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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA594, Tripartite Plus: Coordinator's Visit to Kinshsa

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA594 2008-07-17 14:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKI #0594/01 1991459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171459Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8205
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLEWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000594 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: Tripartite Plus: Coordinator's Visit to Kinshsa 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Joyce Leader, Snior Coordinator of 
the Tripartite Plus Joint Comission, traveled to Kinshasa June 
22-23 as partof a regional trip to Tripartite Plus capitals.  Hr 
schedule included meetings with Foreign Ministr Mbusa, CHOD 
Kayembe, Presidential Envoy Seraphi Ngwej, and SRSG Doss.  Topics 
for discussion cetered around the key Tripartite subjects of 
re-etablishment of diplomatic relations, return of refgees, ending 
the threat posed by armed groups, ad information exchange.  End 
summary. 
 
Meeting with Presidential Envoy Seraphin Ngwej 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  (SBU) Leader emphasized to Ngwej the importance that Washington 
places on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
DRC and the other members of the Tripartite Plus.  Ngwej noted that 
everything is on track for normalization of relations with Uganda 
and Burundi. 
 
3.  (SBU) As for Rwanda, according to Ngwej, it is ifficult for 
President Kabila to agree to re-estblish relations at this time; 
the GDRC believes that Rwanda is re-occupying its territory by other 
means, through the CNDP.  The bottom line for the GDRC is that 
Rwanda must stop supporting Nkunda.  Ngwej stressed that the only 
leverage the DRC has with respect to Rwanda is the normalization of 
diplomatic relations, a point which Leader questioned.  Leader also 
pointed out that Rwanda denies the charge of support for the CNDP, 
and asked how we can move forward on this issue.  She suggested 
distinguishing between political and technical issues associated 
with renewing full diplomatic relations.  Proceeding with technical 
aspects, such as sending a GDRC team to Kigali to determine what 
needs to be done to restore diplomatic compounds, could signal the 
GDRC's intention to move the process forward.  Ngwej stressed that 
the high-level engagement and "moral force" of the USG is required 
and suggested a summit between the Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, 
presided over by POTUS. 
 
4.  (SBU) Leader subsequently asked if the GDRC is making 
preparations for the return of refugees.  Ngwej said this work is 
ongoing, but also underlined that the places of origin of many 
refugees are in areas with tenuous security situations, which the 
GDRC would like to resolve before they return.  Leader asked if the 
DRC was preparing for the UNHCR-led working groups on refugee return 
with Burundi and Rwanda, similar to that launched recently with 
Uganda. Ngwej noted that the GDRC needs a better idea of the number 
of Congolese refugees in other countries and that UNHCR can be used 
as a reference point on this issue.  (Note: Delegations of refugee 
experts from Rwanda, DRC, and UNHCR agreed July 3 in Kigali to form 
a technical working group, establish secure refugee return zones, 
and to register Rwandan refugees in the DRC. End note). 
 
5.  (SBU) On the issue of armed groups, Ngwej provided information 
on what the GDRC is doing to combat them, but also pled a lack of 
resources for military action.  Notably, he raised the draining 
economic effects of the December 2007 offensive against Nkunda. 
Still, he promised that the GDRC will put maximum pressure on the 
LRA, per the agreement at the recent Dar-Es-Salaam summit.  With 
respect to the FDLR, Ngwej said there are certain encouraging signs, 
such as Rwanda agreeing to drop its focus on the long list of 
genocidaires.  He also expressed appreciation for the Rewards for 
Justice program since it clearly outlines which individuals are 
specifically wanted by the ICTR. 
 
6.  (SBU) The most significant problem for the GDRC now is 
relocation of disarmed and demobilized FDLR elements within Congo, 
particularly following the Kisangani conference.  Local populations 
have generally expressed opposition to resettling former FDLR 
members within their communities.  Leader observed that the 
Kisangani "roadmap" appeared to prioritize relocation within Congo 
over return to Rwanda.  Ngwej responded that the GDRC believes such 
relocation will be temporary, serving to break the links between 
combatants and their commanders while increasing their interest in 
returning to Rwanda.  At the same time, he confessed that the GDRC 
does not have sufficient resources available to provide for the 
regroupment and resettlement of these ex-combatants. 
 
