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Viewing cable 08BARCELONA76, DIVERGENT PARTY CONVENTIONS UNITE CATALAN PARTIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BARCELONA76 2008-08-11 11:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Barcelona
VZCZCXRO7731
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHLA #0076/01 2241101
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111101Z AUG 08
FM AMCONSUL BARCELONA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1010
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0970
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 1178
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BARCELONA 000076 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE (ESAMSON) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SP
SUBJECT: DIVERGENT PARTY CONVENTIONS UNITE CATALAN PARTIES 
 
BARCELONA 00000076  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. (SBU) "We love you a lot, Mr. Zapatero, but we love Catalonia 
even more," declared Generalitat and PSC president Jose at the 
close of the PSC eleventh party congress.  For the PSC, 
Montilla's words were especially poignant, a sign that their 
responsibilities of governing Catalonia would take some priority 
over supporting their co-religionists in Madrid. Substantial 
policy differences between the PSC and the PSOE also emerged as 
the Catalans refused to follow PSOE's sharp turn to the left. 
This new push to claim the center reflects the unusual electoral 
situation for the PSC, which does not battle for votes with the 
Popular Party of Catalonia (PPC), but with nationalist, 
center-right coalition Convergence and Union (CiU).  At their 
party convention the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC), 
the majority party of CiU, emphasized a "big tent" form of 
nationalism that seeks to welcome the entire nationalist 
spectrum, from moderates who favor the status quo to those who 
favor outright independence.  The Republican Left (ERC), the 
other independence party, one of PSC's coalition partners in the 
tripartite government (Govern), attempted to address why it has 
lost so many votes since 2006. The ultimate winner of a four-way 
presidential race ran on a "stay the course" platform, but with 
a bare plurality, new president Joan Puigcercos will not lead 
with a mandate and will have to carefully balance the demands of 
the ERC's partners and his intra-party critics. The convention 
of the PPC (PPC) was extremely contentious, as their 
newly-elected president was practically forced upon them by the 
national leadership. The PPC's major problem is that many 
Catalans perceive them to be actively undermining Catalonia's 
interests, hardly a winning strategy in a region with a strong 
national spirit. 
 
2. (SBU) While Catalan parties used the summer to sort out 
internal issues and re-position themselves vis-a-vis each other, 
this fall will see them work together to some degree to wrest 
even more autonomy from Madrid. First, the PSOE-led Spanish 
government and the PSC-led Generalitat are negotiating the terms 
of a new system for financing the Catalan government. Catalonia 
regularly provides more revenue to the central government than 
it receives in services; thus, all the parties except for the 
PPC, are in favor of receiving more money from the central 
government. The other point of contention continues to be 
implementation of the Estatut (Statute) governing relations 
between Catalonia and Madrid. Approved via referendum in 2006, 
the Estatut granted increased powers to the Generalitat, 
including its own police force. It was, however, immediately 
challenged in the Constitutional Tribunal (TC), Spain's highest 
constitutional authority. The TC is expected to issue a final 
ruling on the Estatut this fall. In their conventions, the 
parties called on the TC to keep the Estatut intact, though they 
have not outlined concrete plans in the event it receives a 
negative ruling.  END SUMMARY 
 
PSC:  Catalonia First 
 
3. (SBU) At its party congress this summer, the Socialist Party 
of Catalonia (PSC), long accused by the nationalist parties of 
putting PSOE ahead of Catalonia, struck an independent tone from 
PSOE in hopes of shoring up support. On the ideological front, 
the PSC's centrist move was mainly intended to seize the center 
from CiU. In their platform, the PSC did not call for wider 
access to abortion, support for euthanasia, nor removal of 
religious symbols from official ceremonies and schools, which 
were all moves PSOE made just weeks before. However, this was 
not just a political move, as historically the PSC has had a 
less confrontational attitude with the Catholic Church in 
Catalonia than PSOE does with the wider Spanish Church. This 
difference is attributed to the close relationship the Catalan 
Socialists have with the progressive sections of the Catalan 
Church, which date back to the Franco era, as well as the 
overall reputation for moderation that the Catalan bishops have. 
 
