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Viewing cable 08KABUL1816, SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CODEL REED TO AFGHANISTAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL1816 2008-07-19 11:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1574
OO RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1816/01 2011152
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191152Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4741
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001816 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA FOR A/S BOUCHER AND PMOON 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MSHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 AND POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PTER EAID AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CODEL REED TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
Introduction 
------------- 
 
1. (SBU)  Afghanistan remains a complex counterinsurgency 
environment, in which maintaining strong U.S. support for the 
Afghan government and robust U.S. leadership of international 
community assistance efforts is critical to ensuring that 
momentum for victory remains with us.  Press reporting 
emphasizes dramatic attacks, extremist atrocities, and 
security threats from increased infiltration from Pakistan 
but frequently passes over genuine advances in our 
counter-insurgency and nation-building strategy as we build 
Afghan security forces, improve local governance, broaden 
access to social services (e.g., public health, education), 
and advance economic development and infrastructure projects. 
 Seven years into this fight, we have rediscovered 
counterinsurgency lessons learned from past conflicts.  Now, 
where the U.S. is present, we are putting in the necessary 
levels of security, development and governance resources, 
and, as a result of an Afghan Government restructuring in 
2007, we are getting real traction by partnering with more 
effective provincial governors.  The U.S. has a strategy 
(grounded on an even better understanding of the human and 
political terrain here), and it works. 
 
2. (SBU)  The challenge remains that the extremists have a 
vote on the issue.  They discovered over the last two years 
that they cannot win a straight-up fight with either Afghan 
army or Coalition forces.  Effective counterinsurgency 
practices, especially in the U.S.-led Regional Command-East 
(RC-East), over the last couple of years succeeded in 
separating insurgents from the people, permitting the 
application of U.S. development and governance assistance to 
begin to build, in close concert with provincial and local 
Afghan officials, new connections between the people and the 
government.  The extremists have adjusted their tactics to 
avoid direct confrontations with Afghan army and Coalition 
forces, resorting (with some exceptions) to improvised 
explosive devices and suicide attacks and to direct attacks 
on development and governance targets, including local 
officials who cooperate with the Government and the 
international community. 
 
3. (SBU)  We will not win by focusing on defeating the 
extremists, although security operations remain critical. 
Rather, we need to focus on strengthening the Government,s 
capacity to deliver security and services to the people. 
After thirty years of invasion and civil war, however, 
Afghanistan does not have an educated middle class and its 
leadership has been depleted.  This is compounded by 
pervasive corruption, fed by the opium trade, which in turn 
reinforces the weakness of government structures.  In 
addition, Karzai is perceived by some to be more focused on 
reviving a traditional tribally-based approach than in 
building up an established government structure.  Progress is 
being made in some institutions ) the army, more recently 
the police, sub-national governance ) and some ministries 
have advanced under strong leadership.  The international 
community signaled its commitment to Afghanistan,s stability 
when it pledged more than $20 billion at the June Paris 
Conference, and a new UN Special Representative is bring new 
energy and idea to improve coordination among international 
donors and the Government.  But as the largest military and 
development contributor, the international community and the 
Afghans will continue to the look to the U.S. to lead. 
 
Politics and Governance 
----------------------- 
 
4. (SBU)  Maneuvering among politicians is already well 
underway for the fall 2009 presidential election, with 
parliamentary elections to follow in 2010.  As a result, 
legislative debate and ministerial decisions are increasingly 
complicated by political calculus.  Driving that calculus in 
part are endemic ethnic rivalries among Pashtuns, Tajiks, 
Uzbeks and Hazaras, (among others) and a effort to tap (or 
for incumbents, to deflect) the frustrations many Afghans 
express resulting from unrealized (and in many cases 
unrealistic) expectations for security and economic 
prosperity. 
 
