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Viewing cable 08SANSALVADOR915, FMLN PUSHES PRAGMATISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SANSALVADOR915 2008-07-31 19:54 2011-05-25 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy San Salvador
Appears in these articles:
http://www.wikileaks.elfaro.net/es/201105/notas/4148/
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #0915/01 2131954
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311954Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9885
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ES
SUBJECT: FMLN PUSHES PRAGMATISM 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert Blau, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: On July 29 three high ranking members of the 
(left-wing) FMLN told us that they accepted U.S. assistance 
to counter crime and drug trafficking and were supportive of 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).  They 
reiterated the FMLN,s intention to withdraw Salvadoran 
troops from Iraq if they win the 2009 elections and indicated 
that the FMLN might seek to modify CAFTA but recognize the 
difficulties of doing so. They said that the FMLN wants a 
strong relationship with the U.S.  They declined when asked 
to identify where on the Latin American left spectrum they 
would place themselves.  They said they would open diplomatic 
relations with Cuba.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On July 29, Charge and Poloffs met with FMLN General 
Coordinator Medardo Gonzalez, Legislative Assembly Deputy and 
FMLN Campaign Manager Roberto Lorenzana, and Legislative 
Assembly Deputy Hugo Martinez to discuss the presidential, 
legislative, and municipal elections to be held in 2009 and 
other related issues.  Each took turns explaining that the 
FMLN had a more pragmatic approach than in past years and 
took a &longer view8 than some of their left-leaning 
counterparts in the hemisphere.  They pointed out their 
partnership with the National Conciliation Party (PCN), as 
well as occasional agreements with (conservative, pro-U.S.) 
ARENA on legislation that coincided with the FMLN's political 
program, as examples of their pragmatism and willingness to 
reach out to other political parties. 
 
----------------------------- 
SEEKING ADJUSTMENTS TO CAFTA? 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Lorenzana stated the FMLN's current line on CAFTA, 
which the FMLN strongly opposed during negotiations and even 
after its passage.  He suggested that the FMLN might seek to 
make "adjustments" to CAFTA in order to improve the 
agreement, but backed away when the Charge suggested how 
difficult that would be. They asserted the FMLN,s support 
for maintaining the dollarization of the Salvadoran economy, 
something they previously opposed.  (Note: FMLN candidate 
Mauricio Funes and his economic advisor have also stated 
publicly their support for maintaining dollarization.  End 
note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
FMLN ACCEPTS U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT CRIME 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) All said they recognized the need for U.S. assistance 
to fight narco-trafficking and agreed that the U.S. and El 
Salvador must work together to combat crime. Lorenzana said 
that the FMLN has no intention of following the same path as 
Guatemala, where criminal elements have co-opted political 
and security structures.  Gonzalez mentioned the 2007 
killings of the Salvadoran PARLACEN deputies as an example of 
the crime problem. 
 
5. (C) Martinez, echoed by Gonzalez, expressed the FMLN,s 
support for International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).  He 
said that much of the FMLN,s early opposition stemmed from a 
lack of information about the nature of ILEA training, but 
that a recent visit organized by the Embassy for FMLN members 
fully addressed these concerns.  Martinez added that the FMLN 
was already on record favoring the continued presence of the 
counter-narcotics cooperative security location at the 
military side of Comalapa International Airport. 
 
--------------------- 
FMLN WOULD LEAVE IRAQ 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Martinez asserted that if the FMLN wins the 2009 
elections, they would pull Salvadoran troops out of Iraq. He 
said there were many reasons, including that the war was 
unpopular in the U.S. and thus hard to defend here.  (Note: 
Public opinion polling has consistently shown Salvadorans 
opposed to having troops in Iraq.  The latest poll shows 82 
percent of Salvadorans oppose President Saca's plan to 
continue the Iraq deployment.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
SEEKS TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) As the conversation turned to the broader relationship 
between the U.S. and El Salvador, each FMLN representative 
said that a GOES under their leadership would want to 
maintain a good relationship with the U.S. Gonzalez cited the 
long historical relationship between the U.S. and El 
Salvador, and said that they would like that to continue, 
particularly with so many Salvadorans living in the U.S. 
Responding to Gonzalez's comment regarding a FMLN government 
broadening its diplomatic relations to include Cuba, Charge 
highlighted Cuba,s failed economy which would be a disaster 
for El Salvador to emulate.  Gonzalez replied that El 
Salvador is very different from Cuba, and that the FMLN would 
work with the business community and even enjoyed support 
from small and medium businesses.  Martinez said the FMLN 
wants good relationships with entire region, including trade 
relationships. 
 
8. (C) Gonzalez reported that the FMLN,s governing platform 
was almost finished.  He said that the FMLN had been working 
on it for nearly a year, had consulted with all sectors and 
regions, and was on track to adopt it in August. 
 
9. (C) Comment: The FMLN representatives tried to emphasize 
pragmatism repeatedly throughout the meeting as if to 
distinguish themselves from the FMLN of years past.  Their 
message was consistent with the public message they have 
cultivated for the past several months ) moderate and 
reasonable.  Their whole campaign strategy aims to convince 
voters of this, but they are running into obstacles.  This 
week business leaders publicly challenged Mauricio Funes' 
claim to be pro-business, noting that the FMLN is everything 
but.  We take note of the FMLN's relatively benign 
statements, but do not accept their claims of pragmatism and 
willingness to cooperate with the U.S. at face value. 
Salvadoran municipal and legislative elections will be held 
January 18; presidential elections will be held March 15. 
BLAU

=======================CABLE ENDS============================