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Viewing cable 08ATHENS1216, TFGG01: GREECE'S BUSINESS-AS-USUAL WITH RUSSIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ATHENS1216 2008-08-28 17:51 2011-06-11 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #1216/01 2411751
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281751Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2404
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0380
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0104
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG GR RS
SUBJECT: TFGG01: GREECE'S BUSINESS-AS-USUAL WITH RUSSIA 
UNDERMINES STRONG NATO STATEMENTS 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 1188 
     B. ATHENS 1183 
     C. 07 ATHENS 2375 
     D. SECSTATE 91894 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DEBORAH MCCARTHY.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite strong statements at NATO and the EU 
by FM Bakoyannis supporting Georgian territorial integrity 
and condemning Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as independent states, the GOG at the same time is 
moving ahead with several "business-as-usual" events with 
Russia, including a visit this week of a Russian defense 
industry team to discuss arms purchases, the impending 
Parliamentary ratification of the South Stream gas pipeline 
deal with Russia, and co-sponsorship with Russia of a major 
cultural event marking 180 years of Greek-Russian diplomatic 
relations.  Embassy will continue to press the GOG to delay 
or cancel these events to avoid undercutting NATO and EU 
positions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GREECE'S EVOLVING POSITION 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The Georgia/Russia crisis has put Athens in a tight 
spot due to its historically close ties to both countries. 
Wary of alienating Moscow but spooked by Russian actions and 
the international community's tough response, the GOG at 
first tried to remain silent on the crisis (indeed, Prime 
Minister Karamanlis has still made no public statements on 
the situation).  Once an EU position began to take shape, 
Greece placed itself squarely behind France.  At this 
writing, the Greek position appears to be further evolving 
into one in which they try, under the guise of playing the 
role of a "bridge" between East and West, to take positions 
on both sides of the issue, making tough political statements 
at NATO and elsewhere on Georgia's territorial integrity, 
while moving forward with "business-as-usual" on Russian 
pipeline, arms deals, and cultural events. 
 
3. (C) At the special EU Foreign Ministers' meeting and the 
NATO Ministerial, FM Bakoyannis came out for the territorial 
integrity of Georgia and the need for the withdrawal of 
Russian troops to their pre-crisis positions.  She pledged 
two Greek monitors to the initial OSCE mission (the maximum 
10 percent allowed by OSCE rules of the 20 total monitors), 
and we were told the GOG would be willing to send the maximum 
of ten to the planned expanded 100-monitor mission.  Perhaps 
most significantly, Bakoyannis made a statement following 
Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
independent states in which she expressed "regret" for 
Russia's step and joined the French Presidency in 
"condemning" the Russian decision.  She was strongly 
criticized in the Greek press by a "Russian diplomat" (in 
fact, Russian Ambassador to Greece Vdovin) for using the word 
"condemn," which Vdovin noted Greece had not used in the case 
of Kosovo's declaration of independence. 
 
4. (SBU) Greece also stepped forward early with humanitarian 
assistance to Georgia.  The GoG told A/EconCouns on August 21 
that they have pledged 80,000 euro to the World Food Program 
to help procure necessary food aid.  According to Hellenic 
Aid, the GoG was considering additional humanitarian aid, but 
no decisions had yet been made yet.  As reported by Embassy 
Athens via unclass email to the Georgia Task Force on August 
13, the GoG has already delivered one C-130 full of 
humanitarian supplies, including 10-person tents (3.5 tons), 
blankets (2.5-3 tons), and various medicines and medical 
supplies, and 100,000 euro directly to UNHCR for IDPs in 
South Ossetia. 
 
DO ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS? 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The statements above notwithstanding, Greece is moving 
forward with several ill-advised moves that contradict, if 
not undermine, Greek expressions of support for Alliance 
positions: 
 
-- Greece is currently hosting the visit of Russian technical 
advisors to discuss Greek purchase of 450 Russian-made 
armored personnel carriers (BMPs) -- part of the pipeline and 
arms deal signed by Putin and Karamanlis last December (ref 
C).  Greek officials told us the Russian team would meet only 
with "private" Greek defense firms and there would be no 
official Greek participation.  We believe, however, that the 
Russian team is likely to meet Greek MOD officials and that 
Greek officials will participate in the Russians' meetings 
with defense firms. 
 
-- The Greek Parliament is moving forward (probably in the 
next week) with its previously scheduled ratification of the 
South Stream gas pipeline deal.  On August 28, the Parliament 
Committeeon Commerce and Production approved the 
ratifiation and sent it to the full Parliament.  In a 
statement the same day before the Parliament Foreign and 
Defense Committee, FM Bakoyannis said Greece would "honor any 
commitments it rokered before the Georgia crisis," while 
Deveopment Minister Folias stressed to the Commerce and 
Production Committee the "geopolitical importance" of South 
Stream and Greece's role as a "bridge" linking Eastern 
producers and Western consumers. 
 
-- On August 28, Russian Ambassador Vdovin gave a 
well-received press confrence announcing that the "Moscow 
Virtuosi" msical tour of Europe would begin in Athens onSeptember 5 at the Herodion theater next to the Acropolis. 
The event would take place under the auspices of the Greek 
Ministry of Culture and the Greek Parliament and was designed 
to mark 180 years of diplomatic relations between Russia and 
Greece. 
 
EMBASSY PUSHES BACK 
------------------- 
 
6. (C) Embassy delivered ref D points on Russia's recognition 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states to MFA 
S ecretary General Agathocles and to MFA A5 Directorate for 
CIS Countries Counsellor Elisabeth Fotiadou.  In addition, 
the Embassy has worked hard to convince the GOG not to 
continue "business-as-usual" with the Russians by moving 
forward with the BMP visit, the ratification of South Stream, 
and the cultural event.  We raised the issue with PM 
diplomatic advisor Bitsios, MFA SecGen Agathocles, Bakoyannis 
advisor Haris Lalacos, the CIS Desk at the MFA, the Hellenic 
General Staff, the Ministry of Development, the Parliament 
leadership, and other Greek government agencies, as well as 
with numerous other diplomatic missions, including the 
British, French, Canadian, Polish, Finnish, Hungarian, 
Latvian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Slovenian, and Estonian 
missions.  Our diplomatic colleagues all promised to report 
the information to their capitals. 
 
7. (C) We have heard a generally uniform response from GOG 
officials.  They argue that the Georgia/Russia crisis and 
such developments as the Parliament's impending ratification 
of the South Stream pipeline are "not connected in any way," 
and that the latter was scheduled well in advance and should 
be seen as "routine."  We counter that these events are very 
closely connected, that "business-as-usual" at this point 
serves to legitimize Russia's actions, and that moving 
forward with these events contradicts, if not undermines, 
Greece's stated agreement with Alliance and EU positions. 
 
8. (C) The South Stream ratification received Committee 
approval on August 28, but approval by the full Parliament 
has not yet taken place (we expect it very shortly).  Thus, 
we may still have a window of opportunity to convince the 
Greeks to delay.  We will continue to press them and to urge 
our diplomatic colleagues to do the same.  We will also look 
for opportunities to urge PM Karamanlis to break his silence 
and to come out in favor of Alliance positions. 
MCCARTHY