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Viewing cable 08HOCHIMINHCITY686, TIEN GIANG POLICE PROTEST RECENT FRAUD UNIT VISIT TO THEIR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HOCHIMINHCITY686 2008-07-25 10:41 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO6087
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #0686/01 2071041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251041Z JUL 08
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4698
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 3162
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 4926
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000686 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO, CA/EX, CA/FPP, DS/CR/OCI AND EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD PGOV PREL VM
SUBJECT: TIEN GIANG POLICE PROTEST RECENT FRAUD UNIT VISIT TO THEIR 
PROVINCE 
 
REF: (A) Hanoi 557 and previous (B) 2007 HCMC 1064 and previous (C) Hanoi 835 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000686  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On July 23, the Ho Chi Minh City External 
Relations Office (ERO) Deputy Director Nguyen Vu Tu asked to 
meet with the CG and other consulate staff to discuss a recent 
fraud investigation undertaken by the Consular Section's Fraud 
Prevention Unit (FPU). According to the ERO, Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) officials have vehemently complained at a senior 
level in Hanoi as well as in HCMC that the informant with whom 
our Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) met is a known land rights 
activist in Tien Giang province.  As a result of MPS' 
complaints, no FPU travel to Tien Giang province will being 
approved at least until the ERO submits its own report.  Post 
replied to ERO that the MPS report contained various obvious 
inaccuracies and that the only reason FPU met with these 
individuals was to discuss allegations of consular fraud, which 
was the only topic they discussed.  No one in ConGen HCMC's 
political section has previously heard of these individuals as 
being land rights activists.  We also note that based upon the 
partial read-out of the MPS report provided by ERO, the report 
contains numerous factual inaccuracies that appear designed to 
raise concerns and promote an anti-American agenda.  End 
Summary. 
 
ROUTINE FRAUD INVESTIGATION IN TIEN GIANG 
----------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) The fraud investigation in question took place on June 
16, 2008, and involved allegations of marriage fraud related to 
an immigrant visa case. The FPU had received three signed 
letters from an informant stating that the family of the visa 
beneficiary had paid the petitioner in the U.S. US$ 30,000 to 
enter into a fake marriage. The informant also called the FPU 
and provided a phone number and expressed willingness to meet 
with Consulate staff to discuss the case. Upon arriving in Tien 
Giang province to conduct a field investigation, the FPM and 
Fraud Unit locally engaged staff (LES) contacted the informant 
and agreed to meet at a local cafe. As is standard for such 
fraud investigations, local MPS officers followed the FPM and 
LES to the cafe. Shortly after arriving at the cafe, the 
informant arrived with two other individuals and discussed the 
case with the FPM for approximately ten minutes, after which the 
informant departed the cafe. The FPM and LES waited at the cafe 
until the MPS officers departed, and then also departed. Per our 
understanding with the Ho Chi Minh City External Relations 
office, the FPM notified local ERO officials that she and the 
LES had met with the informant at a local cafe. 
 
3. (SBU) On the evening of July 17, the HCMC ERO office 
contacted via cell phone the LES who had been on the trip, and 
asked several questions regarding the field investigation. 
Specifically, the ERO official asked if the FPM and LES had met 
someone at a local cafe, and if they had discussed anything 
other than the visa case. The ERO official then said that he had 
received a complaint from the MPS in Tien Giang province 
regarding the trip, and wanted to verify certain facts before 
writing a report. According to the ERO official, the three 
people who had come to the cafe were the ringleaders of a land 
rights protest which had recently taken place at the People's 
Committee's office in Ho Chi Minh City. The LES told the ERO 
official that she and the FPM had only discussed the visa case 
with the informant, and at no time during the ten minute 
conversation were issues regarding land rights or other 
sensitive matters raised. 
 