KABUL 00001816  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
5. (SBU)  President Karzai's cabinet represents a 
cross-section of Afghanistan, but ministries vary in 
effectiveness.  Strong leadership in key ministries 
(Education, Health, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and 
Finance) has produced significant achievements in some 
sectors, while other ministries continue to suffer from weak 
leadership and capacity as well as corruption.  USAID's 
Capacity Development Program works with several ministries, 
and we support the World Bank's work with the Civil Service 
Commission to develop a national network of training 
institutes. 
 
6. (SBU) A positive development of the last year is the new 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG).  IDLG 
Director Popal has instituted a more rigorous review process 
for gubernatorial candidates, to include (e.g.) technical 
competence and personal probity.  The growing numbers of 
IDLG-vetted governors are becoming the focal points for 
reconstructing provincial institutions to deliver government 
services.  An ambitious program is underway to review local 
governance policy, and redraft the laws that that define 
roles and responsibilities at the provincial, district and 
municipal levels. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
7. (SBU)  Fed by increased cross-border incursions from 
Pakistan of both Taliban and foreign fighters, engagement 
with insurgents is up overall, but the increased number of 
&troops in contact8 also reflects growing numbers of Afghan 
and Coalition forces in the field taking the initiative to 
extend security and governance into areas where the Afghan 
government and the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) presence had been minimal or non-existent.  As a 
result of the pounding they took last year, insurgents 
largely avoid large-scale operations ) with some notable 
exceptions in Helmand and Konar provinces ) in favor of 
improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks and small unit 
ambushes. 
 
8. (SBU) RC-East remains focused on a balanced COIN approach 
synchronizing operations to protect the populace and push the 
insurgents out while pursuing mutually reinforcing efforts in 
development and governance assistance; the Embassy, USAID and 
CJTF-101 are coordinating more closely than ever USG efforts 
in RC-East.  The Commanders, Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) funding is critical to delivering quick, effective 
assistance projects, which, in coordination with USAID and 
local officials, supports both locally identified needs and 
longer term development goals. 
 
9. (SBU) In RC-South, the number and lethality of IED attacks 
is up dramatically; significantly, in some areas the number 
of IEDs reported by the public to Afghan or ISAF forces is 
also up, reflecting public support for the Government.  The 
approximately 2300 Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU) have carried out successful operations in the 
Garmsir District in Helmand and their mission has been 
extended to consolidate the resulting governance and 
development opportunities.  RC-West and RC-North remain 
relatively quiet. 
 
Building Afghan Security Forces 
------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Using FY 2007 supplemental funding (about $4.9 
billion for the army, and $2.5 billion for the police), the 
U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A) has re-made the Afghan army and is concentrating now 
on the police.  The army is already the most respected 
national institution in Afghanistan and is increasingly 
capable and confident.  We are on track to fill the currently 
authorized force structure of 86,000 (which includes a 
6,000-troop &float8) by fall 2009.  Four Afghan battalions 
are now certified to carry out independent operations, and 
additional units are expected to achieve similar 
certification over the course of 2008.  The Afghan army 
responded impressively to the June Taliban incursion into the 
 
KABUL 00001816  003 OF 004 
 
 
Arghandab District in Kandahar, using Afghan Army Air Corps 
assets to move roughly 50% of the approximately 1000 Afghan 
army reinforcements to Kandahar from Kabul and taking the 
lead in planning and executing a successful joint combat 
operation, with ISAF support, against the Taliban.  The 
Afghan Ministry of Defense has just launched an effort to win 
international community support for a force structure 
increase to 134,000 (which also includes a 12,000-troop 
&float8) which the U.S. supports.  The army will continue 
to depend for some years on Coalition enablers such as close 
air support and intelligence assets. 
 
11. (SBU) We have had less success re-building Afghanistan,s 
weak, corrupt police force.  However, in December 2007, 
CSTC-A launched the Focused District Development (FDD) 
Program, a district-by-district program to retrain and 
reequip the police.  The first FDD cycle began in December 
with seven districts; 55 districts are scheduled to be 
retrained by December 2008.  FDD will take between 4-5 years 
to reach all 364 districts of Afghanistan.  Once back in 
their respective districts, the ANP are gaining respect for 
the first time from local residents for carrying out their 
missions.  Beyond its immediate relevance to the police, FDD 
is becoming the focal point around which the U.S. is 
advancing its coordinated counterinsurgency strategy. 
Continued FDD coordination with the Afghan government, ISAF, 
USAID and the international community will ensure that 
sustainable security improvements in the most critical 
districts in the country will be linked to enhanced local 
governance, rule of law, and reconstruction and development 
projects. 
 
