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Viewing cable 08BUENOSAIRES1006, ARGENTINA: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BUENOSAIRES1006 2008-07-23 15:26 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1006/01 2051526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231526Z JUL 08

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1601
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1112
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0140
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0119
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0088
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0039
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0026
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0061
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1257
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 2094
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0768
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0032
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0570
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1428
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1433
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0070
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0194
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0861
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0102
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001006 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV EAGR AR JA
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA:  JAPANESE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERN 
OVER ARGENTINA'S PARIS CLUB DEBT 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 0976 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In an early July meeting among embassy 
teams, Japanese Ambassador to Argentina, Hitohiro Ishida, 
stressed the importance of Paris Club solidarity in dealing 
with Argentina's outstanding Paris Club debt and emphasized 
the need to send a strong message to the GOA to develop a 
repayment schedule soon.  Ambassador Wayne noted that 
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) was not yet 
prepared to discuss the topic.  Ishida expressed concern with 
CFK's unilateral and zero-sum approach to politics, one that 
does not consult with interested parties prior to launching 
initiatives.  He noted that, despite the political damage 
done by the agricultural conflict, the Kirchners appear 
firmly in control and opposition parties remain weak.  In 
closing, Ambassador Ishida reaffirmed the close relationship 
between Japan and the United States and suggested that the 
two Embassies meet on a regular basis to discuss common 
interests.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On July 7, Ambassador Wayne met with Ambassador 
Hitohiro Ishida and discussed Argentina's outstanding Paris 
Club debt as well as the current political climate given the 
GOA's protracted conflict with the agricultural sector. 
Ambassador Hitohiro was accompanied by DCM Masaru Watanabe, 
Political officer Satoshi Hishiyama, Economic Counselor 
Tomomi Yamazaki, and Economic Officer Ryu Murasawa. 
Ambassador Wayne was accompanied by DCM, Econcouns, Polcouns 
and Polintern. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Concern over Outstanding Paris Club Debt 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Ambassador Ishida outlined Japan,s primary 
interests in Argentina, which included: 1) protecting 
Japanese investment; 2) developing and implementing green 
technologies; and 3) urging the GOA to pay off its 
outstanding debt to the Paris Club.  Ambassador Ishida asked 
Ambassador Wayne several times whether A/S Shannon would 
raise Argentina's outstanding Paris Club debt during his 
bilateral consultations July 10-11.  He expressed great 
concern over the GOA's inaction in addressing its Paris Club 
debt and noted that Japanese companies are hesitant to invest 
further in Argentina as a result of the GOA's delay in 
resolving the issue.  Ambassador Wayne indicated that the 
Paris Club debt was not on A/S Shannon,s agenda because 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) was not yet prepared to 
discuss the topic.  Ambassador Ishida underscored the 
importance of Paris Club solidarity and emphasized the need 
to send a strong message to the GOA that it should develop a 
repayment schedule soon.  The costs to the GoA of financing 
its Paris Club repayment are increasing in line with 
Argentina's growing country risk premium and Ishida wondered 
whether the GOA fully appreciates the potential costs 
involved.  Argentine media coverage of Paris Club debt 
routinely referred to the GoA's Paris Club obligations in the 
$6 billion range, while the true amount is closer to $8 
billion, he said.  Ambassador Wayne said the U.S. agrees on 
the importance of Paris Club Solidarity and shared 
frustration that Argentina had not been able to put forward a 
serious offer for dealing with the debt. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Kirchners in Control Despite Unilateral Approach to Governance 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4. (SBU) Ambassador Ishida observed that he had arrived in 
Argentina on March 10, the day before the GOA,s ill-fated 
 
announcement of Resolution 125 and its sliding scale of 
levies on agricultural exports.  His tenure in Argentina had 
been dominated by the GOA's protracted conflict with the 
agricultural sector (Ref A).  He criticized the process by 
which the GOA arrived at its export tax regime, regarding it 
as a unilateral measure imposed without the consultation of 
Argentina's interested parties.  The Kirchners' zero-sum 
attitude, he said, favors only those who follow their 
political lead.  He also criticized the administration's 
failure to tackle growing inflationary pressures. 
 
5. (U) Ambassador Ishida offered his views on Argentina's 
political parties, noting that the opposition remains weak, 
but that the conflict has exposed fissures within the 
Kirchners' "transversal alliance" and particularly in the 
Kirchners, Peronist Party (PJ) and the Kirchner-allied 
Victory Front (FPV).  Elements within the parties are 
beginning to distance themselves from the Kirchners, he said, 
though they are doing so very carefully, waiting to see what 
happens as political developments unfold.  The Kirchners, 
however, appear to be firmly in control of the reins of 
government.  He predicted that the Kirchners should be able 
to maintain a majority in the Senate in the 2009 legislative 
elections.  He expresseddoubts, however, that they could 
maintain a majority in the entire Congress next year.  DCM 
Kelly, Political Counselor Featherstone, and Economic 
Counselor Climan shared U.S. Embassy perspectives on all of 
these issues. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Strengthening U.S. - Japan Ties in Argentina 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) In closing, Ambassador Ishida noted the importance of 
relations between Japan and the United States and emphasized 
that allies such as our need to maintain close relationships, 
even when outside of our respective countries.  He recognized 
the U.S. Embassy,s breadth of resources when compared to 
Japan's much smaller mission, and expressed an interest in 
meeting with the Ambassador at least once a year to discuss 
common interests.  He suggested that each Embassy,s 
counselors meet with greater frequency.  Ambassador Wayne 
agreed that the U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship is 
important and agreed to maintain close 
contact. 
 
WAYNE