While the PSC's newfound moderate attitude is an important 
development for the party, more surprising is its more 
confrontational stance with PSOE. Vowing that they would 
aggressively pursue a fairer financing scheme for Catalonia, the 
PSC seeks to neutralize one of CiU's most effective weapons 
against them. At the same time, however, the PSC realizes that 
they must balance demands from PSOE and Catalonia. Although the 
PSC is technically an independent party, it has sat with PSOE in 
the same parliamentary group in the Congress of Deputies. While 
some sections of the party seek for it to have its own group, 
the leadership realizes that this, and other 'separatist' 
actions can damage both parties. If PSC completely breaks away, 
PSOE would have to form a Catalan federation of its own, the way 
it operates in the rest of Spain, and something it has not had 
since 1978. This would most likely lead to the defeat of both 
parties at the national and regional levels. Thus, the PSC seeks 
 
BARCELONA 00000076  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
balance in order to maintain power both in Catalonia, and with 
PSOE in Madrid. 
 
ERC:  Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
4. (SBU) The leftist, independence party, the ERC scored 
surprising electoral victories in the early part of the decade, 
enabling it to join the PSC-led coalition in the Govern in 2003 
and 2006. Since then, however, the ERC has suffered a large drop 
in votes, going from 8 seats to 3 in the Congress of Deputies 
after the March 2008 elections. After this defeat, party 
president, Josep Lluis Carod Rovira resigned that office, though 
he remained Vice President of the Generalitat. The internal 
struggle to replace him was a proxy battle over the future 
direction of a party seeking to regain its popularity. 
 
5. (SBU) A bitter 4-way race for the top two party positions, 
evolved, pitting two "stay-the-course" tickets against two "new 
direction" tickets. The winners, Joan Puigcercos for president 
and Joan Ridao for general secretary, won on a platform to 
largely continue the party's current policies, albeit their low 
share of the rank-and-file's vote (37.2% and 37.5% respectively) 
was not a solid endorsement of their views. Indeed, the 
presidential runner-up, Joan Carretero, campaigned as a harsh 
critic of both Carod and Puigcercos' policies, especially in 
regards to the party's relation with the PSC. Many in the ERC 
feel the Socialists compromised too much with Madrid over the 
Estatut, so much so that the ERC called for a 'no' vote on the 
referendum. In dealing with these critical factions, Puigcercos 
has vowed to mark three lines the Govern cannot cross without 
losing the ERC's support. These are: unwavering support for the 
current Estatut; promotion of Catalan language and culture, 
including having Catalonia's 1= million new arrivals learn 
Catalan; and a new finance regime that allocates more tax 
revenue for Catalonia. To further appease intra-party critics, 
Puigcercos said he will ask President Montilla for a formal 
meeting between the tripartite partners to "evaluate the 
accomplishments" of the coalition. It is clear that Puigcercos 
will have to carefully balance the demands from both his 
coalition partners and critics inside the party. Failure to do 
so could lead to the dissolution of the Govern and even harder 
times for the ERC. 
 
ICV:   A Third, But Important, Wheel 
 
6. (SBU) The third member of the tripartite coalition, also 
known as the Entesa Catalana de Progres, the ICV, did not hold a 
convention this summer, opting instead to convene next year. The 
ICV, while not independence-minded, desires more power for 
Catalonia, and largely supports the Socialists on most issues. 
However as a Green party, they are stern critics of the PSC's 
environmental policies. ICV leader and Catalan Councilor for the 
Interior, Joan Saura, often tries to maintain balance between 
the PSC and ERC. 
 
CDC:  Fighting an Uphill Battle 
 
7. (SBU) CDC, the majority party of CiU, has focused on 
recovering the presidency of the Generalitat since they were 
unable to win a majority in 2006. CDC's convention this summer 
underlined a party strategy that will mostly continue its 
current policies with minor adjustments. Among these slight 
tweaks was the adoption of party leader Artur Mas's pet project 
of "the great house Catalan-ism" (la casa gran del catalanisme). 
It is an attempt to make the party appear more welcoming of the 
different strands of Catalan nationalism, thus trying to expand 
its electorate and regaining a majority in the Generalitat. The 
party's platform does not explicitly call for independence, 
though it does emphasize Catalonia's right to self-determination 
and vaguely foresees Catalonia as a free and sovereign state in 
21st century Europe. CiU will also have a seat at the 
negotiating table this summer and fall as the regional and 
national governments wrangle over a new financing system. 
 
