Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08TOKYO1772, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/27/08
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TOKYO1772.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08TOKYO1772 | 2008-06-27 08:15 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO4676
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1772/01 1790815
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270815Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5436
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0987
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8611
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2340
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6846
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9196
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4129
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0123
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0535
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001772
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/27/08
INDEX:
(1) Nuclear programs, abduction, and peace (Part 1): Time of trial
for abduction-and-nuclear issue dual policy (Mainichi)
(2) Dispatch of GSDF personnel to Sudan in August or later as
command center personnel (Sankei)
(3) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear declaration -- Insufficient
report unacceptable (Sankei)
(4) Editorial: U.S. government should reconsider decision to delist
North Korea (Nikkei)
(5) Editorial: North Korea's declaration must lead to complete
nuclear abandonment (Asahi)
(6) Defense exchange isolated (Sankei)
(7) Editorial: IWC plenary meeting; moves underway for normalization
of organization (Tokyo Shimbun)
ARTICLES:
(1) Nuclear programs, abduction, and peace (Part 1): Time of trial
for abduction-and-nuclear issue dual policy
MAINICHI (Pages 1 and 2) (Abridged slightly)
June 27, 2008
President George W. Bush in a press conference on June 26 announced
that the United States would delist North Korea as a state sponsor
of terrorism. The President also emphatically said: "The United
States will never forget the abduction issue."
The President detests tyrannies. He seemed so sympathetic to the
abduction issue that the Japanese public had expected the United
States would not delist the North unless there was progress on the
abduction issue. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
once indicated that the abduction issue was a reason why the United
States put North Korea on its terrorism blacklist.
In reality, the U.S. government has not officially promised anything
beyond "giving consideration." In April 2007, when then Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice said to him clearly that resolving the abduction
issue was not a condition for delisting North Korea.
President Bush started to use the phrase, "We will not forget the
abduction issue," from around that time. He used the same expression
when Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda visited the United States in
November 2007. That can be taken as a U.S. announcement that though
it harbors sympathy, Washington's decision on whether to delist the
North would not be affected by the prime minister's preference for
pressure or dialogue in dealing with Pyongyang.
The turning points were the January-February 2007 U.S.-DPRK Berlin
talks that reached an agreement on resolving the nuclear issue and
the six-party Beijing agreement on first-phase steps. This was
immediately followed by a series of visits to Japan by high-ranking
U.S. officials. While in Japan, they all asked the definition of
progress on the abduction issue. People began to fear that the
TOKYO 00001772 002 OF 010
abduction issue might cause a split in the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Former Prime Minister Abe once at the Diet defined progress as
specific steps by North Korea for the resolution of the abduction
issue. A Japan-DPRK normalization working group also began
functioning under the six-party framework. Momentum was gathering
even under the Abe administration to move the abduction issue
forward in tandem with progress on the nuclear issue.
Prime Minister Abe was replaced by Fukuda in September 2007. Fukuda
soon made it clear that his administration would pursue the nuclear
and abduction issues at the same time with the aim of resolving the
abduction issue while he was office. The phrase "dialogue and
pressure" has rarely been heard since.
Japan-DPRK talks were held on June 11-12 and an agreement was
reached for Pyongyang to reinvestigate the abduction issue and hand
Japanese radicals who hijacked a Japan Airlines plane to North Korea
in 1970 over to Tokyo and for Japan to partially lift its sanctions
against the North. It is widely believed that behind this
development, there was a nudge by Washington, which wants to proceed
with the denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear disarmament.
Although Prime Minister Fukuda has welcomed the series of
developments, the North's declaration in not covering nuclear
weapons, uranium enrichment, and other activities is clearly
imperfect. Japan has lost the leverage of delisting the North, and
the future of the implementation of the reinvestigation into the
abduction issue remains unclear.
There is a proverb that goes: "He who runs after two hares will
catch neither." The Fukuda administration's North Korea policy is
facing a testing time.
