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Viewing cable 08USUNNEWYORK590, SETTLEMENTS UNSCR: ARABS TO CONSIDER BROADENING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USUNNEWYORK590 2008-07-02 23:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO8629
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0590/01 1842315
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 022315Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4544
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000590 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR IO AND NEA FRONT OFFICES 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAL KWBG UNSC PA IS
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS UNSCR: ARABS TO CONSIDER BROADENING 
TEXT TO INCLUDE OTHER ROADMAP OBLIGATIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 69092 
     B. USUN 573 
     C. USUN 531 
 
1. (SBU) Libya convened a second UNSC experts meeting on July 
2 to discuss its draft resolution condemning Israeli 
settlement expansion.  (Note: During the first experts 
meeting on June 30, several delegations expressed support for 
the draft text, but others including USUN and UKUN said they 
had yet to receive instructions from capitals -- so Libya 
adjourned the meeting.  End Note.)  During the July 2 
meeting, USUN and UKUN argued that the text as drafted could 
not be adopted by the Council because it focused on only one 
issue from the Roadmap -- settlements -- without addressing 
the obligations of other parties or the overall context of 
the peace process.  Drawing from ref A, Poloff listed several 
elements a resolution would need to include to potentially 
secure U.S. support, including recognition of progress 
achieved thus far in negotiations and on the ground as well 
as a call on regional states to cut off public and private 
funding for terrorist groups.  Recalling the July 2 vehicular 
attack in Jerusalem that killed four, Poloff emphasized that 
any resolution must unequivocally condemn all such attacks 
targeting civilians.  Based on these elements, the Libyan 
draft would need to be completely rewritten to serve as the 
basis for negotiations.  USUN and UKUN suggested that 
delegations consult with their capitals on whether they could 
support addressing this range of elements before experts 
begin a drafting exercise. 
 
2. (SBU) France, Russia, South Africa, and Italy all voiced 
support for addressing the kinds of elements the U.S. and UK 
had mentioned, to ensure the Council is able to take action 
on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.  South Africa, notably, 
said it could support all of the elements USUN listed -- 
including a condemnation of attacks against civilians -- but 
predicted difficulty in agreeing on specific language 
addressing these elements.  The Libyan expert, recalling that 
more than nine delegates supported the Arab draft on June 30, 
argued that expanding the focus of the resolution would make 
it impossible for the Council to reach consensus.  France 
pointed out that it would be impossible for the Council to 
adopt a resolution solely focused on settlements because the 
U.S. would exercise its veto.  Russia then urged Libya to 
consult with the Arab Group to see if the Arabs are prepared 
to engage on a more comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian draft 
UNSCR.  Russia added that if the Arabs refuse, the only other 
option would be to put the Libyan draft in blue and call for 
a vote.  The Libyan expert, after expressing frustration that 
the U.S., UK, and France could not present an alternate text 
despite receiving the Libyan draft two weeks ago, agreed to 
consult the Arab Group on the idea of a broader 
Israeli-Palestinian UNSCR.  (Comment:  If the Arabs agree to 
negotiate a broader text, a view Arab PermReps had earlier 
expressed to Amb Khalilad (ref B), the Libyan expert would 
then call another experts meeting -- most likely on Monday 
July 7 -- and would expect one of the P-3 to propose edits or 
an alternate draft.  End Comment.) 
 
3. (SBU) Separately, French PR Ripert told Amb Khalilzad on 
July 1 that France would be prepared to table a modified 
version of the alternate P-3 draft UNSCR at the right time to 
draw support away from the Libyan draft and serve as a 
possible basis for consensus.  (Note: This text was e-mailed 
to IO/UNP and cleared by the Department on June 30.  End 
Note.)  Explaining the modifications France would seek, 
Ripert argued the alternate draft UNSCR should treat equally 
the Palestinian security and Israeli settlement Roadmap 
obligations.  He suggested using the same language to address 
both issues (e.g., "condemn" attacks against civilians as 
well as settlement expansion).  He said that France would 
have other minor text changes to propose, as well.  Ripert 
said France is in no hurry to take action on this issue, and 
would prefer to defer action until after the French-hosted 
Euro-Med summit on July 13-14, which will include Arab and 
Israeli participation.  Ripert did not offer any plan for 
convincing the Arab Group and NAM members of the Security 
Council to wait until mid-July, however.  Furthermore, French 
expert Nicolas Kassianides said on July 2 that Paris had 
still not issued instructions authorizing him to formally 
share with USUN the amendments Ripert described to Amb 
Khalilzad.  According to Kassianides, Paris is concerned that 
the draft will leak and France will incur Arab disfavor 
because the text moves so far away from a focus on 
settlements.  He also speculated that Paris may want the 
Mission to delay even negotiating a P-3 text until after the 
July 13 summit.  But Kassianides agreed that if the P-3 are 
unable to present an alternate text during the next experts 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000590  002 OF 002 
 
 
meeting, momentum could shift back in Libya's favor because 
other delegations could conclude the P-3 are not serious 
about reaching consensus, and the Arabs could decide to put 
their draft to a vote. 
Khalilzad