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Viewing cable 08STATE62767, DEMARCHE REQUEST: INDIA'S ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE62767 2008-06-11 13:40 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2767 1631350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 111340Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0000
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0000
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000
UNCLAS STATE 062767 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PHUM UNGA IN ZI SF PO CA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: INDIA'S ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY 
OF DEMOCRACIES 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 3. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  (SBU) India has a longstanding position at the UN against 
the use of country-specific language in resolutions and it 
seems they are extending that position to statements issued 
by the Community of Democracies (CD).  India has been 
particularly unhelpful on efforts to issue a statement on the 
situation in Zimbabwe; an appropriate high-level approach may 
be helpful in obtaining India's support, which would be very 
useful in drawing along a begrudging but compliant South 
Africa.  To urge further action on Zimbabwe, we have taken 
the following actions: the U.S. delegation to the CD has 
asked India for an explanation of its position and included 
the issue in President Bush's brief for his meeting with PM 
Singh on the sidelines of the G-8.  Thus far the Indian 
delegation maintains its unhelpful stance, objecting to the 
statement without explanation. Additionally, India's recent 
decision to remove its Foreign Secretary's endorsement for 
the CD's Diplomat's Handbook, a successful initiative that 
has been in the works for well over one year and has been 
widely praised by CD members, calls into question the GOI's 
commitment to the efforts and principles of the Community. 
After the strong support India had thus far displayed for the 
Handbook and the recent reversal, it may be possible that the 
Indian delegation in Washington did not adequately report on 
the project throughout the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
in earlier stages.  An explanation of India's decision on 
Zimbabwe, its recent reversal on the handbook, and its intent 
for future cooperation on CD projects would be useful. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
3.  (U) Post is requested to pursue the following objectives: 
 
-- Ascertain India's reasons for not supporting the statement 
on Zimbabwe.  Though we understand that India opposes the 
statement, we have not heard any particular reasons either 
publicly or privately.  Other CD members have shared with us 
their confusion about India's position on this matter.  No 
other country has objected in writing as the Portuguese 
procedure required:  Others like Mongolia, the Czech 
Republic, and El Salvador are publicly supportive while South 
Korea and Morocco are privately supportive. We would find 
India's constructive comments helpful in advancing the 
ability of the CD to play an effective role in supporting 
democratic elections in Zimbabwe. 
 
-- Urge India's support for a Community of Democracies 
Statement on the election crisis in Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe is 
undergoing an urgent crisis over its elections.  As 
democracies, we ought to urge Zimbabwe to end the violence 
and establish a level playing field for the runoff election. 
This situation goes to the core of what CD is about -- the 
promotion and protection of democratic institutions and 
processes.  Even South Africa, which did not like the 
proposed statement, said it would not block the CG from 
issuing it.  Zimbabwe's actions June 5, when police forces 
detained British and U.S. diplomats at the outskirts of 
Harare, and characterized their elections observations in the 
north as "criminal," is indicative of the true attitude of 
the Mugabe regime toward democracy. 
 
-- Remind India of our shared commitments under the CD to 
protect democracies under threat.  The CD is a forum distinct 
from the UN, and one designed specifically to bring 
democracies together to assist one another - and to offer 
examples of good governance.  Cooperation on CD issues has 
been discussed at several Summits with President Bush and PM 
Singh and the high level Global Issues Forum.  India's 
opposition to the CD statement is not in the spirit of our 
commitments in Warsaw or our countries' bilateral talks. 
 
-- Query India as to its reasons for the sudden withdrawal of 
Foreign Secretary Menon's endorsement for the Diplomat's 
Handbook, which it had previously supported during the GOI's 
strong leadership of the Working Group for Democratic 
Governance and Civil Society in the run up to the Bamako 
Ministerial last year. 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
4.  (U) Embassy is requested to report results of efforts by 
cable to DRL/MLGA Laura Jordan, G Joaquin Ferrao, and SCA/INA 
Madeeha Ashraf before June 16. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
5.  (SBU) At the May 5 meeting of the Convening Group (CG), 
we circulated a draft statement on the situation in Zimbabwe 
and urged the CG to issue it on behalf of the Community of 
Democracies.  The U.S. delegation argued Zimbabwe is 
undergoing a clear crisis over its elections, and that free 
and fair elections are at the core of what CD is about.  The 
heart of the CD lies in the Warsaw commitments -- to promote 
and defend democracy, especially in situations such as 
Zimbabwe.  It would be detrimental to its mission if the CD 
remained silent.  As democracies, the CD member states ought 
to urge Zimbabwe to end the violence and establish a level 
playing field for the runoff election, particularly by 
allowing international monitors.  At a special Convening 
Group meeting May 23 to further discuss the possible CD 
statement on the situation in Zimbabwe, our delegation 
offered an updated version for consideration, expressed 
openness to changes in the document that could make the 
declaration more meaningful and current, and asked that 
delegations express their thoughts on the matter quickly to 
enable us to identify a way forward. 
 