On the night of June 13 at a Cabinet Office conference room, Foreign
Ministry Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director-General Akitaka
Saiki briefed abductees' families on the Japan-DPRK talks held in
Beijing. In the session, Saiki said, "I did my very best, but I am
ready to take any criticism." His explanation lasted an hour and 40
minutes.
Some of the family members who were assembled together after
receiving fax messages from the government the day before were
hopeful that surviving abductees would be able to return to Japan.
Family members fiercely criticized Pyongyang's plan to reinvestigate
the abduction issue and Tokyo's plan to partially lift its
sanctions. The abduction issue was reinvestigated in 2004 after the
second Japan-North Korea summit, and Pyongyang did not change its
previous claim that eight abductees had died.
Family members had high hopes for Saiki, who headed the government's
investigation team that visited North Korea immediately after the
first Japan-North Korea summit that took place in September 2002.
His expression was stony throughout the meeting with the family
members.
The Association of the Families of Victims of Kidnapped by North
Korea (AFVKN), which regards abductions as an ongoing act of
terrorism, has been waiting for the Untied States to identify
"abduction" as a ground for keeping North Korea as its terrorism
blacklist. Since its then representative Shigeru Yokota, 75, first
visited the United States in February 2001, AFVKN members have often
TOKYO 00001772 003 OF 010
visited Washington to lobby U.S. officials.
In the spring of 2004, the abduction issue made the State
Department's Annual Country Report on Terrorism. The AFVKN took this
as Washington having recognized abductions an act of terrorism. In
April 2006, Sakie Yokota, 72, visited the United States and met with
President Bush in person. The AFVKN was convinced that unwavering
ties were established with the United States.
North Korea conducted a nuclear test six months later, in October
2006, promoting Washington to put high priority on Pyongyang's
nuclear programs. AFVKN members visited the United States last fall
and this spring to lobby against delisting the North in vain.
At a regular AFVKN meeting in Minato Ward, Tokyo, on the night of
June 25, Sakie Yokota bitterly criticized the government's decision
to ease sanctions against the North.
Her daughter Megumi Yokota, who was abducted at the age of 13,
scratched so desperately at an iron door during the boat ride to the
North that she lost all her fingernails, according to a former North
Korean agent.
What Sakie fears the most is the reopening of Japanese ports for the
North Korean cargo-passenger ship Mangyongbong-92. The ship is used
for Korean residents in Japan to visit their kin back in North
Korea. It has also become clear through police investigations that
the Mangyongbong has been used for activities by North Korean
agents. Abductees' families, including Sakie, have been conducting a
dive to keep the vessel out of Japanese ports. The government has
imposed a ban on the ship's entry into Japan in the wake of the
North's missile launches in July 2006. But based on the recent
bilateral agreement, the vessel will be allowed to enter Japanese
ports strictly for transporting humanitarian supplies.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura met on June 17 with
family members with a letter opposing the government's decision to
partially lift the sanctions. The government's spokesman said to
them: "The reinvestigation must be based on the repatriation of
(abductees). We are now at the stage of word for word, so we will
not lift sanctions immediately." Representative Shigeo Iizuka, 70,
did not conceal his mistrust in the government which keeps pace with
the United States. The blog of Teruaki Masumoto, 52, the
organization's secretary general, reads: "The United States has
completely betrayed us. The Japanese government, too, has abandoned
the victims of kidnapped by North Korea."
On the night of June 26, Machimura discussed (the delisting of North
Korea) with Stephen Hadley, assistant to the President for national
security affairs. In the conversation, Machimura had to make a
request to the U.S. government, saying: "The Japanese public is
shocked (by the delisting), although it is a predetermined step. We
would like to see the U.S. government handle the matter carefully."