7.  (SBU) Leader brought up the subject of information sharing among 
the Tripartite Plus countries and its importance to the U.S.  She 
asked if the Tripartite fusion cell is the best mechanism for this 
activity, noting the lack of engagement of countries in the project. 
 Ngwej said that the GDRC could possibly support the idea of a 
"virtual" cell (Note: whereby the countries could continue to 
exchange information, but without the physical headquarters of the 
current cell.  End note)  However, he opposed the idea of moving the 
cell from Kisangani to Goma, for the reason that the GDRC would find 
it difficult to guarantee the security of its personnel in Goma, 
described by Ngwej as much more volatile than Kisangani. 
 
 
Meeting with Foreign Minister Mbusa 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Leader also stressed to Mbusa the importance the U.S. 
places on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
Tripartite Plus countries.  Mbusa agreed and said that Kabila must 
be persuaded to take appropriate action on this issue with respect 
to Rwanda.  He said the U.S. should encourage Kabila to move forward 
on this issue.  Like Ngwej, Mbusa suggested a summit between the 
Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, presided over by POTUS.  At the 
same time, Mbusa underlined that Rwanda needs to halt its support 
for Nkunda, which would in turn remove the DRC rationale for 
refusing to normalize relations with Kigali. 
 
9.  (SBU) Mbusa also highlighted the difficulties the GDRC is having 
in identifying DRC relocation sites for demobilized FDLR-RUD 
elements in the aftermath of the Kisangani conference, given local 
resistance.  He outlined a plan he had proposed for temporary 
re-location in North Kivu that he claimed had President Kabila's 
support.  He insisted, however, that relocation should not be the 
first option and questioned the priority ascribed to relocation by 
the Kisangani roadmap. 
 
 
Meeting with CHOD Kayembe 
------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Leader focused the meeting with Kayembe on the issue of 
information sharing and action against armed groups.  Kayembe noted 
that the GDRC has deployed eight battalions in the Kivus to put 
pressure on the FDLR.  However, the cost of transporting military 
units to the area is causing a great deal of difficulty for the 
FARDC.  He stressed the need for U.S. assistance in military 
training, as well as for a special operations capability and 
additional helicopters in order to fight the FDLR effectively. 
Kayembe also noted that the GDRC is sending three battalions to 
Dungu to put pressure on the LRA. 
 
11.  (SBU) Leader asked Kayembe's opinion on the fusion cell, noting 
that U.S. funding for this mechanism will soon come to an end. 
Kayembe said that the fusion cell has helped in GDRC operations 
against negative forces, but agreed that a mechanism that can make 
even better use of shared information would be useful. 
 
 
Meeting with SRSG Doss 
---------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) SRSG Doss, accompanied by MONUC Force Commander General 
Gaye, stressed the need for MONUC to continue training FARDC 
battalions deployed against the FDLR.  Doss said that those FARDC 
units which are MONUC-trained are doing well, but MONUC must 
continue follow-up training and mentorship to ensure sustainability. 
 In addition, Doss expressed the need for better intelligence and 
special operations capabilities for MONUC, along with a surge 
capacity.  He pointed out that additional MONUC troops will be 
required to provide security as the disengagement and brassage 
processes begin. 
 
13.  (SBU) Doss stressed the need to determine the modalities for 
receiving and relocating demobilized FDLR-RUD elements.  At the same 
time, he cautioned against relocation as a first option.  He raised 
the idea of providing a resettlement grant as an incentive to return 
to Rwanda.  On the Goma process, Doss expressed concern that all 
sides will talk themselves into a crisis.  He underlined the need 
for Rwanda to put some pressure on Nkunda to show flexibility, and 
hinted that the U.S. also needs to push both Nkunda and Rwanda on 
this issue. 
 
Meeting with MONUC Stabilization Plan Team 
------------------------------------------ 
 
14.  (SBU) Lise Grande, Stabilization Plan coordinator, noted that 
facilitating the return of Banyamulenge refugees to the DRC is one 
of the key benchmarks in allowing MONUC to withdraw.  Johan Peleman 
of MONUC's Joint Mission Analysis Cell explained that the constant 
focus on refugee return from Rwanda to North Kivu masks the more 
complicated question of Banyamulenge return to South Kivu, where 
there is a great deal of animosity directed towards this group. 
 
15.  (SBU) On police reform, Grande noted that the United Nations 
Office for Project Services is helping build housing for police 
units along recently opened axes in the east.  Beyond this, MONUC is 
providing for police training, as well as assistance in the areas of 
logistics, transport, and food provisions. 
 
16.  (U) Ambassador Leader has cleared this cable. 
 
GARVELINK