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Viewing cable 08TOKYO1802, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO1802 2008-07-01 08:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7044
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1802/01 1830808
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010808Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5519
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1046
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8670
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2399
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6902
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9255
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4183
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0174
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0589
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) U.S. makes one compromise after another to North Korea; Hasty 
results are fraught with danger (Nikkei) 
 
(2) Nuclear threat to Japan -- Repercussions from North Korea's 
nuclear declaration (Part 1): Impatient U.S. to delist just as DPRK 
anticipated (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Nuclear threat to Japan -- Repercussions from Korea's nuclear 
declaration (Part 2): Need for Japan to rebuild North Korea policy, 
U.S. policy (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) Dispatch of "handful of" SDF personnel to Sudan: lack of PKO 
strategy (Asahi) 
 
(5) Ozawa embarks on coordination for campaign cooperation with 
other opposition parties on his nationwide tour (Yomiuri) 
 
(6) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties (Nikkei) 
 
(7) Wiercinski becomes new commander of U.S. Army Japan at Camp Zama 
(Asahi) 
 
(8) Man arrested for bomb threat to U.S. Embassy (Sankei) 
 
(9) Flights leaving Haneda to the west to be shorter by 3 minutes 
with partial return of airspace over U.S. Yokota base, starting in 
September (Asahi) 
 
(10) Prime Minister's schedule, June 30 (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) U.S. makes one compromise after another to North Korea; Hasty 
results are fraught with danger 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 1, 2008 
 
The United States delisted North Korea as a terrorism sponsor in 
return for Pyongyang's declaration of its nuclear development 
programs. Following this, the six-party talks have entered a new 
phase. Under the situation in which things are going on under the 
lead of the U.S. and North Korea, Pyongyang has given no information 
on the number of nuclear weapons and facilities it now possesses. 
Since nuclear arms threaten Japan's national security, the 
government, which has been beset with the issue of North Korea's 
abductions of its people, now finds itself in a difficult 
situation. 
 
U.S. President Bush abruptly changed his schedule and appeared in 
the White House's Rose Garden a little past 07:30 on June 26. The 
President held a press conference to announce the delisting plan 
only less than two hours after the North presented the nuclear 
report. 
 
Recently, the Bush administration has often used North Korea's 
favorite expression, "action for action," in an apparent attempt to 
justify what it did in response to North Korea's action. 
 
In a drive to hurriedly produce positive diplomatic results in the 
 
TOKYO 00001802  002 OF 010 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08 
 
run-up to the expiration of its term of office, the Bush 
administration has made one compromise after another. The North's 
nuclear report is not directly linked to the removal of North Korea 
from the U.S. blacklist under a six-party agreement. But the U.S. 
decided to delist North Korea with the aim of prompting Pyongyang to 
produce a nuclear report six months behind schedule. 
 
Japan has taken seriously the fact that the report contains no 
information about North Korea's nuclear weapons. Focusing on this 
fact, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said in 
talks held by Japan, the U.S., and South Korea in Washington in 
mid-May, "That's why the verification of the report becomes 
important." He called on his counterparts for their cooperation in 
forming a framework to verify the nuclear report. 
 
The Bush administration has also deepened cooperative relations with 
India and Pakistan, both of which possess nuclear weapons. While 
making utmost efforts to prevent Iran's nuclear development in the 
Middle East, the Bush administration has given top priority to 
preventing North Korea from shipping its nuclear weapons. The 
administration has thus adopted the so-called "double standard." 
 
According to (U.S.) informed sources, North Korea gives priority to 
the nonuse and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons over possession, 
like Pakistan. This shows that the U.S. has a different type of 
alarm from Japan, which is faced with nuclear threat. 
 
