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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD2463, KIRKUK: TENSE, RETURNING TO NORMAL, BUT NO RESUMPTION OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD2463 2008-08-06 15:16 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #2463/01 2191516
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061516Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8701
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL MOPS KCRM IZ
 
SUBJECT:  KIRKUK:  TENSE, RETURNING TO NORMAL, BUT NO RESUMPTION OF 
COMMUNAL VIOLENCE 
 
REF:  Baghdad 2423 
 
THIS IS A PRT KIRKUK REPORTING CABLE 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Over the past two weeks, ethnic relations in 
Kirkuk have been buffeted by the passage - and subsequent veto - of 
a controversial provincial elections law in Baghdad, a terrorist 
attack at a Kurdish demonstration resulting in mass casualties, a 
violent confrontation between Kurdish demonstrators and the Iraqi 
Turkoman Front (ITF), and a Provincial Council (PC) resolution 
passed by the Kurdish bloc threatening to join Kirkuk province to 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  Despite these events, 
Kirkuk remains generally stable and calm with no immediate threat of 
large-scale communal violence.  Arab and Turkomen politicians have 
entered into an informal alliance against the Kurds.  While Kurdish 
decisions to organize the July 28 demonstration and pass the 
resolution on the Regions Law were perceived as provocative by the 
other ethnic groups in the province, they are generally perceived as 
political maneuvers meant to influence negotiations in Baghdad on 
the elections law.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Personal Ties Endure as Community Attitudes Harden 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
2. (SBU) While rhetoric over the veto of the elections law has 
sometimes been heated, personal interactions between members of the 
different ethnic blocs at the Kirkuk Government Building (KGB) 
remain normal and even friendly.  PRT members have observed Kurdish 
and Arab Provincial Council (PC) members joking with each other over 
the prospect of the implementation of the Regions Law in Kirkuk. 
Leaders of all ethnic groups are speaking out against violence, and 
asking for calm from their constituents.  The PC meeting on 5 August 
saw all blocs represented and proceeded normally, with no apparent 
anger or difficulty. 
 
3. (SBU) While it is nearly business as usual at the KGB, a media 
battle is underway in Kirkuk between Kurd and Turkoman media 
outlets.  There are few Arab-specific media outlets in Kirkuk, and 
no true independent media. Turkomen television stations, such as 
Turkmeneli, present stories about Kirkuk with a Turkomen and Arab 
bias, while Kurdish media outlets do the same for the Kurds.  Biased 
media coverage in Kirkuk contributes to ethnic tension, but to date 
there has been no communal violence stemming directly from media 
coverage, and we are working to improve media skills and discourage 
inflammatory reporting. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Kurdish Political Tactics Provoke Other Communities 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (SBU) Arab and Turkomen contacts blame the Kurds for increased 
tension in Kirkuk over the past two weeks by organizing the 28 July 
demonstration that led to the attack on ITF headquarters and, a few 
days later while tensions in the city were still elevated, by having 
the Kurdistan Brotherhood List (KBL - Kurdish bloc on the PC) call a 
special PC meeting on 31 July to pass a resolution threatening to 
implement the Regions Law in Kirkuk -- essentially threatening to 
join the KRG.  Subsequent PRT meetings with Kurdish PC members 
confirm that both of these events were calculated political moves, 
approved by the KRG leadership in Erbil, to influence the 
negotiations over the elections law in Baghdad, but they were 
perceived by Kirkuk's Arab and Turkomen communities as direct 
threats. 
 
