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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA880, NICARAGUA'S CENIS- DEBT RENEGOTIATED, BUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA880 2008-07-10 16:42 2011-06-23 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO3974
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0880/01 1921642
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101642Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2866
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000880 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC, INR/IAA AND EEB/OMA 
STATE PASS TO OPIC AND USOAS 
DEPT FOR USAID/LAC 
DEPT ALSO FOR CA/VO/L/C 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/MSIEGELMAN 
3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/WH/MKESHISHIAN/BARTHUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S CENIS- DEBT RENEGOTIATED, BUT 
PERSECUTIONS JUST BEGINNING 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 808 
     B. MANAGUA 481 
     C. MANAGUA 450 
     D. MANAGUA 443 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b&d 
 
1. (C) Summary:  On July 7 Special Prosecutor Armando Juarez 
filed formal accusations against 39 people for "crimes 
against the economy of the country, fraud, and influence 
peddling" in connection with the bailout of Nicaragua's 
banking system and attendant issuance of bonds, originally 
known as Negotiable Investment Certificates (CENIs).  This 
list of those accused includes opposition leader Eduardo 
Montealegre and several former Central Bank Presidents and 
Finance Ministers.  Reports are that the final list was 
scrubbed by President Ortega himself before its release. 
Meanwhile, on July 4 the Central Bank and Bancentro signed a 
final CENIs renegotiation agreement with the same terms as 
BanPro had agreed to in June (Ref A).  The combined 
renegotiations will save the GON between USD 30-40 million in 
net present value (NPV) terms.  End Summary. 
 
Let the Circus Begin ... 
------------------------ 

2. (U) On July 7 the Office of the Prosecutor General's 
Special Prosecutor for the CENIs case Armando Juarez filed 
formal accusations against 39 individuals for "crimes against 
the economy of the country, fraud, and influence peddling," 
in connection with the bailout of Nicaragua's banking system 
and attendant issuance of bonds, originally known as CENIs. 
He requeS_d+QQ1}b&Q^%rFel restrictions for the 
duration of the case.  The list of accused includes Former 
Finance Minister and opposition Managua mayoral candidate 
Eduardo Montealegre (the country's most popular opposition 
political figure), former Finance Ministers Esteban Duque 
Estrada and Mario Flores, former Nicaraguan Central Bank 
(BCN) Presidents Noel Ramirez and Mario Alonzo, former 
Superintendent of bank Noel Sacasa, current BCN General 
Manager Jose de Jesus Rojas, current BNC Financial Manager 
Carlos Cerda, current BCN Legal Manager Juan Jose Rodriguez, 
current Director of the Deposit Insurance Agency Vilma Leon 
York and shareholders of Bancentro and BanPro, including the 
President of La Prensa's (right of center daily) Board of 
Directors Jaime Chamorro Cardenal.  Most of these accused are 
former members of the previous Bolanos administration. 
 
3. (C) The Prosecutor General had intended to file the 
charges last week, but reportedly had to delay because of 
last minute consultations with the Presidency over who should 
be on the list.  Sources indicate that the Presidents of 
Bancentro and BanPro, Roberto Zamora and Ramiro Ortiz Sr., 
were taken off the list by direct order from President 
Ortega.  Former President Bolanos was also on the preliminary 
list of accused, but later was removed.  The focus of the 
Ortega government's accusations continues to be Eduardo 
Montealegre (Ref C).  The Special Prosecutor claims that each 
of the accused played some role in the original issuance of 
the CENIs in 2000-2001, the 2003 renegotiation of the CENIs 
(which while it reduced Nicaragua NPV CENIs debt, did 
increase nominal payments), and in the valuation and 
liquidation of the failed banks' assets. 
 
4. (U) In an effort to stall the impending indictments, on 
July 3 Eduardo Montealegre filed a formal request that 
Special prosecutor Juarez be removed from the case. 
Montealegre cited Juarez' role as legal counsel for Francisco 
Mayorga, president of one of the failed banks who was tried 
and convicted for his role in the failures, as a conflict of 
interest. (Note: Mayorga ended up only serving two years of 
his nine year sentence. End Note)  Montealegre also stated 
that Juarez is a nephew of Ortega's former state Security 
director and FSLN Political Director Lenin Cerna, and has 
strong ties to the FSLN.  On July 4, without denying any of 
Montealegre's accusations, Deputy Prosecutor General Ana 
Julia Guido (also a loyal FSLN member) dismissed 
Montealegre's request to remove Juarez.  The next legal steps 
will include a review of the evidence and possible further 
investigation by the criminal court judge.  The judge 
assigned to the case is Julio Cesar Arias, a member of the 
FSLN who issued the sequestration orders on Bancentro and 
BanPro's CENIs in April. 
 
... While the Financial Cliffhanger is Resolved 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

5. (U) While the prosecution was getting started, on July 4 
BCN President Rosales and Bancentro Executive Director Julio 
Cardenas signed a final agreement for the renegotiation of 
the remaining USD 31.4 million in CENIs.  The terms are 
exactly the same as those negotiated with BanPro in June (Ref 
A); bonds with 20 year maturities, paying at 5% for the first 
15 years and 5.25% percent for the last five.  The 2008 
payments due to Bancentro will be reduced from USD 7.3 
million to just under USD 1 million.  Overall, the GON has 
reduced its CENIs debt load by 26.4% in net present value 
(NPV) terms, according to BCN President Rosales.  The IMF 
reports that the NPV savings on both renegotiations will be 
USD 30-40 million.  Rosales will now formally request the 
lifting of the sequestration order on Bancentro's CENIs, just 
as he did with BanPro's.  (Note: The BanPro CENIs were 
officially released from sequestration on June 19. End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 

6. (C) Few would disagree that the FSLN is determined to use 
the CENIs case as the basis for a political witch hunt.  The 
charges represent the first formal step in Ortega's efforts 
to bring down members of the former Bolanos administration 
still operating prominently in Nicaragua's political and 
financial arena.  Deputy Prosecutor Guido has admitted that 
the main source of Juarez' investigation, and the basis of 
the charges lodged against the group of 39, is the 2006 
report by the National Assembly's Ethics Committee, headed by 
PLC Deputy Donald Lacayo Nunez.  Lacayo, at the time a 
fervent supporter of former president and convicted felon 
Arnoldo Aleman, and his Committee had little understanding of 
banking or finance, which resulted in a report that was more 
political than technical in nature. 
 
7. (C) Settling the issue of whether the government will 
honor its debt to BanPro and Bancentro should calm 
international concerns about growing risk to Nicaragua's 
financial sector for the time being.  However, it has not 
escaped public notice that BCN President Rosales has just 
concluded renegotiating agreements in exactly the same manner 
as had Montealegre and former BCN officials who are now 
accused of wrongdoing.  Several prominent economists, from 
both sides of the political fence, have pointed out that if 
Montealegre is convicted, the GON may have grounds to 
invalidate Rosales' just concluded negotiations. Thus, the 
specter of the GON reneging on its payment promises remains. 
Indeed, Ortega's public statements on the CENIs reflect this 
paradox.  In one breath, he publicly praised the 
renegotiation during a July 6 rally, but in the next stated 
that all those accused in the case "should go to jail." 
 
TRIVELLI