4. (SBU) At the July 23 meeting with the CG, ERO Deputy Director 
Nguyen Vu Tu recounted the above incident, and emphasized that 
the people with whom the FPM and LES met had been identified in 
a subsequent MPS report as known land rights activists. He said 
that according to the report he had received from the Tien Giang 
MPS, the informant had been "invited" to the Consulate to 
discuss land rights issues, and that during the June fraud 
investigation to Tien Giang consulate staff had switched cars in 
an attempt to confuse local MPS officials. CG made it clear that 
these allegations are entirely false.  No one in the Consulate's 
Political or Exec officer recognized any of the names prior to 
the trip. (Comment: HCMC's Pol Section has since been able to 
verify via conversations with other contacts that one of the 
three is associated with the land rights movement.)  CG went on 
to clarify that the FPU did not invite any of the three to the 
Consulate and that the only topic discussed by FPU staff was 
visa fraud.  Similarly, the FPU team did not switch cars or 
undertake any other steps to evade the MPS plain clothes 
surveillance officials who follow their every move. 
 
5. (SBU) CG explained the background of the fraud case, and the 
fact that while the Consulate FPU receives many "poison pen" 
letters regarding visa cases, it is unusual that the letters are 
signed or that the informant is willing to talk to our staff. 
The CG reiterated that in this case the purpose of the trip was 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000686  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
simply to acquire additional information from the informant 
regarding a possible fake marriage, and that no other issues 
were discussed. Citing inaccuracies in the MPS report, the CG 
went on to say that such allegations call into question the 
credibility of the entire MPS report. Finally, the CG said that 
the people with whom the FPM met with had never been invited to 
the Consulate to discuss land issues. To demonstrate that the 
purpose of the meeting in Tien Giang was only to discuss a visa 
fraud, the CG provided copies of the letters the informant had 
sent to the FPU. Mr. Tu was not surprised by the CG's response 
and candidly explained that the overall thrust of the MPS report 
was that this incident is "proof" that the "true purpose" of FPU 
trips is to stir up anti-GVN unrest. 
 
6. (SBU) The ERO asked that we provide the names of the three 
individuals who met the FPM and LES in the cafe, and suggested 
that on future fraud investigation trips that the FPM meets with 
informants at the residence of the informant. He also said that 
until this matter is cleared up, permission for our FPM to 
conduct field investigations in Tien Giang province would not be 
granted. 
 
OVERVIEW OF CONGEN HCMC TRAVEL PROCEDURES 
----------------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) Ref A and the numerous previous cables to which it 
refers provide an overview of the long history of the dispute 
over ConGen HCMC's Consular District.  The status quo that has 
existed since the Consulate opened is the USG recognizes ConGen 
HCMC's area of responsibility as extending from Thua-Thien Hue 
province in Central Vietnam to Ca Mau province at the country's 
far southern tip.  The GVN, in contrast, recognizes the 
Consulate and its officers being as accredited to Ho Chi Minh 
City only.  (Note: Because HCMC is a "special city," the GVN 
equates this one-city designation with being the same as 
recognizing a Consular District of one U.S. state. End Note.) 
Any travel Consulate officers undertake to destinations outside 
of HCMC is therefore considered to be "out of Consular District" 
and may only be undertaken subject to advance notification and 
approval from the GVN.  Consulate officers must submit DipNotes 
at least five work days in advance of travel listing the entire 
itinerary in detail and complete contact information for every 
person and group -- whether official or private -- that the 
officer(s) plan to speak to during the travel. 
 
8. (SBU) Because the advance notification requirements imposed 
by the GVN were rendering travel by HCMC's Consular Fraud Unit 
worthless (since someone was clearly warning every subject of 
"surprise" inspections), in early 2008 the Consulate reached an 
agreement with the ERO under which FPU staff do not have to list 
the exact name, address and phone number of every person to be 
visited.  Instead, they only list the exact province and 
neighborhood.  MPS (security) personnel routinely follow FPU 
staff during investigations and interview all subjects after 
they have spoken with the FPU, but they do not interfere in the 
interviews.  While subjects of FPU investigations are still 
sometimes warned in advance of the pending arrival of the FPU, 
this is the exception rather than the rule and we suspect that 
local security personnel are simply able to guess the subject 
based on the neighborhood and then tip subjects off in exchange 
for kick-backs.  To convince the MPS to allow this somewhat 
relaxed travel approval process (compared to the full 
notification required for political, economic and other travel) 
following a notorious incident of MPS harassment in An Gian 
province last October (ref B), the CG agreed that FPU staff 
would only undertake consular investigations while on FPU trips 
and would not combine consular fraud trips with political 
reporting or other activities. 
 
