Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08OTTAWA878, FEDERAL COURT ORDERS RELEASE OF KHADR INTERROGATION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08OTTAWA878.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08OTTAWA878 2008-06-27 13:44 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO5029
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0878/01 1791344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271344Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8105
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0941
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000878 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KJUS CA
SUBJECT: FEDERAL COURT ORDERS RELEASE OF KHADR INTERROGATION 
EVIDENCE 
 
1. (U) Summary:  Canada's Federal Court has ordered the government 
to release sensitive information, including U.S. documents 
previously shared with Canadian authorities, to lawyers representing 
Canadian Guantanamo detainee Omar Khadr.  The order derives from a 
recent Supreme Court of Canada (SCOC) decision that found that 
Canadian officials had acted illegally in interrogating Khadr at 
Guantanamo Bay.  The presiding judge said that the information 
bolstered Khadr's claim that he was mistreated while in U.S. 
custody.  The judge further remarked that the disclosure might harm 
Canada-U.S. relations, but that that information regarding 
interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo Bay was already in the 
public domain and, therefore, should not be protected.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (U) The June 25 Federal Court decision related to a prior Supreme 
Court of Canada ruling of May 23 that the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (Bill of Rights analogue) extends to the actions of 
Canadian officials abroad who participate in foreign proceedings 
that breach Canada's obligations under international law.  The SCOC 
found that Canadian officials had acted illegally by interrogating 
Khadr at Guantanamo Bay in 2003 and 2004, and by sharing the 
resulting intelligence with U.S. authorities.  It therefore ordered 
the Canadian government to disclose information to Khadr's lawyers 
relevant to his defense in U.S. military proceedings.  The Canadian 
government had sought to protect the information on national 
security grounds.  The SCOC tasked the Federal Court of Canada with 
reviewing relevant evidence held by Canadian authorities and 
determining what could be disclosed, subject to the need to balance 
Khadr's right to a fair trial with national security. 
 
3. (U) The Federal Court of Canada found that Canadian officials 
"became implicated in the abuse of Khadr" by U.S. authorities when 
they interviewed him despite having knowledge of his treatment and 
of U.S. steps to "prepare" him for their visit.  As a result, the 
Court ordered relevant documents and DVD recordings of the Canadian 
interrogation of Khadr to be released to Khadr's legal defense team. 
 The court directed that the faces of U.S. and Canadian officials be 
blurred before the material is handed over.  Additionally, it 
ordered interview notes and witness statements prepared by U.S. 
agents in advance of the Canadians' visit to be disclosed.  The 
Court did not specify publicly what other information it wanted 
disclosed, but noted that the full package would be detailed in a 
private order by the Federal Court directly to the Khadr defense 
team.  The Court has not publicly specified a date when the material 
must be turned over. 
 
4. (U) Subject to conditions in the private court order, the Federal 
Court gave Khadr's legal team the right to release such information 
it receives, including to the media, as it sees fit.  The Court 
denied a separate request by media outlets for the release of the 
information directly to them.  Presiding Federal Court Justice 
Richard Mosley acknowledged that while the release of the 
information, particularly the DVD evidence, "may cause some harm to 
Canada-U.S. relations, that effect will be minimized by the fact 
that the use of such interrogation techniques by the U.S. military 
Qthat the use of such interrogation techniques by the U.S. military 
at Guantanamo is now a matter of public record and debate." 
 
5. (U) Justice Mosley ruled that his authority to order disclosure 
flowed exclusively from the SCOC decision in May and accompanying 
Charter remedy.  He specifically stated that such disclosure was 
separate from Khadr's formal application of January 24, 2008 for 
disclosure under Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.  Further, it 
was separate from a number of civil actions currently pending in 
Khadr's name in the Federal Court against the Canadian government 
respecting the provision of consular services and related issues, 
which could also result in additional disclosures. 
 
6. (U) In one of his few observations that favored the government, 
Justice Mosley stated that his review of the evidence indicated that 
Canadian interrogators apparently had not acted with the purpose of 
helping U.S. authorities assemble a case against Khadr.  He also 
revealed that U.S. authorities had inquired whether Khadr might be 
tried in Canada and had provided details about the U.S. evidence 
against Khadr to Canadian officials for that purpose. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) When it is publicly released, the Khadr material will be 
headline news in Canada and will stoke the political campaign for 
Khadr's repatriation, as well as the national and legal debate over 
balancing civil rights and national security.  Canadian courts have 
 
OTTAWA 00000878  002 OF 002 
 
 
become increasingly proactive in identifying what they determine to 
be the appropriate balance between the two.  The Khadr case, the 
ongoing Khawaja terrorism trial, current immigration security 
certificate proceedings, and previous disclosures regarding Afghan 
detainees have put pressure on the Canadian government's ability to 
protect sensitive foreign security information.  As a result, 
Canadian commentators on security have warned that the flow of law 
enforcement and intelligence information from friendly governments 
-- on which Canada is heavily dependent -- could be compromised due 
to the courts actions in this an other recent cases. 
 
WILKINS