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Viewing cable 08TOKYO1745, ASD SHINN PRESSES JAPAN ON REALIGNMENT, PLANNING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO1745 2008-06-25 07:48 2011-06-15 02:00 SECRET Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO2569
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #1745/01 1770748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250748Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5382
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4089
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2391
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0084
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8569
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0945
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2298
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9154
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUHPSAA/COMMARFORPAC  PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7077
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 WEIR/KOSINSKI 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2023 
TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA
SUBJECT: ASD SHINN PRESSES JAPAN ON REALIGNMENT, PLANNING 
AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
REF: TOKYO 1657 
 
TOKYO 00001745  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 
Pacific Security Affairs Shinn used June 16 meetings with 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) counterparts to register strong concerns about delays 
in base realignment, emphasize the importance of robust 
bilateral planning, and stress the need for continued 
progress on information security.  MOD Administrative Vice 
Minister (AVM) Masuda gave assurances that Japan remains 
committed to completing the Futenma Replacement Facility 
(FRF) on schedule despite the delays in the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA).  Defense Policy Bureau Director 
General (DG) Takamizawa cautioned, however, that accelerating 
on-land construction at the FRF could endanger local 
cooperation.  On bilateral planning, Operational Planning 
Bureau DG Tokuchi pressed for increased communication and 
cooperation but was unwilling to discuss hold-ups on 
finishing guidance to initiate a bilateral threat assessment. 
 MOFA North American Affairs DG Nishimiya suggested that 
misperceptions remain over the level of detail each side 
needs about the others' operational plans.  AVM Masuda 
underscored the need for greater cooperation on information 
security, but noted that other ministries and agencies are 
not as sensitive to the problem.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) During June 16 meetings at the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) and MOFA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 
Pacific Security Affairs James Shinn discussed possible 
Japanese deployment options to Afghanistan (reported 
separately in Reftel) and a range of other security issues, 
including the status of the Futenma Replacement Facility 
(FRF), bilateral defense planning, and information security 
with Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Kohei Masuda, 
MOD Director-General for Defense Policy Nobushige Takamizawa, 
MOD DG for Operations Policy Hideshi Tokuchi, and MOFA North 
American Affairs DG Shinichi Nishimiya.  Commander United 
States Forces in Japan (USFJ) Lt. Gen. Edward Rice also 
participated in the meetings. 
 
Realignment 
----------- 
 
3. (C) ASD Shinn registered strong concerns with AVM Masuda 
over the possible delay in implementing the Agreed 
Implementation Plan (AIP) for the construction of the FRF, 
saying Tokyo should accelerate work on those areas of the FRF 
not subject to the environmental impact assessment (EIA). 
Masuda assured ASD Shinn that Japan remains committed to the 
timely completion of the Realignment Roadmap despite the 
eight-month delay in the EIA.  Demolition of existing 
facilities and EIA survey work have commenced and the United 
States should not be overly concerned by comments from the 
Japanese side stating the contrary, Masuda said. 
 
4. (C) In an unusually heated outburst, DG Takamizawa argued 
that U.S. government pressure to speed up on-land 
construction at the FRF threatens to undermine Tokyo's 
efforts to secure cooperation from Okinawa.   Accelerating 
construction before completion of the EIA could backfire on 
the U.S. and Japanese governments, leading to an 
unsatisfactory result to both sides. ""We may win some battles 
but will lose the war,"" DG Takamizawa warned, referring to 
securing the Governor's approval for landfill work.  While 
Japan would welcome specific ideas from the U.S. side, 
general expressions of concern about Japan's execution  
strategy are counter-productive, DG Takamizawa asserted.  ASD 
Shinn reiterated that the delay in the EIA is a serious 
concern, that the entire agreement is at risk due to the 
delay, and that both sides need to work together to 
compensate for the delay. 
 
Guam 
---- 
 
5. (C) Regarding construction of facilities on Guam, AVM 
Masuda said the Japanese government will request appropriate 
funds to finance the project for FY 2009 in September during 
the extraordinary Diet session.  To prepare for the Diet 
deliberations, Japan seeks continued cooperation and 
information from the United States per Defense Minister 
Ishiba's recent conversation with Secretary of Defense Gates 
in Singapore. 
 
