise language that can satisfy both parties. 
SOBEL