(2) Dispatch of GSDF personnel to Sudan in August or later as
command center personnel
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full)
June 27, 2008
The government on June 26 decided to dispatch several Ground
Self-Defense members to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which is
TOKYO 00001772 004 OF 010
operating in southern Sudan, as central command personnel. It will
undergo coordination with the UN with the aim of dispatching them in
August or later.
This will be the first dispatch of SDF personnel to Africa since
1993-1995, when they were sent to join UN operations in Mozambique
(ONUMOZ). The government's aim is to play up Japan's international
contributions in the run-up to the G-8 in July, where Africa
assistance will top the agenda.
SDF personnel will be dispatched to the UNMIS command center located
in al-Khartum, the capital of Sudan. They will be serving as liaison
and coordination officers dealing with troops taking part in
peace-keeping operations (PKO) there. The government yesterday held
a meeting of Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura, Foreign
Minister Masahiko Koumura and Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
However, coordination has been still underway as no agreement was
reached at that meeting over the posts they will assume.
Regarding the dispatch of SDF personnel to Sudan, the government has
considered dispatching GSDF personnel for the reconstruction of
roads and the removal of land mines. However, only command center
personnel will be dispatched at least for the present. The
government is also looking into dispatching SDF personnel to PKO
centers in Ghana, Kenya and Egypt for the first time as
instructors.
(3) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear declaration -- Insufficient
report unacceptable
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
June 27, 2008
In the wake of North Korea handing over a declaration of its nuclear
programs, U.S. President George W. Bush has notified Congress of his
decision to delist Pyongyang as a state sponsor of terrorism.
It is extremely regrettable that Pyongyang's declaration has
excluded or forgone a list of its actual nuclear weapons, which is
especially vital for Japan, even though it had been expected in the
report.
We have to wonder how effectively and completely verification can be
done in the 45 days before delisting goes into effect.
If North Korea is removed from the U.S. blacklist, it will be able
to get international economic support. "No economic assistance to
North Korea before resolution of the abduction issue" has become
common public opinion of Japan. Therefore, the U.S. government's
decision this time around may put the brakes on resolving the
abduction issue, and it may also harm Japan's national interests.
However, delisting has not yet been finalized. It is time for Japan
to devote all its energies to prevent Japan from being left in the
lurch.
The declaration stipulates the amount of extracted plutonium, the
reactor records, among other matters. A separate report should have
itemized nuclear weapons that use highly-enriched uranium and
indicate Pyongyang's cooperation to Syria's nuclear development.
But the United States appears to have given in to North Korea's
assertions.
TOKYO 00001772 005 OF 010
Pyongyang has put off providing a list of its nuclear weapons to a
later phase of the complex negotiations.
The declaration this time around was made based on the joint
statement by the Six Parties in September 2005. The joint statement
stipulated that the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons
and existing nuclear programs. Therefore, it is evident that the
declaration is a major backsliding.
The United States put North Korea on its list of state sponsors of
terrorism in 1988 after its agents were found to have bombed a South
Korean airliner the previous year. In order to remove a country from
the list, the two points must be proved: 1) the country has not
supported any terrorists for the past six months; and 2) the country
is committed to not supporting terrorism in the future.
What should be forgotten was that the U.S. government has clarified
that it would add the issue of abductions to the conditions for its
designation as terrorist-sponsoring state. This is the remark made
by then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage after then Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi had visited Pyongyang. The issue of
Japanese abduction of nationals by North Korea agents was first
stipulated in the annual report on global terrorism in 2004. The
phrase that the abduction issue is not resolved should be written
into the annual report.
We wonder how much the Japanese government made efforts to share
such a view with the governments of the United States and other
countries. In order for the U.S. Congress to reverse the Bush
administration's decision to delist the North, new legislation is
necessary. We want the Foreign Ministry and Diet members from the
ruling and opposition forces to do their best to bring about a
rollback by taking advantage of their channels to the U.S.
Congress.
