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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1081, GOSS MINISTER BENJAMIN ON ABYEI AND THE ICC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1081 2008-07-17 14:27 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9861
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1081/01 1991427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171427Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1367
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001081 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOSS MINISTER BENJAMIN ON ABYEI AND THE ICC 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1065 
B) KHARTOUM 1059 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: GOSS Minister for Regional Cooperation Barnabas 
Benjamin indicated he is hopeful that GOSS President Salva Kiir will 
successfully negotiate with VP Taha July 17 a solution to the 
Administrator and Deputy Administrator for Abyei.  As Kiir himself 
told the CDA, he hoped to get an agreement on Abyei in exchange for 
heading the committee that will address the ICC charges (Ref B). 
Barnabas was deeply troubled by the delay in implementing this 
critical part of the Abyei roadmap agreement, which he views as 
another example of the NCP finding a difficult issue to renegotiate 
in order in order to delay the implementation of an agreement it 
does not like. We tend to agree with Barnabas, but Kiir should not 
sell his services cheaply and should take advantage of the NCP 
quandary on the ICC to get a solution on the interim administration. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Benjamin complained to CG that the delay in the selection 
of an Administrator for Abyei was due to the fact that the NCP still 
wanted to place a Misseryia in the Deputy position, and this was 
unacceptable to the SPLM. Although he had expected Kiir to return 
from talks in Khartoum on July 16, his return had been delayed and 
he was now expected him back in Juba July 17 or 18.  Minister 
Benjamin hoped that Kiir would announce in a debriefing expected 
later today or early tomorrow that the impasse on Abyei had been 
solved.  (Note: Kiir himself told the CDA he might be able to 
negotiate past the impasse on the interim administration in exchange 
for heading on the GNU Committee that will create a strategy to 
address the ICC charges.  The committee plans to focus on 
demonstrating that the GNU has cooperated with efforts at peace, 
generating a plan to address the Darfur crisis, and a legal strategy 
to refute the ICC indictment.  The Committee also includes VP Taha, 
Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi (who is still in 
Darfur), Assistant to the President and Eastern Front leader Musa 
Ahmed, State Minister of the Presidency Bakri Saleh, FM Deng Alor, 
Information Minister El Zehawi Ibrahim Malik, and Justice Minister 
Abdel Basit Sabdrat. End note.) 
 
3. (SBU) Asked who the choice of the SPLM would be for the 
Administrator position, Benjamin indicated Edward Lino may be the 
current SPLM choice once again since the NCP hasn't backed off it's 
position to appoint a Misseryia to the Deputy position. Benjamin 
reported that he is very concerned about the delay in appointing the 
Administrator and Deputy, and said he believed it was a typical 
example of the NCP finding a difficult issue to renegotiate in order 
to delay implementing an agreement it does not want.  On other 
fronts, however, he was more optimistic.  He said the SAF was in the 
process of withdrawing from Abyei (albeit slowly), police forces 
from both the North and the South were now in place and ready to be 
trained by UNMIS, and the JIU was trained, positioned, and ready to 
begin its work.  Everything was moving forward, if a little behind 
schedule, except for the Administrator and Deputy issue.  (Note: 
UNMIS confirmed to ConGen Juba today that the SAF has withdrawn 
nearly 900 soldiers from the area, leaving about 250 in Abyei town 
who appear to be packing in preparation for leaving. End Note.) 
 
5. (SBU) Benjamin observed that Bashir wants Kiir on the committee 
because he has credibility with the UN and with the West, and so can 
talk to everyone and negotiate in good faith.  Benjamin joked that 
Kiir's first act as committee chair should be to turn over Ahmed 
Harun and Ali Kushayb to the ICC.  He then allowed that such a thing 
was highly unlikely, however.  Still, he said, the SPLM had to be 
careful how it managed this affair so as not to become complicit in 
helping to protect ICC indictees.  Asked his opinion of the ICC 
action, Benjamin opined that this will expose to Bashir the 
seriousness of the situation in Darfur in the eyes of the 
International Community, and that the NCP must be serious in solving 
the problem of Darfur or face the consequences.  There was still 
time for Bashir to act, he said, since it will take a month or two 
for the judges on the ICC to consider the case.  If the UN is 
allowed to do its work in Darfur, and if the peace process moves 
forward, perhaps Bashir still has time to avoid an arrest warrant. 
 
6. (SBU) Asked if arrest warrants for Bashir would threaten the CPA, 
Benjamin said he thought not.  "Individuals are not important to the 
process," he said.  "Garang died and the CPA continued."  The same 
could hold true with Bashir if the will to continue the peace 
process remained. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: The speculation among informed observers in 
Khartoum is that Kiir and Taha have been negotiating the interim 
administration over the last two days in exchange for Kiir serving 
on the ICC response committee.  However, the committee has already 
been announced and it appears that the CPA parties have not reached 
an agreement on the interim administration, which is disappointing. 
We advised Kiir and FM Alor not to sell their services cheaply but 
 
KHARTOUM 00001081  002 OF 002 
 
 
it appears that keeping the regime stable was of primary importance 
to the SPLM after the announcement of the indictment.  The SPLM's 
highly moderated and nuanced statement on the indictment and the 
Darfur conflict (a copy of which has been sent to AF/SPG) which 
assigned no blame and offered the SPLM's services in resolving the 
problem, shows how far the SPLM is willing to go in order not to 
rock the boat. 
 
FERNANDEZ