The U.S.-North Korea framework accord signed under the Clinton 
administration in 1994 used just the expression "freeze" (on 
operations at nuclear facilities in North Korea), so North Korea, 
breaking its promise, resumed plutonium production. The resumption 
allowed the North to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea might do 
the same thing under the latest agreement, too. But NSC Advisor 
Stephen Hadley said: "The framework agreement was a bilateral accord 
between the U.S. and North Korea. The agreement this time specifies 
that multilateral nations push ahead with sanctions and diplomatic 
negotiations. The accord also obligates the North not to freeze but 
to disable nuclear facilities." 
 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice advocates developing the 
six-party talks into a Northeast Asia security mechanism. If moves 
for creating the mechanism gain momentum in the six-party foreign 
ministerial, the next U.S. administration will take over the 
challenge. Hadley emphasized that the two factors of multilateral 
agreement and continuity will ensure that the failure in the days of 
the Clinton administration will never be repeated. 
 
Even so, a sense of apprehension cannot be erased. The Group of 
Eight (G-8) leaders planned to hold the six-party talks soon after 
the U.S. delists North Korea, but this plan was cancelled. Behind 
this decision seems to be North Korea's strategy to put off the 
six-party talks to sometime after the G-8 Summit (Lake Toya Summit) 
and ascertain moves by U.S. Congress during the 45 days until the 
delisting plan is put into effect. The Japan-U.S. summit to be held 
on the sidelines of the G-8 Summit will be the first important test 
case to prompt Pyongyang to disable its facilities in the third step 
under the six-party agreement. 
 
(2) Nuclear threat to Japan -- Repercussions from North Korea's 
nuclear declaration (Part 1): Impatient U.S. to delist just as DPRK 
anticipated 
 
 
TOKYO 00001802  003 OF 010 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
June 28, 2008 
 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting Kyoto on June 27 
to attend the Group of Eight foreign ministerial, was hit by 
questions during a press conference to explain the U.S. decision to 
remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. She 
replied: "Even if the DPRK is delisted as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, there still remain sanction measures against it." 
 
Washington's decision to start the process of delisting Pyongyang in 
return for the North's having provided the day before a list of its 
nuclear programs, as promised in a six-party agreement, met with 
strong reactions not only in Japan but also the United States. The 
Wall Street Journal carried an editorial that went: "Delisting North 
Korea will send a message to rogue states that just by producing 
nuclear weapons, they can boost their political power." 
 
President George W. Bush has acknowledged that the DPRK's nuclear 
declaration does not include the enriched-uranium nuclear program, 
nuclear cooperation with Syria, and a list of nuclear weapons, which 
threaten Japan's security. The Bush administration has made a 
complete about-face in its policy from the one it professed when it 
was inaugurated. At that time, President Bush described North Korea 
as part of an "axis of evil." 
 
For the Bush administration, negotiations with North Korea on its 
nuclear programs are a fight against time. There are about seven 
months to go before President Bush leaves office. However, North 
Korean leader Kim Jong Il can serve as general secretary for as long 
as he wishes. There was a previous case in which the White House 
made a major concession to North Korea during its closing days 
because it was in the rush to achieve progress on denuclearization. 
President Bush, too, is proving to be no exception. 
 
North Korea completely saw through President Bush's anxiousness to 
make a deal. According to a source familiar with the six-party 
talks, Washington and Pyongyang generally agreed on the contents of 
the DPRK's nuclear declaration in their bilateral meeting in April. 
In order to win further concessions, however, Pyongyang dragged out 
negotiations, urging Washington to first delist it from its rest of 
state sponsors of terrorism. The source said: "North Korea took 
advantage of Christopher Hill, chief U.S. negotiator at the 
Six-Party Talks." 
 
Following Pyongyang's submission of its nuclear declaration, 
Six-Party Talks on North Korean's nuclear programs will enter the 
next stage in which the DPRK is to completely abandon its nuclear 
weapons. However, the time left for the Bush administration to reach 
that stage is too short. 
 