(4) Editorial: U.S. government should reconsider decision to delist
North Korea
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
June 27, 2008
Following North Korea's submission of a declaration of its nuclear
development programs, the U.S. government notified Congress of its
decision to delist the North as a state sponsor of terrorism. The
U.S. came up with the decision in disregard of Foreign Ministry's
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Akitaka Saiki's
warning that a delisting decision may negatively affect the
reliability of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Things are going as North
Korea intended. The foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance could be
undermined under the current serious situation.
During the 45-day delisting process, if North Korea presents
measures to verify the contents of its report effectively and if
progress is made toward settlement of the issue of Japanese
nationals abducted by North Korean agents, the situation will turn
around. Otherwise, the Bush administration should retract the
delisting decision.
The delisting plan contains a number of problems. First, the deal
between the U.S. and North Korea might make it more difficult to
move negotiations on North Korea's denuclearization forward since it
lacks rationality and balance.
TOKYO 00001772 006 OF 010
North Korea's declaration is not linked to the U.S. removal of North
Korea from its blacklist under U.S. domestic law. Moreover, North
Korea had promised in an agreement reached in the six-party talks
last October to produce a complete and accurate declaration of its
nuclear programs and activities by the end of last year. The
declaration came out six months later.
An extravagant reward is given to a student for the homework the
student turned in six months later. The spoiled student will
continue to get around doing homework. According to this logic, it
will become less hopeful for North Korea to denuclearize itself.
Second, the nuclear report, though taken as a one step forward for
form's sake, contains no information concerning the nuclear weapons
Pyongyang has produced. Further, the report sets out no principle on
how to verify its contents. A state of closed nature, like North
Korea, can deport investigators from the nation at any time, as the
North did in the past. As long as North Korea remains closed, the
effective verification of the report will be difficult.
Third, it is an open question that North Korea is no longer a state
sponsor of terrorism. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on Sept. 11
in 2001 and North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens are both
challenges to the civilized world. North Korea has yet to launch the
reinvestigation of the Japanese abductees based on its pledge to
Japan. The perpetrators of the abductions, who can even be called
state terrorists, are still in the hands of North Korean
authorities.
Fourth, the delisting policy of the U.S. will deal a serious blow to
the Japan-U.S. alliance. The Bush administration is strict with Iran
but is not so with North Korea. The delisting decision exposed that
Japan and the U.S. have different senses of menace toward North
Korea.
Sharing the same sense of menace should be a premise for the
alliance. If Japan and the U.S. do not have common sense, their
security treaty would be just a scrap of paper.
A U.S. informed source said that the feeling or sense of U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has not changed from
that when he was serving as U.S. ambassador to South Korea in the
days of the administration led by President Roh Moo Hyun. If Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda turns a blind eye to the cracks that are
appearing between Japan and the U.S. and officially falls in step
with the U.S. policy of reconciliation toward North Korea, Japan's
cornerstone supporting the alliance would be undermined.
North Korea is apparently taking into account the Bush
administration's term of office drawing closer. We want to ask
President Bush if he would like to go down in history as the
president who made a decision that caused the U.S. to lose its most
important alliance in the Pacific region.
(5) Editorial: North Korea's declaration must lead to complete
nuclear abandonment
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
June 27, 2008
At long last, North Korea came up with a declaration of its nuclear
TOKYO 00001772 007 OF 010
programs. Its details have yet to be unveiled. This declaration,
however, is an important step in line with an agreement reached at
the six-party talks for North Korea's nuclear abandonment.
Last year's six-party agreement anticipates three phases. The first
phase is to freeze and seal North Korea's nuclear-related
facilities. The second phase is to disable these facilities so they
cannot be used and is to declare all nuclear programs. The third
phase is to complete North Korea's nuclear abandonment.
So far, the first phase is over. North Korea is currently in the
process of disabling its nuclear-related facilities. The declaration
is the last thing of what North Korea should do in the second phase.
North Korea was to have come up with its nuclear declaration by the
end of last year. However, it was six months overdue due to its
protracted talks with the United States.
