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Viewing cable 08HARARE606, VIOLENCE INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON MDC TARGETS;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HARARE606 2008-07-11 08:48 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Harare
VZCZCXRO4594
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0606/01 1930848
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110848Z JUL 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3167
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2139
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2259
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0795
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1536
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1894
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2315
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4746
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1405
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000606 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. HILL 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS 
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON MDC TARGETS; 
POPULACE REMAINS INTIMIDATED 
 
REF: HARARE 598 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) While violence appears to have subsided since the 
June 27 election, particulary in Harare and Matabeleland, 
there are pockets of violence throughout the rest of the 
country, supported by the continuing presence of ZANU-PF 
bases used for torture, beatings, and reeducation.  In 
addition to these pockets, post-election violence has been 
targeted at individuals, particularly MDC officials and their 
families.  The result of this is an intimidated populace and 
an exacerbated humanitarian problem as many IDPs are afraid 
to return home.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Assessment of Violence Difficult 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Assessing whether or not violence has decreased 
since the June 27 Presidential election is a tricky task in 
the current environment of repression and intimidation.  With 
the MDC's grassroots and leadership framework fractured 
through the murder, hospitalization, hiding and displacement 
of MPs, Senators, Councilors and party organizers, along with 
activists and journalists, the ability of opposition and 
civil society to compile and disseminate real-time 
information regarding rural violence has been impeded. 
Without the usual reporting networks, it is difficult to 
definitively say if violence has truly declined in some areas 
or just altered its form. 
 
------------------------------- 
A look at numbers and incidents 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) An analysis of NGO reporting of 
politically-motivated deaths, injuries, and intimidation 
indicates that the prevalence of incidents involving large 
numbers of victims has fallen.  Before the June 27 runoff, 
entire communities in many areas of Zimbabwe were forced to 
attend ZANU-PF rallies.  At many of these rallies people were 
beaten, tortured, and even killed.  In addition, 
"re-education camps" were used to hold dozens of MDC 
activists who were tortured and indoctrinated.  There are far 
fewer reports of this kind of mass activity since June 27. 
However, incidents of violence have not stopped.  The most 
recent detailed data of incidents runs through July 1, the 
weekend of the election.  Comparing election weekend data 
(Friday-Sunday) with the weekend before reveals that there 
were 18 incidents requiring medical attention confirmed on 
election weekend, versus 25 over the previous weekend.  Also, 
the reports from election weekend are almost exclusively 
limited to the Harare area, likely because of reporting and 
travel constraints rather than an absence of incidents in 
rural areas.  The targets of the election-weekend violence 
were almost exclusively those holding positions in the MDC 
rather than just perceived MDC supporters, who were also a 
prime target of the pre-June 27 violence.  Because of 
reporting difficulties, it is almost impossible to conduct an 
accurate comparative analysis of violence before and after 
the June 27 election at this early date. 
 
4.  (SBU)  That said, post-election reports indicate that 
violence has subsided considerably in Harare and ZANU-PF 
bases used for beatings, torture, and reeducation have been 
dismantled.  Bulawayo and the two Matabeleland provinces 
experienced relatively little pre-election violence and 
 
HARARE 00000606  002 OF 003 
 
 
remain mostly calm; there has been some sporadic violence. 
Anecdotal reports from rural areas in the rest of the country 
indicate pockets of violence and the continued presence of 
ZANU-PF bases.  In Midlands province, there are reports of 
six murders on July 3, where relatives have reportedly been 
denied access to bodies in the mortuary.  In Gokwe, Midlands 
province, on July 6, ZANU-PF youths and war veterans 
reportedly attacked homeless MDC supporters who had gathered 
together.  There are reports of at least one death in the 
incident, and many of the survivors fled into the forest. 
Police impounded an ambulance that was en route to the scene 
to help the victims. In Nyanga in Manicaland province on June 
30, 34 people who had sought refuge at the local MDC 
chairperson's farm were taken to the police station while 
police "looked for arms" at the farm.  In Masvingo province 
on the same day, villagers were beaten by ZANU-PF youths and 
war veterans who were looking for the six people who had 
voted for MDC at the local polling station.  We have also 
received reports of violence directed against groups of MDC 
supporters in the Mashonaland East communities of Mudzi and 
Mutoko. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Intimidation having the intended effect 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) If the large-scale pre-election violence has 
subsided, targeted violence and intimidation continues, much 
of it directed against MDC officials and their families. 
Fleeing death threats or trumped up charges, several MDC MP 
candidates remain on the run, even with parliament scheduled 
to convene next week.  A Manicaland MP was abducted at 
gunpoint on June 30 outside of the High Court where he had 
gone for a hearing on an electoral challenge by the losing 
candidate in the March 29 election.  His wherabouts are still 
unknown.  One particularly violent murder was widely 
publicized on Zimbabwean blogs on July 7.  MDC driver for 
Mashonaland West, Joshua Bakacheza, was abducted on June 25 
in Harare along with another activist.  The two were tortured 
and questioned about their MDC activities, shot, and left for 
dead.  Bakacheza was shot three times and died, while the 
other activist was shot once and survived.  He dragged 
himself to a nearby road and a good Samaritan drove him back 
to town where he remained in a coma for one week.  He was 
then able to direct colleagues to Bakacheza's badly 
decomposing, tortured body that remained in a field.  Photos 
of his body have been widely publicized online.  While this 
is just one of over one hundred murdered MDC activists and 
supporters, the images have the intended effect of instilling 
fear and intimidation in those who would dare to work for 
change. 
 
6.  (SBU)  In some areas, such as the Harare high-density 
suburbs of Chitungwiza and Hatcliff, police have arrested 
some of the ZANU-PF youth who perpetrated the violence 
leading up to the June 27 runoff.  However, perpetrators 
generally remain free and have not faced any legal 
consequences.  This is one of the main reasons, in addition 
to the loss of their homes and livelihoods, that thousands of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Harare refuse to go 
home.  They know who beat them or burned their homes down, 
and they are terrified of facing them again in person. 
Furthermore, the recent militia attack on the 
government-sponsored IDP camp (reftel), only served to 
confirm their fear and mistrust of government actors. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
HARARE 00000606  003 OF 003 
 
 
7.  (SBU) In light of the ongoing political negotiations, it 
is uncertain if the apparent lull in generalized violence 
will continue or if, as some media outlets have suggested, 
ZANU-PF will unleash its full force again on the general 
population.  The violence and intimidation directed against 
major and minor actors in the MDC and civil society continues 
to cripple their ability to organize or resist, and continues 
to have a chilling effect on the mood in Zimbabwe.  It also 
impedes a resolution to the humanitarian crisis, as IDPs 
remain afraid to return home.  While we continue to monitor 
the levels and types of violence across Zimbabwe, we remain 
conscious that even if some categories of violence subside, 
the intimidation factor remains utterly pervasive.  END 
COMMENT. 
Dhanani