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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA2116, GOVERNMENT RELEASES POLITICAL PRISONER ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA2116 2008-08-04 09:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO2484
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2116/01 2170924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040924Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1535
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002116 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM KJUS PGOV PREL ET
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT RELEASES POLITICAL PRISONER ON 
WASHINGTON PRESSURE 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Seven days after Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Rights, and Labor David Kramer asked senior 
Ethiopian Government (GoE) officials to grant political 
detainee Assefa Abraha parole in accordance with standard 
Ethiopian judicial practice, the GoE released the former 
senior official on July 31 after over seven years in prison. 
The release highlights the effectiveness of respectful and 
private, yet clear and direct, bilateral engagement by senior 
USG officials in pressing the GoE on adhering to the rule of 
law in managing domestic political space.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (SBU) Prior to the 2001 rift within the ruling Tigrayan 
People's Liberation Front's (TPLF) Central Committee, Assefa 
Abraha headed the office of Government Development 
Organizations in the Office of the Prime Minister and served 
from 1995-2001 as the Chairman of the Board of the Ethiopian 
Privatization Agency.  After opposing the Prime Minister in 
2001, former Defense Minister (and now independent political 
opposition leader) Seeye Abraha and four of his siblings, 
including Assefa Abraha, were imprisoned and prosecuted on 
corruption charges in May 2001.  Despite Assefa's non-guilty 
plea, the Ethiopian High Court finally convicted him in July 
2007 on two charges for selling two GoE organizations slated 
for privatization below their market value.  The court 
sentenced Assefa to nine years in prison.  The fact that 
Assefa, his brother Seeye, three other siblings, and several 
other former senior GoE officials who opposed the Prime 
Minister in 2001 were immediately and systematically 
imprisoned and convicted of corruption -- combined with the 
fact that the sale of the two properties for which Assefa was 
convicted was approved by the entire nine-member Board of the 
Privatization Agency and approved by the Prime Minister -- 
give credence to the view that these detentions and 
convictions were politically motivated. 
 
USG INTERVENTION 
---------------- 
 
3. (SBU) While Seeye Abraha and his other siblings were 
released in 2007, Assefa remained in prison.  Standard 
Ethiopian judicial practice dictates that Ethiopian convicts 
shall be released on parole upon serving two-thirds of their 
sentence with good behavior.  Despite having served 
two-thirds of his sentence by May 2007 -- two months prior to 
his final conviction and sentencing -- Assefa was never 
subjected to a parole review.  Members of the diplomatic 
community have hypothesized that by continuing to hold 
Assefa, the GoE effectively kept his brother Seeye from 
taking too strong of a stance in opposition politics.  (Note: 
Seeye has explicitly told Ambassador and EmbOffs that 
Assefa's sustained detention has impeded him from taking a 
more formal opposition political role or from joining an 
established opposition party. End Note).  Since being 
released Seeye has actively sought USG support to urge the 
GoE to grant Assefa parole and to protest the 24-hour 
surveillance focused on himself.  Ambassador Yamamoto has 
raised the case with Prime Minister Meles twice in recent 
months. 
 
4. (SBU) Seeye conveyed Assefa's case to DRL A/S Kramer on 
July 23, requesting Kramer's intervention.  On July 24, A/S 
Kramer and Pol/Econ Chief raised the case with EPRDF Central 
Committee member and Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister 
Bereket Simon.  In response to A/S Kramer's inquiry whether 
there was a possibility of positive GoE consideration for 
Assefa's case, Bereket argued that the judiciary decided 
Assefa's case, found him guilty of corruption, and the GoE 
had no right to intervene.  Bereket went on to argue that if 
the GoE were to consider "pardoning" someone convicted of 
corruption, it would have to do so for all such convicts and 
not on a case-by-case basis.  Pol/Econ Chief interjected to 
clarify that the USG was not requesting a pardon for Assefa, 
but rather that he be subjected to the same standard judicial 
practice of granting parole to those convicts who have served 
over two-thirds of their sentences with good behavior.  With 
this additional detail about the case, Bereket conceded that 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002116  002 OF 002 
 
 
Assefa's parole case should be considered.  Seven days later, 
on July 31, prison officials called Assefa to the 
administrative office to inform him of his immediate release. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
5. (SBU) The release of Assefa Abraha highlights the 
effectiveness of respectful and private, yet clear and 
direct, bilateral engagement by senior USG officials in 
pressing the GoE on adhering to the rule of law in managing 
domestic political space.  Bereket's tactic of attempting to 
redirect the conversation by presenting not-wholly-accurate 
or relevant details, however, is also a recurring dynamic in 
senior GoE dialogue with visiting USG officials.  By 
distracting USG interlocutors with obscure and stylized 
details about any given case, GoE officials often succeed in 
deflecting pressure by visiting USG principals away from the 
fundamental issues at hand.  In the case of Assefa Abraha, 
the combination of senior Washington engagement along with 
the familiarity of the details of the case presented by 
Embassy staff presented the necessary mix to secure a 
positive result.  End Comment. 
YAMAMOTO