In return, the United States is now in the process of delisting
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.
We would like to welcome the resumed process of translating the
six-party agreement into action. However, we cannot say we totally
welcome it.
First of all, North Korea has yet to disable all of its nuclear
facilities. North Korea will reportedly invite the six-party
members' news media to see North Korea demolish one of its nuclear
facilities today. This is probably aimed at visual effects. However,
North Korea should disable its nuclear facilities through such
substantive measures as removing spent nuclear fuel from the
reactor.
Second, we wonder if the submitted declaration really clarifies
North Korea's nuclear development in its entirety. It reportedly is
a far cry from being a "complete and correct declaration."
That is because the declaration is said to contain no core
information, such as how many nuclear weapons North Korea has and
where they are stored. North Korea is said to have only declared its
nuclear development using plutonium and reportedly does not touch on
its uranium enrichment. It looks like the declaration fails to
account for its suspected proliferation of nuclear-related
technologies to Syria.
All these doubts must not be left vague.
Even so, the declaration itself should be viewed as progress. It
will not ease North Korea's nuclear threat. However, North Korea
will be disabled at least from making raw materials for nuclear
weapons.
More importantly, the third phase-which is for North Korea's
abandonment of its nuclear programs-is finally in sight.
What should be done from now is clear. The six-party talks should
resume at once and decide on how to verify North Korea's
declaration. North Korea should sincerely respond to on-the-spot
inspections and hearings from its engineers. After that, we want the
six-party talks to work out specific procedures for the third
phase.
We probably cannot say U.S. President Bush, whose term is to run out
TOKYO 00001772 008 OF 010
shortly, is not impatient. If the declaration is found false, the
United States could bring back the process. Bush stressed in his
press remarks that he will not forget the abduction issue.
For the sake of Japan's national security, we must prod North Korea
to abandon its nuclear development. In that process, we should pave
the way to resolve the abduction issue or tragic crime. We should
make headway without losing sight of this starting point.
(6) Defense exchange isolated
SANKEI (Page 6) (Abridged)
June 26, 2008
Toshu Noguchi
ZHANJIANG, Guangdong, China-The Maritime Self-Defense Force
destroyer Sazanami, now visiting China for the first time, went
through main exchange events yesterday. China apparently tried to
make an appeal to the international community on its stance of
disclosing information, with the exchange this time as a symbol of
confidence building between Japan and China in the military area.
With an eye on anti-Japanese sentiment, the MSDF ship's visit to
China was isolated from the Chinese public. This gives the
impression that it is difficult to build confidence.
The Sazanami had about 100 visitors from the naval forces of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army yesterday. On the deck, they were
taking pictures and listening to an MSDF officer's briefing on the
Sazanami's hardware. I asked them about historical issues that lie
between Japan and China, and I also tried to ask them about the
issue of marine interests in the East China Sea. "Please ask our
officer," one of them said.
China stressed that the "military exchange" is based on the Japanese
and Chinese leaders' common understanding" (in the words of China's
South Sea Fleet Commander Su Shiliang). In November last year, the
South Sea Fleet's missile destroyer Shenzhen made its first port
call in Japan. This time around, an MSDF ship visited China. Japan
and China are now set to go on with bilateral exchanges in the most
delayed area of military affairs. "Looking back on history," one of
the Sazanami's crew said, "it wouldn't be so easy to build a
relationship of mutual trust in a real sense." This is also true,
however.
In Zhanjiang, China was wary of 'anti-Japanese' moves. The Sazanami
remained berthed at the naval base, where the South Sea Fleet is
headquartered. An MSDF band's downtown performance was canceled, and
a joint concert planned to be held in the city was suddenly
rescheduled to take place on base.
Such measures were taken for "security reasons." Public security
authorities were guarded against anti-Japanese demonstrations.