9. (SBU) Political, economic and other non-FPU travel remain 
subject to the stricter notification requirements.  In the early 
years of the Consulate's operation, ConGen HCMC personnel 
sometimes traveled without providing notification or without 
waiting for formal approval.  In recent years, however, this 
procedure was abandoned because making such trips without prior 
approval invariably led to reactions that ranged from 
cancellation of meetings to literally kicking people out of 
their hotel in the middle of the night.  Trips taken without 
prior approval were rarely a success and could be dangerous.  In 
addition, everyone that Consulate staff interacted with while on 
"unauthorized" trips was subsequently subjected to questioning 
or even detention by VN security personnel.  We know from our 
more sympathetic interlocutors in the GVN that the MPS routinely 
reported these trips as "proof" that the Consulate was fomenting 
rebellion by organizing "networks of anti-government agitators." 
 To maintain the safety and security of both our staff and our 
contacts, and to prevent actions by one section or agency from 
having negative repercussions on the work of other 
sections/agencies, ConGen HCMC staff now strictly follow the the 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000686  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
GVN unilaterally-imposed five-day notification rule for travel 
outside of the city. 
 
10. (SBU) In practice, the five-day notification rule usually 
amounts to little more than an onerous paperwork exercise for 
ConGen staff.  Since Consulate Officers are followed by plain 
clothes MPS observers at all times, we are not divulging 
anything by providing the names of individuals with whom we will 
meet.  Permission to travel is sometimes denied, however, with 
no explanation given.  In addition, most of the Consulate's 
contacts are interviewed by VN security personnel before and/or 
after meetings with ConGen officers, but this level of 
interference would likely take place whether or not we provided 
details in advance.  As noted above, failure to provide details 
generally makes the interrogation more severe.  Any unscheduled 
stop, including a restroom break, will often cause a 
plainclothes security officer to approach the vehicle and 
inquire why the car is stopping. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
11. (SBU) Even the limited insights into the contents of the MPS 
report that ERO HCMC provided to us are sufficient to show that 
the MPS report contains factually incorrect exaggerations such 
as the allegation that the FPU staff switched cars to elude 
their MPS watchers or invited interlocutors to the Consulate. 
Given this apparent willingness to play fast and loose with the 
truth, we decided to verify the MPS claim that FPU met with land 
rights protestors.  While none of our Political or Economic 
staff had heard of any of the three individuals, phone checks 
with contacts verified that one of the three people who attended 
the meeting is indeed connected to the land rights movement. 
Despite this grain of truth in the MPS allegations, we find them 
both insulting and disturbing and agree with the ERO's candid 
admission that the MPS report was written with the goal of 
inhibiting future travel by the FPU.  This desire by 
provincial-level MPS to restrict FPU (and perhaps other) 
Consular travel is problematic and needs to be borne in mind as 
we move forward with bilateral discussions of the HCMC Consular 
District, a possible future APP in Danang and the GVN's own 
desire to open a Consulate General in Houston (and possibly 
elsewhere) and to begin processing visas in New York. 
 
12. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: It is also worth emphasizing that 
the first contacts on this case were not via official channels 
to American officers but in direct evening and weekend calls to 
our dedicated local Vietnamese fraud prevention staff.  Direct 
calls to staff at their homes and on weekends, including with 
direct or veiled threats, are distressingly common at ConGen 
HCMC.  This type of harassment has driven some employees to quit 
or transfer although most, thankfully, tough it out.  For LES 
staff who do not cooperate with request for "informal" 
information on the activities and conversations of Consulate 
officers, the pressure can extend to family members, including 
parents, spouses and even children in school.  We are quite 
lucky to have such dedicated, professional Vietnamese staff who 
continue to do their best even in the face of such intimidation. 
 Unfortunately, as documented in a recent first-person message 
from the Ambassador (ref C), the combination of rampant 
inflation and nearly stagnant wages mean that our Vietnamese 
staff are increasingly having to deal with economic hardships in 
addition to political harassment.  As the Ambassador noted in 
ref C, "the proposed 2008 salary increases determined by the 
2007 survey will now be considered by our LES employees 
laughable at best, insulting at worst." 
 
13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. 
FAIRFAX