Development and Economic Growth 
------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU)  The Afghan economy grew by 11.5 percent in Afghan 
fiscal year 2007 (which ended March 20, 2008), thanks largely 
to greater agricultural production.  While annual GDP growth 
rates averaged over 12 percent for the past five years, 
Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world.  With poor agricultural growth and higher inflation 
this year, the IMF estimates that GDP growth will drop to 7.5 
percent for fiscal year 2008 (which ends March 20, 2009), 
forcing the government to make two food aid appeals this 
year.  The United States has already responded by donating 
30,000 MT of wheat through the World Food Program, and 
additional assistance is being planned.  Afghanistan,s IMF 
program remains on track, however, despite the government,s 
recent challenges in meeting IMF revenue collection 
benchmarks. 
 
13. (SBU)  U.S. economic development priorities are energy, 
roads, agriculture, and private sector development.  In the 
power sector, USAID is now funding four major electricity 
projects, including the strategic Kajaki Dam in Helmand and 
the North East Power System to import cheap power from 
northern neighbors.  USAID is also constructing hundreds of 
kilometers of strategic roads while employing Afghan workers 
to create jobs, cut costs, and train the workforce.  To help 
with the food supply, USAID is supporting increased 
production of food crops and agricultural exports. 
 
Counter-Narcotics 
----------------- 
 
14. (SBU) In its 2007 report, the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) reported that Afghanistan's poppy crop reached 
record levels, with some 193,000 hectares under cultivation. 
Favorable weather compounded the problem, resulting in 
Afghanistan alone producing 8,200 tons, or 93 percent of the 
world's opium.  In its Rapid Assessment Survey, released in 
February 2008, the UNODC is predicting 2008 will see 
nation-wide cultivation levels similar to or slightly lower 
than 2007. 
 
15. (SBU) Successes in reducing production in the east and 
north, and the links between the insurgency and continuing 
high levels of production in the south, are reflected in a 
growing segmentation of Afghan poppy production as well as a 
growing nexus between drugs and insurgents.  We are seeing 
 
KABUL 00001816  004 OF 004 
 
 
positive results by committed governors where security allows 
for effective counter-narcotics campaigns.  For example, the 
UNODC and the U.S. predict poppy cultivation has been slashed 
in Nangarhr Province, where cultivation had increased by 85 
percent in 2007.  Kabul plans to hold govenors accountable 
for poppy production in their provinces.  The Government has 
also committed to support stronger eradication measures, 
including army-provided force protection for polce 
eradication efforts.  President Karzai, on the advice of his 
cabinet, decided against the use of chemical spray for 
eradication in 2008. 
 
Regional Dynamics 
----------------- 
 
16. (SBU) Afghanistan's effort to build a secure and stable 
state is complicated by its relationships with its neighbors. 
 Karzai, who is already predisposed against Pakistan for its 
perceived manipulation and radicalization of Pashtun tribes 
in the border area, has renewed his public attacks on the 
Pakistani military and intelligence services over increased 
cross-border infiltration of extremists and allegation of a 
Pakistani hand behind recent events such as the June 
jailbreak in Kandahar and the July bombing of the Indian 
Embassy. 
 
17. (SBU) Mre than half of all Afghans speak Dari, which is 
closely related to Farsi.  Many Afghans along the border in 
the west look towards Iran for news, entertainment, jobs, 
education, medical care and, among Afghanistan,s more than 
three million-strong Shia population, religious guidance. 
Afghans fear that tensions over Iran,s nuclear ambitions 
could erupt into a war that would embroil them. 
WOOD