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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM967, CPA IMPLENTATION IN SOUTHERN KORDOFAN STATE PLAGUED BY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM967 2008-07-01 05:38 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6936
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0967/01 1830538
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010538Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1197
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000967 
 
FOR SE WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID SOCI KPKO SU
SUBJECT: CPA IMPLENTATION IN SOUTHERN KORDOFAN STATE PLAGUED BY 
INCAPCITY AND MISTRUST 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The SPLM Deputy Governor of Southern Kordofan, 
the state's Under Secretary for Rural Development, and an UNMIS 
analyst all agreed that CPA implementation in that state is lagging, 
with resulting problems in security, but they provided conflicting 
reasons for the delay.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) On June 26, Emboffs met separately with SPLM Deputy 
Governor of Southern Kordofan state Daniel Kode and with Jade 
Duchesneau-Bernier, UNMIS Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) team 
leader for the Three Areas, to discuss issues CPA implementation in 
Southern Kordofan, especially the Nuba Mountains region.  (Note: 
Under the CPA, the Governor of Southern Kordofan is named by the 
GoS, while the Deputy r}[cQ2H9id note.)  Bernier had 
just returned from a visit to Southern Kordofan. 
 
3.  (SBU) Kodi cited a list of alleged deficiencies in implementing 
the CPA in his state, including failure by the SAF to reduce its 
forces in South Kordofan, lack of integration and training for the 
Joint Integrated Units, lack of DDR and failure to integrate 
demobilized SPLA veterans and other SPLM civil service candidates 
into the state civil service, and reactivation of Popular Defense 
Force militias. 
 
4.  (SBU) Kodi claimed that while the SPLA had withdrawn its forces 
south of the 1-1-1956 border in accord with the CPA, the SAF has not 
made corresponding reductions.  He added that SPLA soldiers now are 
starting to return from Lake Abeyad, south of the 1-1-1956 line, to 
their native Nuba Mountains, due to lack of adequate living 
facilities at Lake Abeyad for themselves and their families.  (Kodi 
described it as "Lake Malaria.")  Bernier confirmed that JMAC has 
detected what she said were two companies of SPLA who recently 
returned to the Nuba Mountains from the Lake.  Both Kodi and Bernier 
also said that the SAF has reinforced along Southern Kordofan's 
border with neighboring Abyei, following the fighting there in May. 
(Note: Other UNMIS contacts have confirmed this information as well, 
and report that senior SPLM officials have claimed to UNMIS that the 
SPLA soldiers who returned to the Nuba Mountains are "AWOL" and 
merely wish to see their families and are miserable at Lake Abeyad. 
Kodi made a similar assertion in our meeting with him. End note.) 
 
5.  (SBU) Kodi said that a failure to implement DDR is contributing 
to insecurity in the Nuba Mountains.  Kodi also complained that 2400 
SPLM\A administrators, and 3000 police have not been integrated into 
the civil service, as promised. He indicated that 1500 of these 
police officers were currently being paid by the GOSS.  He said that 
unresolved issues include job protection for existing staff, 
capacity building, and regularizing ranks and qualifications between 
the old and new employees.  Pressed to identify the source of 
resistance to the integration of former SPLM\A into the civil 
service and who the Embassy might approach to try to correct the 
siuation, od was unable to do so.  He finally averred that the 
problem stemmed from the GNU Ministry of Finance in Khartoum and 
that the state government, including its NCP members, were 
supportive of state administrative integration. 
 
6.  (SBU) Separately, Bernier said that she had observed resistance 
to police reintegration in the NCP-led state government.  She said 
that the GoS Southern Kordofan chief of police had told her just 
days before that he would "never" accept former SPLA into the police 
force because he had concluded that they would maintain their 
primary allegiance to the SPLA.  Bernier noted that this was a 
change from three months previous, when the same police chief had 
been fairly optimistic about integrating former SPLA. 
 
7.  (SBU) Finally, Kodi complained that $20 million transferred from 
the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to the state had been misused.  The money 
had been intended for development projects in the war-affected areas 
of the Nuba Mountains, but instead had been spent by the state 
government in non-war-affected regions. 
 
8.  (SBU) In a side conversation, the Rural Development U/S told 
AIDOff that, while the NCP has not been helpful to the 
administrative integration process, the real problem has been Kodi's 
own lack of capacity. He indicated that before leaving for Germany, 
the Deputy Governor arranged for two state committees to be formed: 
1) A committee to finalize the recruitment and salary payment of the 
newly integrated administrative personnel-headed by Dr. Ahmed Saed, 
the SPLM Minister of Finance for the state; and 2) A committee to 
travel to Blue Nile state to see how state administrative 
integration has been able to progress in that state and make 
recommendations to the Southern Kordofan government-headed by Neroun 
Phillip, the SPLM co-chair of the Parliamentary Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission. (Note: That these appointees are the most 
 
KHARTOUM 00000967  002 OF 002 
 
 
capable and active SPLM officials in the state government perhaps 
shows that the Governor has, after months of inaction, begun to take 
the issue seriously and realized his inability to carry out the 
work. End note.) 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Deputy Governor Kodi exemplifies the 
administrative-capacity problems that plague the SPLM.  Kodi's 
mental ability has been deteriorating due to health problems, 
reportedly compounded by heavy drinking.  During much of the 
conversation, Kodi seemed confused and to have difficulty grasping 
what was being asked, and he finally deferred questions to the 
Director General of the state Rural Development Ministry, who 
accompanied him.  On the day following our meetings he flew to 
Germany for medical treatment.  This is a serious issue, as many 
astute long-term observers of Sudan have predicted that the Nuba 
Mountains will be the next region to explode after Abyei.  The 
simmering DDR, redeployment, integration and development issues in 
Southern Kordofan must be credibly addressed soon, lest they boil 
over into conflict.  Emboffs will continue to address these issues 
with the CPA partners and will travel to Southern Kordofan in the 
coming weeks and months to pursue these issues at the state level as 
well.  The committees set up to address these issues will be 
submitting proposals to USAID for technical and operational support 
to carry out their work.  South Kordofan contrasts well with Blue 
Nile state - NCP behavior, as always is dubious - but effective and 
empowered SPLM leadership (in Blue Nile in the bulky shape of 
Governor Malik Agar) can make all the difference. 
 
FERNANDEZ