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Viewing cable 08NAIROBI1809, DIVERSION REQUEST FOR CASE KE-B-UAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAIROBI1809 2008-07-28 10:27 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1809/01 2101027
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281027Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6582
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ5//
RHMFIUU/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDRUSASAC FT BELVOIR VA
RHMFIUU/CDRUSASAC NEW CUMBERLAND PA
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2/
RUEASRA/USARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA//INTEL//
RHMFISS/CDRUSASETAF VICENZA
RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, PM/RSAT ARCHETTO 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MASS PARM PREL KE XW
SUBJECT:  DIVERSION REQUEST FOR CASE KE-B-UAD 
 
REFERENCE: Nairobi 1449 
 
ΒΆ1. The following letter was sent to the Director of Strategy, 
Plans and Policy at U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
by COL David McNevin, the U.S. Defense Representative to Kenya. 
It is a follow up of reftel country team assessment that 
requested expedited approval for the sale of small arms to the 
Kenyan Army.  Begin text: 
 
Kenya-US Liaison Office (KUSLO), on behalf of the Country Team, 
Nairobi, Kenya requests diversion of assets from FMS cases to 
expedite delivery of M-16A4 and M-4A1 weapon systems.  The Chief 
of the General Staff, General Jeremiah Kianga, has personally 
made the request to the KUSLO several times as a matter of great 
urgency. 
 
The Country Team supports the Kenyan Ministry of Defense's 
assessment that they urgently require new individual weapon 
systems due to the notoriously unreliable nature of their 
current weapons systems.  The current weapons do not meet the 
military's needs in defending Kenyan borders against a host of 
transnational threats.  The Country Team Assessment message 
further elaborates the requirement for expedited procurement 
based upon the strategic environment. 
 
Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania have all 
been sources of tension in the past for the Government of Kenya 
(GOK).  Most pressing is the threat posed from Somalia'last 
month, suspected terrorist operatives tried to infiltrate the 
border with large amounts of money and weapons. They were 
arrested and subsequently freed by an armed group that moved 
back into Somalia.  This is but one example of the threat posed 
by the long porous borders with Somalia and is a central reason 
for concern to both the GOK and the US Government (USG). 
Through this border came the explosives that destroyed the US 
Embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attempted 
shoot-down of an Israeli jet, and the Kikambala bomb which 
killed dozens at a coastal hotel in 2002. 
 
US forces operate daily in conjunction with Kenyan forces in 
order to counter regional terrorism in North East Africa.  As 
such, the threats to Kenyan and US interests in North East 
Africa are well known.  Kenya's desire to rapidly acquire modern 
US-manufactured individual weapons directly ties into current 
and future bilateral training.  Obtaining a minimum of 500-600, 
or more, M16A4s/M4A1s (a mix thereof) by January 2009 will 
enable a seamless fielding and transition by US forces of the 
weapon system to key Kenyan units bound for border security 
missions.  Weapons fielding and training are essential for 
building force interoperability and host nation capacity during 
this time. 
 
The Chief of the General Staff of the Kenyan Armed forces 
personally requested that the US government expedite the initial 
shipment of the 9,761 M16A4/M4A1 weapons, which they agreed to 
purchase on 30 June 2008, to arrive by January 2009 to 
facilitate integration into bilateral training. 
 
Modernizing the Kenyan military by training and equipping their 
army is critical toward the US government's counter terrorism 
and regional stabilization goals for Eastern Africa. 
Additionally, the sooner the modernization process begins, the 
sooner the GOK can move towards full integration into future US 
and NATO led peacekeeping missions on the Continent.  These 
goals were outlined in last year's 1206 and FMF proposals, for 
which Kenya has received funding and support from the Department 
of State and the Department of Defense, respectively. 
 
Moving the Kenyan military and ultimately all Kenyan security 
forces to the M-16 and M-4 platforms has other positive, long- 
range effects.  Adoption of the weapon systems may lead to in- 
country manufacturing capability with proper licensing 
agreements in place, which could influence purchasing decisions 
of neighboring countries.  This has the potential to lead to 
significant US sales over the next 15 years in the region. 
Also, the US will gain significant leverage against regional 
black market small arms and 7.62mm ammunition proliferation due 
to the control of the production of dissimilar ammunition types 
by the GOK.  By reducing easy access to ammunition for the 
ubiquitous AK-47, there is the potential to reduce internally 
committed violence and crime. 
 
The Kenyans have expressed to us that, as much as they prefer 
US-manufactured equipment, any significant delay in 
manufacturing or delivering these items would force them to 
reconsider subsequent purchases from USG sources.  We do not 
want the Kenyans to re-initiate their tender with other nations 
to obtain small arms due to perceived delays in the US 
procurement process. 
 
Building the capacity of Kenyan forces to defend their borders 
is a lynch-pin of the Mission Strategic Plan.  The importance of 
delivering enough weapons to meet the minimum requirements to 
support operations and bilateral training can not be 
understated. 
 
Addressees are encouraged to forward this memorandum to the 
appropriate agencies for further action. 
DAVID T. McNEVIN 
COL, USA/FAO 
CHIEF, KUSLO and UNITED STATES 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE 
End Text. 
SLUTZ 
SUBJECT:  Diversion Request for Case KE-B-UAD (Cont.) 15 July 2008 
 
 
 
 
KENYA - UNITED STATES LIAISON OFFICE 
P.O. BOX 606 
VILLAGE MARKET 
00621 NAIROBI, KENYA