6.  (SBU) India privately reached out to Portugal shortly 
after the draft statement was first proposed to ascertain the 
level of support for the text; when Portugal noted South 
Africa's reservations due to Mbeki's role as the SADC 
mediator, India then expressed reservations for unstated 
reasons.  Since the May 23 meeting, India issued its 
opposition to the statement in writing and asked that the 
statement not be issued, but did not provide its reasons for 
opposing the statement.  India has been mostly opposed to 
country-specific actions in multilateral fora, preferring 
instead thematic approaches to human rights problems.  (Note: 
India played the key obstructionist role last fall, when the 
CD tried - and failed - to issue a statement condemning the 
Government of Burma's crackdown on peaceful democracy 
activists and Buddhist monks.  However in 2003 the CD did 
manage to issue a statement on Burma.  At the Human Rights 
Council's March 2008 Session, India attempted to water down 
the resolution on Burma.  End Note.) 
 
7.  (SBU) South Africa's position is that the current 
proposed statement would interfere with the delicate efforts 
of President Mbeki to help find a peaceful resolution to the 
election crisis.  Privately, South Africa says it is 
concerned about having tough language in the declaration 
because it believes it would undermine its role as a 
mediator.  We have been publicly supportive of SADC's 
mediation role and of South African President Mbeki as the 
designated SADC facilitator, but privately we have encouraged 
him to take a more active role.  Mbeki deserves credit for 
helping improve the conduct of the elections, but his efforts 
have not prevented post-election manipulation of the results 
or the descent into runoff-related violence.  Mbeki has been 
subjected to harsh domestic criticism on Zimbabwe and the 
Zimbabwean opposition has "fired" him as facilitator, which 
puts his ability to continue in this role in question.  We 
think the Convening Group should issue the statement on 
Zimbabwe, since for us it is a more neutral way to increase 
public pressure on Mbeki and South Africa to take a more 
assertive position, and since the statement supports SADC's 
leading role in addressing the Zimbabwe crisis. 
 
8.  (SBU) Separately, India requested May 29 in a private 
meeting with NGO Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD) 
the removal of its Foreign Secretary's endorsement in the 
frontispiece to the Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy 
Development Support.  The specific reasons given were three: 
One case study was entitled Burma/Myanmar.  CCD was told 
India no longer recognizes the old name Burma.  One case 
study was entitled "Belarus: Europe's Last Dictator?" 
Apparently, India regards that reference as an insult to the 
sovereignty of Belarus.  Taiwan was mentioned (CCD said it is 
mentioned twice, once in the Resource list under Taiwan 
Foundation for Democracy) in the Handbook.  India's position 
is that there is no such country.  CCD notes their 
understanding that even if they had made modifications to the 
handbook the FS's decision was not reversible.  This came as 
the Diplomat's Handbook launched May 30 in final form on 
www.diplomatshandbook.org and went to print the same day. 
India was the chair of the working group out of which the 
Diplomat's Handbook emerged in the run-up to the Bamako 
Ministerial; Canadian retired diplomat Jeremy Kinsman led the 
effort with the help of CCD and Princeton University to 
develop, publish and promote the book.  FSI recently 
announced its intent to purchase 400 copies of the book to 
use in training of U.S. diplomats.  CCD notified us that they 
were able to remove FS Menon's remarks from the book before 
it went to print. 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
9.  (U) Please contact DRL/MLGA Laura Jordan at (202) 
647-3088 or via e-mail for any necessary further background 
information or argumentation to meet our objectives. 
RICE