The Japanese government has insisted that the United States should 
not delist the DPRK before improvement is made on the abduction 
issue. Tokyo will not only have to move ahead with the U.S., South 
Korea, China and Russia to pressure the North to abandoning its 
nuclear weapons, it will also have to find a way to resolve of the 
abduction issue. It therefore finds itself in a difficult position. 
North Korea considers delisting to be an important step toward 
normalizing relations with the United States. As Washington and 
Pyongyang move closer to each other, it is conceivable that discord 
might break out between Tokyo and Washington. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001802  004 OF 010 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08 
 
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said on June 27: "Denuclearization is 
important, but we have to resolve the abduction issue, as well." He 
underscored his intention to aim at pressuring North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear programs and at the same time making progress on 
the abduction issue. At the G-8 Summit in Hokkaido, which will open 
just 10 days from now, Fukuda intends to take up the North Korean 
issue in a positive manner in order to boost his administration's 
popularity. However, if the Fukuda government provides support to 
North Korea without any progress on the abduction issue, its 
diplomacy might be fatally wounded A senior Foreign Ministry 
official said in worried voice: "Any mishandling of the issue could 
create a problem for the future that would make it difficult for the 
Fukuda administration to survive. 
 
(3) Nuclear threat to Japan -- Repercussions from Korea's nuclear 
declaration (Part 2): Need for Japan to rebuild North Korea policy, 
U.S. policy 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
June 29, 2008 
 
On June 25, a day before the United States started the process of 
removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, 
U.S. President George W. Bush called Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda on 
the phone to say: "I will not forget the abduction issue." Although 
the remark shows the President's sincere feeling, his real intention 
was in his unreported remark: "There must never be a divide in 
U.S.-Japan relations. That would please only North Korea." 
 
If the delisting actually takes place 45 days later, Japan will lose 
an effective pressure card against North Korea for resolving the 
abduction issue. The remark was an expression of President Bush's 
concern that if Japan were to display skepticism about the 
reliability of the bilateral alliance, Pyongyang would triumph in 
the end. 
 
The Fukuda government is now under pressure to revamp its North 
Korea policy and to review the foundation of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance. 
 
Japan has already announced in the recent bilateral working-level 
talks its decision to partially lift sanction measures against North 
Korea, reflecting Fukuda's stance of giving more importance to a 
"dialogue" approach than to a "pressure" approach. Japan now needs 
to come up with an elaborate strategy toward North Korea that uses 
as diplomatic leverage the use of economic cooperation and energy 
assistance. 
 
Creating a mechanism which would allow the involvement of Japan and 
international organizations to join the reinvestigation of the 
abduction issue will be a topic of discussion between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang. Otherwise, North Korea might again claim there are no new 
facts, as it said in 2004 after the two meetings between Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. 
 
It is also important for the Japanese government to gain the 
public's understanding. 
 
Shigeru Yokota and Sakie Yokota, the parents of abductee Megumi 
Yokota, openly voiced their distrust of the government on June 28 in 
Tsuruoka City, Yamagata Prefecture. They stated that they saw no 
enthusiasm in the Japanese government to get the abductees back. 
 
TOKYO 00001802  005 OF 010 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08 
 
 
There is a certain sense of helplessness in the Japanese government. 
According to a senior Foreign Ministry official, the prevailing view 
there is delisting will come but the implementing process would not 
get started for a while. 
 
Ever since he took office, Fukuda has called on Bush not to remove 
the DPRK from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, but 
Japan's request has not been accepted. Some influential Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) members contend that they there is no 
evidence that Fukuda has made any effort to strengthen the 
Japan-U.S. alliance relationship. They cite his lack of interest in 
the use of the right of collective self-defense, which the United 
States has continued to ask Japan to consider. 
 
Fukuda must strengthen the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, 
while moving forward with negotiations with Pyongyang by using a 
carrot-and-stick negotiating approach. Now is the time for Fukuda to 
test his diplomatic skills. 
 
(4) Dispatch of "handful of" SDF personnel to Sudan: lack of PKO 
strategy 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
July 1, 2008 
 
Prime Minister Fukuda during a meeting with UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon held on June 30 revealed his government's plan to dispatch 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to the command center of the UN 
peace-keeping operations (PKO) in southern Sudan.  Defense Minister 
Ishiba is expected to order the Joint Staff Council chairman to 
prepare for the dispatch of a handful of SDF personnel in September. 
The Defense Ministry will dispatch a preparatory team to Sudan 
within July at the earliest for the inspection of the central 
command located in al-Khartum. 
 