Bilateral Planning 
------------------ 
 
6. (S) MOD Defense Operations DG Tokuchi underscored the need 
for improved communication and cooperation between the United 
States and Japan on bilateral planning for contingencies, 
noting four areas of bilateral planning that are essential. 
First, the plans must be workable.  Second, the U.S. must 
avoid making plans and expecting to execute them 
unilaterally.  Third, site surveys of seaports and airports 
must continue, but plans must acknowledge that other entities 
besides the U.S. military will need to use them in a 
contingency.  Finally, bilateral understanding of each 
country,s decision making mechanisms in a crisis is 
imperative. 
 
7. (S) ASD Shinn thanked Tokuchi for his insights and noted 
that Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Thomas 
Mahnken, the Defense Department's lead planner, will visit 
Japan in July to discuss an analytical review of Contingency 
Plan 5055 and updates directed under the next Subcommittee 
for Defense Cooperation bilateral planning framework guidance 
(currently in bilateral coordination).  ASD Shinn and Lt. 
Gen. Rice underscored the importance in the bilateral 
planning process of having a shared threat assessment.  DG 
Tokuchi responded that he was not ready to discuss the status 
of the draft guidance to initiate a threat assessment 
(so-called Common Security Assessment).  (Note: Tokuchi 
approved the document within days, however.) 
 
8. (S) Embassy Tokyo Pol-Mil Chief Greene said that the 2006 
DPRK missile launch experience highlighted the shortcomings 
in the assumptions used to craft emergency legislation, such 
as the Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan Law.  The 
legislation assumed an escalating crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula and did not allow the Alliance to respond 
effectively to a sudden threat.  Lt Gen Rice noted that the 
U.S. and Japan need to work to create a &robust8 series of 
contingency scenarios.  Updating existing scenarios and 
developing new ones will allow the United States and Japan to 
better analyze their future operational needs.  DG Tokuchi 
agreed with both points, noting that the reality of missile 
defense made older decision making mechanisms inadequate and 
that the United States and Japan both must be &circumspect8 
on all assumptions and scenarios. 
 
Site Surveys 
------------ 
 
9. (S) Lt. Gen. Rice stressed the importance of bilateral  
defense planning with AVM Masuda and urged greater 
cooperation on surveys of airports and seaports for possible 
use in contingencies.  Masuda responded that Japan needs 
specific information on how the facilities would be used by 
U.S. forces as this will help the Government of Japan to 
engage local governments on the nature of the site surveys. 
The information is also necessary for Japan to develop plans 
to de-conflict usage of the air and sea ports by the U.S. 
military, Japan Self Defense Forces and civilian Japanese 
entities, Masuda asserted. 
 
Information Security 
-------------------- 
 
10. (C) ASD Shinn and Lt. Gen. Rice urged continued 
cooperation on information security and the Bilateral 
Information Security Task Force (BISTF).  Highlighting the 
recent leak of intelligence on Chinese missile launches to 
the Sankei newspaper, Lt. Gen. Rice underscored the need to 
work toward a secure system that provides comprehensive, 
government-wide safeguards for classified information.  As 
both countries work more closely together on security 
initiatives, such as ballistic missile defense cooperation, 
the need for stronger information security measures is even 
greater.  ASD Shinn stressed that there has been a 
considerable amount of bilateral discussions within the BISTF 
and now there is a need for action, including implementation 
of real safeguards and strengthening of law enforcement. 
 
11. (C) Masuda acknowledged the need for greater cooperation 
but pointed out that both sides need to examine areas of 
information security that fall outside the BISTF's authority 
and to deal with ministries and agencies that are not 
sensitive to the problem.  Lt. Gen. Rice responded that this 
is exactly why a comprehensive approach to information 
security is needed. 
 
12. (U) ASD Shinn,s staff and Lt. Gen. Rice cleared this 
message. 
SCHIEFFER