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Viewing cable 08KABUL1818, BAMYAN: HAZARA POLITICS: VIEW FROM THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL1818 2008-07-19 12:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1589
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1818/01 2011233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191233Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4747
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001818 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON AF
SUBJECT: BAMYAN: HAZARA POLITICS: VIEW FROM THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
 
REF: A) Kabul 1008 
B) Kabul 1460 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (SBU) Bamyan is a bellwether for political attitudes of members 
of the Hazara ethnic group, and it offers insights to how various 
parties are seeking to engage the Hazara population.  Hezb-e-Wahdat 
Islami and the Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami-e-Mardum remain the most active 
and influential parties in the Hazarajat; Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq and 
the Mardum party have gained momentum in recent months.  The 
Insejomi Milli party under Sadiq Mudabir is new to the field but 
appears to be a serious contender for influence.  Meanwhile, the 
majority of Tajiks in the province are loyal to Jamiat-e Islami or 
Hezb-e Islami. 
 
The Demographics 
---------------- 
2. (U) Though more Hazaras live outside Bamyan province than inside, 
it remains the political touchstone and heartland for the Hazara 
community.  Hazaras view development in Bamyan as symbolic of 
central government attention to the Hazara minority.  Should 
anti-government elements target Hazaras, many would return to Bamyan 
and rely on it as a strong hold.  Thus, Bamyan remains a 
battleground for the hearts, minds, and votes of Hazara throughout 
Afghanistan. 
 
3. (SBU) Population data is difficult to obtain because Afghanistan 
lacks updated census data, large numbers of Hazaras have returned 
from Pakistan and Iran, and many have migrated within Afghanistan. 
Rough estimates portray the following distribution: 1.2 million in 
Kabul, 750,000 in Samangan and Balkh, 400,000 in Bamyan, 350,000 in 
Ghor and Dai Kundai, 270,000 in Ghazni, 230,000 in Wardak, 190,000 
in Herat, and 100,000 in Sari Pul. 
 
The Primary Parties: A Tale of Two Hezb-i-Wahdats 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
4. (SBU) Two branches of Hezb-e Wahdat Islami have the most 
influence among Hazaras.  The first branch, Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami is 
led by Second Vice-President Mohammad Karim Khalili, who inherited 
leadership from Hazara leader and unifier Abdul Ali Mazari.  Under 
Khalili's leadership the party still commands reach and resources. 
However, the stature of Khalili and his party is diminishing as the 
perception that Khalili has failed to support the Hazara people 
during his vice-presidential tenure increases.  Hazaras have seized 
on Khalili's long absence from the province and hands-off reputation 
to perpetuate this impression.  Despite its decline, the party's 
staunch supporters hold key leadership positions, including Deputy 
Governor Fahimi, current head of the Provincial Council Poya, and 
the Deputy Chief of Police.  Their base of power lies in Bamyan and 
Yakawlang Districts. 
 
5. (SBU) Kabul MP and former presidential candidate Haji Mohammad 
Mohaqqeq leads the Hezb-e Wahdhat Islami-e-Mardum party, which 
commands the majority of Hazara support.  Despite a 2005 setback 
when Mohaqqeq aligned himself with Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, a 
figure widely despised by Hazara, in an ill-fated deal to elect 
Sayyaf lower house Speaker in exchange for Sayyaf's support of 
Mohaqqeq's run for First Deputy Speaker, the party has steadily 
regained popularity.  Mohaqqeq actively complains about the lack of 
attention, development, and equality for Hazaras.  He travels to the 
province regularly and recently donated a large statue of Mazari in 
the central round-about, hinting he may be a better inheritor of 
Mazari's legacy.  In Kabul, meanwhile, Mohaqqeq's rhetoric has 
turned increasingly towards a Hazara nationalist line, which appears 
to be gaining political traction. 
 
6. (SBU) At his provincial party headquarters Mohaqqeq is taking a 
populist approach, sponsoring sports events like a widely-attended, 
full-contact karate tournament, and receiving development requests 
in order to "expedite" them to the government.  The Mardum branch of 
Hezb-i-Wahdat has support from around 70 percent of the Hazara 
population.  Many of the better educated and more connected Hazara 
leaders, however, remain suspicious of Mohaqqeq's past human rights 
violations and unsavory political alliances.  The party remains 
active in central Bamyan and maintains major power bases in the 
populous southern districts of Panjab and Waras.  The party's 
message on social justice and equality for Hazaras has lately gained 
more credence.  The perception of central government inaction on 
Kuchi (Pashtun nomads) migration into Hazarajat and the perception 
 
KABUL 00001818  002 OF 002 
 
 
that development is only happening in Pashtun areas continue to fuel 
discontent. 
 
The New Entrants and the other Bamyan 
------------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) The Insejomi Milli party, a relative newcomer to the Hazara 
political scene, has surprised many with its popularity.  In 
mid-June, the party opened its new centrally located headquarters in 
Bamyan.  Sadiq Mudabir, Deputy to Farooq Wardak, Palace Head of 
Parliamentary Affairs, leads the party.  Minister Wardak and Mudabir 
also worked together when Wardak headed the Joint Electoral 
Management Body.  In some ways, Isejomi Milli is a splinter of the 
Hizb-e Harakat Islami-e Mardum-e Afghanistan, which splintered from 
the Harakat-e Islami party.  Mudabir's influence in the current 
administration, coupled with his knowledge of the elections process, 
could make his new party a formidable political force.  Insejomi 
Milli is appealing to intellectuals, university students and youth. 
It bills itself as one of the President's parties and has the 
support of the Minister of Mines.  Some recent appointments, 
including the Provincial Executive Officer, seem to indicate the 
party is already leveraging a spoils system to reward supporters. 
 
8. (SBU) While Bamyan is known as the Hazara homeland, the northeast 
districts of Bamyan are recent additions to the province, and the 
majority ethnic group is the Tajiks, not the Hazaras.  The Tajiks in 
these districts divide their allegiance between Jamiat-i-Islami and 
Hezb-i Islami. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: Governor Sorabi remains staunchly apolitical, 
refusing to align herself with any party.  Recalling her attendance 
of an initial Insejomi Milli event in Kabul, she said she was 
uncomfortable with the strong evidence of conservative Pashtun 
influence at the event.  As elections approach, however, more and 
more people seem to be clamoring for the governorship.  The position 
may become a mechanism for Karzai to pull Hazaras into his political 
orbit.  Governor Sorabi says she is open to suitable alternatives 
but insists any move happen on her terms. 
 
10. (SBU) Most senior figures in Bamyan appear to accept the reality 
of a Pashtun President.  They even say they prefer a Pashtun over a 
Tajik candidate, revealing a lingering distrust of Tajik intentions 
and previous broken alliances. 
 
WOOD