5. (SBU) A key goal for the Kurds in Kirkuk is to prevent Iraqi Army 
(IA) battalions from central and southern Iraq from entering Kirkuk. 
 Provincial leaders believe the current security situation in Kirkuk 
is calm, and that sufficient IA and Iraqi Police (IP) are present to 
maintain this peace (with which we and MND-N agree).  Kurdish 
leaders argue that IA battalions from the South will raise tensions 
in the province, but they clearly believe that such moves would also 
undermine Kurdish authority in the province.  Kirkuk PC Chairman 
Rizgar Ali (PUK) and PC member Mohammed Kamal (KDP) raised the issue 
of IA deployments with Iraqi Minister of Defense (MOD) Abdul Qadir 
during his visit to Kirkuk on 05 August.  Abdul Qadir reportedly 
said, "we have no intention to send extra troops into Kirkuk. 
Kirkuk has more troops than it needs right now." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Turkomen Fearful for Security 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU) Turkomen leaders in Kirkuk have established an informal 
political alliance with Arab leaders to prevent Kirkuk from joining 
the KRG, believing that if Kirkuk were to join the KRG, both 
 
communities would be marginalized.  In meetings with the PRT, both 
Turkomen and Arab PC members denounced the KBL's threat to implement 
the Regions Law, but both blocs appear to believe that this was a 
political maneuver meant to influence negotiations in Baghdad. 
Tahseen Kahea (ITF) said, in a 04 August meeting, that the 
implementation of the Regions Law was "only a political ruse, rather 
than a petition to join the KRG." 
 
7. (SBU) The Turkomen and Arabs have much in common politically, but 
the Turkoman are more fearful about security conditions in Kirkuk 
city, especially following the July 28 mob violence at ITF 
headquarters.  This incident left several dead (both Kurd and 
Turkomen), and led to the detention of at least nine ITF members. 
The details of this altercation are still under investigation, with 
both sides blaming the other for initiating the violence.  Turkomen 
leaders are proponents of bringing IA battalions from the South into 
Kirkuk, along with the establishment of a more prominent Coalition 
Forces (CF) presence in the city.  The Turkomen heavily backed the 
vetoed version of the provincial elections law, and stood to benefit 
disproportionately from the "32 percent" representational proposal. 
(Most estimates are that Turkomen make up no more than 12 percent of 
Kirkuk province's population. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Arab Kirkukis Less Threatened, but Aligned with Turkomen Against 
Kurds 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (SBU) Arab leaders in Kirkuk province are much more focused on 
the elections law than the Turkomen, and less on security, perhaps 
because Arab Kirkukis mostly live on the edge of the city and in the 
countryside.  Top Arab politicians, particularly Deputy Governor 
Rakan Saeed, and PC member Mohammed Khalil, appear to be in regular, 
direct contact with members of the Council of Representative (CoR). 
Rakan even claimed he was the author of the controversial Article 24 
on Kirkuk's future status.  Over the past two weeks, Arab leaders 
from Kirkuk have made several trips to Baghdad to meet with 
different CoR blocs - particularly ISCI, whom they hope will join 
with the Sunni groups on the Kirkuk issue.  The Arabs are proponents 
of bringing in IA troops from outside the province, just as they 
warmly welcomed efforts to establish what is now a predominantly 
Arab IA/IP presence in the Arab area of Hawija.  Arab Kirkukis 
favored the "32 percent" proposal, but appear willing to settle for 
a balanced ethnic split of the top three positions in the province 
(Governor, Deputy Governor, and PC Chairman if they can get a 
guarantee that Kirkuk will never join the KRG. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT: Ethnic tensions in Kirkuk province seem to have 
been managed following the July 28 violence.  Leaders of all ethnic 
groups have publicly called for calm, and have specifically avoided 
statements that might inflame the public.  Arab and Turkomen leaders 
appear to perceive the KBL's threat over the Regions Law as a 
political maneuver, rather than a serious threat to imminently pull 
Kirkuk into the KRG.  PC Chairman Rizgar Ali, at the 05 August PC 
meeting, emphasized that Kirkuk was not joining the KRG now, which 
may help to calm fears.  While the threat of violence in Kirkuk has 
been reduced, another violent incident in Kirkuk or political 
breakdown in Baghdad could reawaken ethnic animosities.  END 
COMMENT 
 
CROCKER