Participation in PKO is one of the concrete measures Japan takes as 
a peace-cooperating state. Ban during the meeting welcomed the move, 
noting: "It is very encouraging. I welcome Japan's decision."  He 
said he hoped for Japan's cooperation in logistical support, 
including transportation as well as the dispatch of command center 
personnel, saying, "I hope the SDF will contribute in specialized 
areas in the future." Fukuda also told Ban plans to donate about 1 
million dollars to the PKO training center in Malaysia and dispatch 
an SDF officer as a lecturer to the center as a first case. 
 
MOD opposes foregone conclusion that SDF personnel should be 
dispatched 
 
Fukuda during a joint press conference with Ban held after the 
meeting proudly said, "I have conveyed to UN Secretary General Ban 
Japan's resolution that it as a peace-cooperating nation will make 
comprehensive contributions in a proactive manner for the sake of 
peace and the further development of our society." 
 
The idea of dispatching SDF personnel cropped up after Prime 
Minister Fukuda came up with a proposal for making Japan a 
"peace-cooperating nation" in a policy speech he delivered in 
January. Related government agencies desperately tried to find an 
appropriate country to be the destination for Japan's PKO personnel 
at the request of the Fukuda administration, which wanted to 
demonstrate Japan's international contribution to the international 
 
TOKYO 00001802  006 OF 010 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07//08 
 
community as the summit-host nation. They came up with Sudan. 
 
The Kantei and the Foreign Ministry at first considered the 
possibility of dispatching GSDF personnel to Juba, a major city in 
southern Sudan. However, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) opposed the 
government's stance that made dispatching SDF personnel a foregone 
conclusion, saying that it had had a harsh experience when it 
dispatched personnel to Mozambique, where they encountered trouble 
from local diseases. Reasons cited by the MOD included the argument 
that it was not in national interests for SDF personnel to risk 
their lives in Sudan. They argued that the country has a different 
climate and culture and that the Defense Ministry cannot dispatch 
troops to dangerous areas just for the convenience of the Foreign 
Ministry and for PKO strategy. However, China is rapidly increasing 
its presence in Africa through the dispatches of PKO personnel and 
official development assistance (ODA). China has dispatched 1,977 
personnel as of the end of May, following France -- both are UNSC 
members. Japan has dispatched only 36, the smallest number among G-8 
member nations. Africa is far away from Japan in geographical terms. 
However, its importance as a supplier of rare metals is increasing. 
 
 
The following comment by a Japanese government source indicates 
Japan lacks a PKO strategy: "When withdrawal of SDF personnel from 
refueling operations in the Indian Ocean and air-lifting operations 
in Iraq became a hot topic, we realized that our policy toward 
UN-led PKO activities was weak. We should have compiled a mid- to 
long-term strategy for international cooperation." 
 
(5) Ozawa embarks on coordination for campaign cooperation with 
other opposition parties on his nationwide tour 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Excerpts) 
July 1, 2008 
 
Ichiro Ozawa, president of the major opposition Democratic Party of 
Japan, on June 30 visited Gifu Prefecture, the last prefecture on 
his nationwide stumping tour that began in May 2006 shortly before 
assuming the party presidency. With an eye on a Lower House 
dissolution for a snap general election, Ozawa has also embarked on 
coordination with the aim of carrying out campaign cooperation with 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People's New Party (PNP). 
His effort has already given rise to objections in some local 
districts. 
 
After touring shopping streets in Gifu City yesterday, Ozawa 
exchanged views with local housewives and others and sought the 
cooperation of Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) Gifu 
executives. Ozawa also held a press conference in the city and 
indicated that he would make clear his attitude in late August or 
later regarding the DPJ leadership race, saying: "I want to continue 
visiting a variety of places in July. My calendar is packed with 
events at least until after the (mid-August) Bon holiday break. I am 
so engrossed in the nationwide tour that the party presidential race 
is not on my mind." 
 