Anyone suspicious was barred from the gate to the base. On the
Internet were write-ins for demonstrations against the Sazanami's
port call.
There were no citizens at the base ceremony upon the Sazanami's
arrival. The Sazanami's crew felt a welcome mood. In their eyes,
however, the scene there looked somewhat bare. The Sazanami will be
opened to the public on June 27. This event, however, is reportedly
for only those permitted by Chinese authorities.
TOKYO 00001772 009 OF 010
The Chinese media is friendly toward the Sazanami's visit, but their
coverage of the MSDF ship's port call is not so prominent. Local
residents voiced their mixed feelings. "History is history," a
taxicab driver said. "It's important to promote exchange and
friendship," he added. "A naval ship flying the Japanese flag is
here," a restaurant manager said, "so I can't help but imagine the
history of aggression."
Japan and China have somehow started their defense exchanges.
However, one of those concerned voiced misgivings: "It's also
important to promote open exchanges like visiting each other's
ships. However, I wonder if we can understand each other without
exchanging views or holding discussions, including sensitive issues.
The slogan of exchanges may take on a life of its own, and I fear
that China may only use this exchange for their image strategy to
make an appeal on what they call 'transparency.'"
(7) Editorial: IWC plenary meeting; moves underway for normalization
of organization
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full)
June 27, 2008
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) at its 60th plenary
meeting, now underway in Santiago, Chile, has decided to set up a
working group joined by major member nations. Both whaling and
antiwhaling countries need to seriously make efforts to normalize
the organization.
It has been more than 20 years since Japan withdrew from commercial
whaling in late 1982, when the IWC imposed a 10-year moratorium on
such at a plenary meeting. The outcome of the Santiago meeting has
paved the way to put an end to an annual verbal battle between
whaling and antiwhaling countries seen at IWC meetings.
The IWC at its Santiago plenary meeting, which has started this
week, agreed to establish a working group tasked with dealing with
the future of the organization and key issues.
The membership of the IWC is now 81, of which 24 major countries
will join the envisaged working group -- 10 countries, such as
Japan, China, South Korea, Norway, Iceland, etc., from the whaling
countries' side, and 14 countries, including the U.S., Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentine, etc., from the
antiwhaling countries' side.
Main items the envisaged working group will take up include the
resumption of small-scale coastal whaling, as sought strongly by
Japan, and the completion of the revised management scheme (RMS) for
the proper control of cetacean resources. Antiwhaling countries will
bring up a total of 33 items, including the expansion of sanctuaries
and the way Japan's whaling should be.
The IWC says that the working group will aim at submitting a package
of agreed proposals at the plenary meeting in Madeira, Portugal,
following a first meeting this fall and a series of discussion
sessions to be held with the IWC's interim meeting next March in
between.
In view of the fierce conflict in the past, the agreement reached
this time is groundbreaking. It is praiseworthy that participants
TOKYO 00001772 010 OF 010
vowed to find common ground through talks for the normalization of
the stalemated organization.
Japan, which has been calling for long-term whaling, once hinted at
its intention to walk out of the IWC, after the Anchorage plenary
session last year. It cast a ballot in favor of aboriginal
subsistence whaling in the U.S. and Denmark. However, its proposal
for resuming coastal whaling was voted down by antiwhaling
countries.
The IWC is an international agency established in 1948, based on the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Its
objective is to preserve cetacean resources and develop the whaling
industry in an orderly manner. Member nations are obligated to
restore the original form of whaling.
However, the future of whaling is far from reassuring. The key is to
what extent whaling and antiwhaling countries will make concessions.
Antiwhaling countries will probably seek the curtailment of or
withdrawal from research whaling in the Southern Ocean, if Japan
focuses on the resumption of coastal whaling. The barrier to the
resumption of commercial whaling is even higher. Revising key items
requires approval by a two-thirds majority or more at a plenary
meeting. Making decisions from a broad perspective is
indispensable.
SCHIEFFER