8. (SBU) In a perennial move, the CDC reiterated its desire to 
completely merge with rightist Democratic Union of Catalonia 
(UDC)  into a single party, which UDC, again, flatly refused, 
although it has not held a convention this summer. However, the 
two will continue as partners in CiU. The CDC also opted for 
more inclusion of the rank-and-file in decision-making, stating 
that the executive committee will consult with the membership on 
those matters of vital political transcendence, but their 
opinion will not be binding. Long accustomed to being perceived 
as the socially centrist choice among Catalan parties, it is not 
yet clear how the CDC will respond to the PSC's move to the 
middle. 
 
PPC:  Down but Not Quite Out 
 
 
BARCELONA 00000076  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
9. (SBU) The PPC, the Popular Party's Catalan subsidiary, is 
plagued by the same problems faced by the national party: 
unpopular leaders pushing unpopular ideas. For example, party 
members arrived at their convention to find that national PP 
president, Mariano Rajoy, had unilaterally imposed a last-minute 
candidate for PPC president, Alicia Sanchez-Camacho, a senator 
from Girona. Rajoy also dispatched the new PP Secretary for 
Organization, Ana Mato to persuade the other candidates, bitter 
rivals Alberto Fernanez-Dmaz and Daniel Sirera to drop their 
bids. Still, a fourth candidate, Montserrat Nebrera, refused to 
end her candidacy, and in the final vote, lost to 
Sanchez-Camacho by a slim 53%-47% vote. 
 
10. (SBU) Still, unpopular leaders are not the PPC's only 
obstacle to winning elections. In 2006, the PP opposed the 
Estatut for the complete opposite reason as the ERC; they 
claimed it gave too much autonomy to Catalonia. This is but one 
instance in which the PP was thought by most Catalans to be 
working against Catalonia's interests. In a region dominated by 
fervent nationalists, undermining Catalonia is hardly a winning 
strategy. If the entire goal of a political party is to win 
elections, the PPC has to drastically reform the way it does 
business if it ever hopes to govern Catalonia. 
 
COMMENT 
 
11. (SBU) As in many other ways, Catalan politics differ 
markedly from the rest of Spain, a product of the strong Catalan 
national spirit that has seen a resurgence in the past three 
decades of democracy. Still, despite this deep-seated 
nationalism, less than a third of Catalans support full 
independence from Spain. In Barcelona, the beating heart of 
Catalan politics and economy, support is even lower. It is 
difficult to imagine Spain without Catalonia and impossible to 
imagine Catalonia without Barcelona. Why, then, are the Catalan 
parties strongly advancing even more autonomy? Why are the 
Catalan Socialists pushing against PSOE, ranking "Catalan" over 
"socialist"? The answer is that while the vast majority of 
Catalans do not want independence, they do want respect from the 
rest of Spain.  They want recognition of the importance of the 
region in the Spanish context - that they pay more into the 
system than they get out of it, that they are, at least in their 
own minds, the hardest working, most productive, and most 
efficient.  We also believe they want acceptance of Catalonia as 
a people with a different "story", much like the Basques or the 
Galicians, that make them unique in Spain.  And recent history 
indicates that Madrid is ready to give them that respect, as the 
development of the Estatut showed. The central government 
voluntarily limited its power over the region, allowing the 
Catalans to police and educate themselves. Now, despite much 
bickering and hand wringing on all sides, most signs point to a 
new financing system that allows them to better fund themselves. 
 
12. (SBU) Since presiding over the Generalitat, the PSC has 
fully acknowledged that this desire for respect exists, and that 
to keep power, they must accommodate it. However, as the next 
regional elections (scheduled for 2010) approach, the PSC will 
have to strike careful balances, not only between PSOE and 
Catalonia, but between its left flank and the need to win the 
center. To some extent, the tripartite alliance is a real boon, 
as the PSC's partners, the ERC and ICV, will mostly likely pick 
up the leftist votes lost by the Socialists' attempt at the 
middle. This complicates things enormously for the CiU, which 
lacks a similar arrangement on the right. The PPC, though an 
occasional ally in the past, is so fraught with its own problems 
that it can provide little support; even should both parties 
desire it. In this light, the CiU's new policy of big-tent 
nationalism comes across as an aggressive electoral strategy to 
woo the staunch independents of the ERC, and win an absolute 
majority. In addition to placing nationalism at the forefront, 
the CiU can also hope that Spain's current economic woes, 
expected to last well into 2009, tarnish the incumbent 
Socialists enough to win. Indeed it may be that this is CiU's 
best hope, since the resolution of the Estatut and successful 
negotiations for a new finance system may fulfill Catalonia's 
desire for greater respect.  END COMMENT 
ROBINSON