The frequency of Ozawa's nationwide visits increased in June. In 
fact, Gifu was the 13th prefecture he visited in the month. His tour 
has been focused on campaign cooperation with other opposition 
parties. The SDP is reluctant to join hands with the DPJ in such 
prefectures as Yamagata, Miyagi, Niigata, Fukuoka, Oita, Miyazaki, 
and Okinawa. Given the situation, when he visited those prefectures, 
 
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Ozawa made certain to meet in person with local Rengo, DPJ, and SDP 
executives. The reason is that Ozawa, deeming the SDP's prefectural 
organization rigid, thinks controlling SDP headquarters is 
difficult. In yesterday's press conference, Ozawa expressed high 
hopes for the SDP's organizational strength, saying: "The SDP still 
has influence in some local districts. Joining hands with that party 
is essential." 
 
The DPJ has also stopped looking for its own candidates for some 
districts, including the Tokyo No. 25 constituency, where PNP 
candidates are likely to win seats as a result of garnering votes 
from postal organizations. 
 
The DPJ has informally determined its own candidate for 243 
single-seat constituencies. Further, the party has decided to back 
SDP and PNP candidates for 10 constituencies and is also considering 
supporting the two parties' candidates in an additional 20-30 
constituencies. 
 
Ozawa's top-down approach displayed in his nationwide tour has been 
drawing fire in some areas. In Akita, Ozawa dissuaded the DPJ 
prefectural chapter from backing a prefectural assemblyman and to 
instead to support the SDP candidate. This has left strong 
discontent in the prefectural chapter. 
 
(6) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 30, 2000 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote findings from the 
last survey conducted in late May.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
Yes 26 (24) 
No 63 (64) 
Can't say (C/S) + don't know (D/K) 11 (12) 
 
Q: Which political party do you support or like now? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 36 (31) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 35 (36) 
New Komeito (NK) 4 (5) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (4) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1 (2) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 
Other political parties 1 (1) 
None 15 (16) 
C/S+D/K 5 (5) 
 
(Note) The total percentage does not become 100 PERCENT  in some 
cases due to rounding 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was taken by Nikkei Research Inc. 
over the telephone on a random digit dialing (RDD) basis. For the 
survey, samples were chosen from among men and women aged 20 and 
over across the nation. A total of 1,555 households with one or more 
eligible voters were sampled, and answers were obtained from 900 
persons (57.9 PERCENT ). 
 
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(7) Wiercinski becomes new commander of U.S. Army Japan at Camp 
Zama 
 
ASAHI (Page 31) (Full) 
July 1, 2008 
 
By Mitsuo Sekine 
 
There was a commander replacement ceremony at U.S. Army Japan 
(USARJ) headquarters at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City, Zama City) on 
June 30. Brig. Gen. Francis Wiercinski, former deputy commanding 
general of U.S. Army Pacific in Hawaii, has now become the new USARJ 
commander, replacing Maj. Gen. Elbert Perkins, who has retired after 
serving in the post for five years. As was the case with his 
predecessor, Wiercinski also presides over the headquarters of U.S. 
Army 1st Corps. 
 
Lt. Gen. Benjamin Mixon of U.S. Army Pacific and Gen. Ryoichi Oriki, 
chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force, and others attended 
the ceremony. Outgoing commander Perkins delivered a speech before 
some 220 Japanese and American persons, in which he said: "I am 
proud of the last five years (here at Camp Zama). The establishment 
of U.S. Army 1st Corps headquarters at Camp Zama (in December 2007) 
has made us feel that the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force is 
always beside us." Many Camp Zama-centered plans are in place to 
strengthen collaboration between Japan and the Untied States, such 
as increasing the number of personnel at U.S. Army 1st Corps 
headquarters from the current 30 to 90 in September and the 
relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Regiment to Camp Zama by 
fiscal 2012. 
 
Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Wiercinski, who is scheduled to become a major 
general before long, said in his speech: "I have hopes for Japan, a 
great ally of the United States." 
 
Holding a press conference on behalf of the new commander, Maj. 
James Crawford, a U.S. Army spokesman at Camp Zama, said: "The 
United States and Japan will continue strengthening cooperation. 
Increasing his understanding of Japan is the new commander's 
immediate task. In July, he is scheduled to tour U.S. and SDF bases 
across Japan and to visit places in (Kanagawa) Prefecture and 
Zama." 
 
(8) Man arrested for bomb threat to U.S. Embassy 
 
SANKEI (Online) (Full) 
June 30, 2008 (22:59) 
 
The Akasaka Police Station of Tokyo's Metropolitan Police Department 
on June 30 arrested a 50-year-old jobless man of Ichihara City, 
Chiba Prefecture, for threatening to blow up the U.S. Embassy in 
Tokyo's Minato Ward. The man has admitted to the charges, but the 
Akasaka police will carefully check his mental competency to bear 
responsibility. 
 
According to police investigations, the man called the U.S. Embassy 
that day from his home at around 10:30 a.m., saying, "I've set a 
bomb there, and it will blow up at 12 noon." Police tightened 
security, and the man is charged with obstructing the embassy's 
business. His home telephone number was displayed on the embassy's 
telephone, so he was identified. 
 
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There was a similar telephone call to the U.S. Embassy on June 26. 
The Akasaka police are investigating the man's involvement. 
 
(9) Flights leaving Haneda to the west to be shorter by 3 minutes 
with partial return of airspace over U.S. Yokota base, starting in 
September 
 
ASAHI ONLINE (Full) 
July 1, 2008, 1:27PM 
 
Yokota Air Base of the U.S. military (Tokyo) will partially return 
to Japan this September the airspace over which the base has the air 
traffic control rights. After the airspace is partially returned to 
Japan, the flight times of aircraft leaving Haneda Airport and 
heading west will be shortened by about three minutes on average, 
according to a provisional calculation released by the Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport Ministry today. The operation of 
flights on new routes will be initiated on Sept. 25. 
 
In an agreement reached between the governments of Japan and the 
U.S. in 2006 over the airspace controlled by the Yokota base, the 
U.S. side agreed to partially return the airspace to Japan. The 
so-called Yokota RAPCON (Radar Approach Control) area covers a wide 
airspace, including space over Tokyo and Yokohama. With the Yokota 
RAPCON area as the "block," commercial aircraft leaving Haneda and 
bound for the west must raise their altitude, while circling around 
above Tokyo Bay to a higher altitude than the RAPCON area. The 
partial return will enable aircraft to fly at a lower altitude. It 
will become possible to set new flight routes more effectively. 
 
Flight times will be shortened by about three minutes on average - 
about four minutes for flights bound for Fukuoka and Hiroshima, and 
about two minutes for those headed for the Kansai district. The 
ministry's calculation also sees annual fuel costs will be cut by 
approximately 2.8 billion yen and that carbon dioxide emissions will 
be reduced by an amount equivalent to the total of emissions from 
15,000 households annually. Many people concerned expect the partial 
return of the airspace will contribute to easing the rising air 
traffic problem and improving the safety of air traffic. 
 
(10) Prime Minister's schedule, June 30 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 1, 2008 
 
09:30 
Posed for a photo with his wife and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 
and his wife at the Kantei. Hosted a welcome event. 
 
10:00 
Met Globe International chairman and others. Followed by Japan Trade 
Union Confederation Chairman Takagi. Later met METI Vice Minister 
Kitabata, Deputy Vice Minister Toyoda, and Resources and Energy 
Agency Director General Mochizuki. 
 
11:34 
Met former Prime Minister Nakasone at Sabo Hall in Hiraga-cho. 
 
12:32 
Met Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura at the Kantei. 
 
 
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13:34 
Met Foreign Minister Koumura and Machimura. Koumura stayed behind. 
 
13:59 
Met former Prime Minister Kaifu at TBR Building in Nagata-cho. 
 
14:29 
Met at the Kantei with Internal Affairs Minister Masuda and 
Info-Communications Policy Director General Ogasawara. 
 
15:04 
Met former Education and Science Minister Kawamura, caretaker of the 
parliamentary council to promote public record libraries, LDP 
Digital Archives Subcommittee Chairman Seiko Noda, and others. 
Followed by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Futahashi and Assistant 
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Saka. 
 
16:03 
Met LDP Tax System Research Council Advisor Noda. 
 
18:00 
Met Ban. Later, held a joint press conference. 
 
19:10 
Hosted a dinner party. 
 
20:42 
Returned to his official residence. 
 
SCHIEFFER