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Viewing cable 08NAIROBI1449, COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR SMALL ARMS FOREIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAIROBI1449 2008-06-12 14:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1449/01 1641456
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121456Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6062
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2\CCJ3\CCJ5//
RHMFIUU/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUEAAMC/CDRUSASAC FT BELVOIR VA
RHMFIUU/CDRUSASAC NEW CUMBERLAND PA
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2/
RUEASRA/CDR ARCENT FT MACPHERSON GA
RHMFISS/CDRUSASETAF VICENZA
RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001449 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, PM/RSAT ARCHETTO FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MASS PARM PREL KE XW
SUBJECT:  COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR SMALL ARMS FOREIGN 
MILITARY SALE TO KENYAN ARMY FOR FY 2008 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. The Government of Kenya has been a close partner for the 
U.S. in many areas, including in military cooperation. 
They have provided important support in the Global War on 
Terror in spite of the risk they face, and it is in our 
interest to help them modernize their military forces to 
better provide that support.  The Kenyans are in the 
process of seeking vendors to modernize their small arms 
inventory, and our Security Assistance Office was recently 
able to convince the Kenyan Ministry of Defense to submit a 
request for U.S.-manufactured M-16A4/M-4 carbine rifles 
rather than the Chinese-manufactured equivalent.  The 
completion of this sale would represent one of the largest 
of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa with a low risk of 
unauthorized proliferation.  Should the sales expand to 
other countries in the region (as we expect), there would 
also be an opportunity to shape the small arms landscape in 
the region and shrink the size of the illegal small arms 
market.  Country Team strongly recommends the expedited 
approval of this request, as a delay in delivery could 
result in a loss of the sale.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Kenya: A Close and Important Regional Partner 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. The Government of Kenya has demonstrated outstanding 
support for U.S. and coalition operations in the Horn of 
Africa (HOA) region.  They have allowed a continuous US DoD 
presence in Manda Bay that allows for training and combined 
operations in support of counter-terrorism operations and 
anti-piracy actions.  They have maintained one of the only 
long-term access agreements that allows unparalleled 
cooperation for U.S. military aircraft, permits DoD 
personnel to enter and exit the country by simply 
presenting an ID card, provides a safe location for hub 
operations throughout the HOA region, and provides a Status 
of Forces Agreement that safeguards US DoD personnel. 
Kenya is among our strongest supporters in the region and a 
key friend in the regional war on terror. 
 
3. Since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, 
the Government of Kenya has provided firm support for the 
Global War on Terrorism, but Kenya's threat profile for 
terrorist attack remains one of the highest on the 
continent.  Due to its strategic location and the stability 
of its pro-democracy government, Kenya is a top priority 
country for support from the United States.  Even though 
Foreign Military Funding was suspended from 2005 until 
January of 2008 because of ASPA sanctions, Kenya continued 
to work with the U.S. in creating a joint strategic 
approach to coastal and border security in a 2005 white 
paper endorsed by the Kenyan Chief of General Staff. (Note: 
The strategy in now in the process of being updated.  End 
Note.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Military Planning to Upgrade Outdated 
Small Arms Stocks...And Talking To China 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. The Kenyan military is planning to modernize its 
military -- in particular, its small arms stocks -- by 
replacing the (nearly obsolete) German-made 7.62mm G3 
rifle, which is standard issue for military personnel.  The 
Government is already in the process of re-tooling its 
ammunition factory to manufacture smaller, lighter 5.56mm 
ammunition to accommodate the phase-in of new weapons, and 
it has been in discussions with several countries, 
including China, to find a suitable vendor. 
 
--------------------------------- 
...But They'd Like to Buy American 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
5. The desire on the part of the Kenyans to increase the 
interoperability between Kenyan and U.S. military forces 
and the persistent effort by the Security Assistance Office 
in Kenya to engage the Kenyan military has led to an 
agreement by the Kenya Ministry of Defence (KMOD) to 
modernize with U.S.-manufactured equipment, particularly M- 
16A4 and M-4 carbine rifles in lieu of procuring similar 
weapons from China, specifically the Chinese export 5.56mm 
caliber carbine, the QBZ95/97. 
 
6. To this end, the Kenyan Government recently submitted a 
Letter of Request for 10,000 M-16A4/M-4 carbine rifles and 
150 MK-19 grenade launchers.  Based on our discussions with 
KMOD, this will likely represent the first in a series of 
such purchases that will ultimately result in the purchase 
of over 40,000 weapons, with all associated accessories, 
over the next three to five years.  This series of 
purchases will re-arm Kenya's Army, Navy, and Air Force and 
are in line with the current and projected strength of 
Kenya's armed forces.  Over time, the dollar value of these 
Foreign Military Sales cases is be expected to exceed 
USD60-80 million; likely one of the largest set of sales of 
their kind in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
7. The requested equipment would modernize Kenya's 
military, but not fundamentally alter its force structure. 
Changes would include a complete fielding of new individual 
firearms for all military personnel.  These weapons systems 
are not considered to be sensitive technology. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
USG Interests: Better Security, More 
Interoperability, Influence Over Future Sales 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8. Supplying Kenya with this equipment has long-term 
benefits that squarely fit U.S. national interests.  Not 
only will this sale solidify our relationship with the 
Kenyan military, it will also contribute to the Kenyans' 
ability to control their porous borders, which will result 
in improved stability and security in the region.  Also, by 
moving from their current small arms weapon (7.62 mm) to a 
5.56mm weapon, the Kenyans would be interoperable with U.S. 
and NATO forces, which would assist in their full 
integration into future peacekeeping missions on the 
Continent.  Kenyan officials have hinted that the remainder 
of Kenya's security forces could also over time be equipped 
with U.S.-manufactured small arms. 
 
9. The Kenyans are also investigating the possibility, 
through the Security Assistance Office at Post, of 
obtaining a license agreement with the manufacturer to 
produce spare parts for and possibly manufacture new 
weapons at their ordnance factory.  If this came to 
fruition, we might expect that the neighboring countries 
would offer a market for U.S.-manufactured small arms as 
well.  If neighboring countries also adopt this weapon 
system and responsibly dispose of their excess (7.62mm) 
weaponry, we could expect the availability and market for 
the ubiquitous AK-47 variant 7.62mm weapons to drop 
dramatically.  Also, the purchase of U.S. military 
technology guarantees U.S. influence over future arms 
sales.  The implications for the reduction of illegal small 
arms proliferation and trafficking in Northeast Africa are 
significant. 
 
------------------------------ 
What Will the Neighbors Think? 
------------------------------ 
 
10. We expect only positive reactions from neighboring 
countries, and believe they will want to adapt to the same 
weapons system in the future.  This is evidenced by the 
fact that dozens of nations worldwide are now seeking to 
convert to U.S. manufactured small arms.  The superior 
quality of the M-16A4 and M-4 has resulted in demand that 
 
far exceeds supply.  As such, it is very important to USG 
interests that priority partner countries like Kenya are 
moved to the top of the procurement list. 
 
11. Kenya at any one time has between 200 and 250 U.S. 
military personnel in-country.  There have not been any 
negative incidents or reactions to these personnel in 
Kenya. 
 
------------------------------- 
Operation, Maintenance, Support 
------------------------------- 
 
12. Training will be required initially, as these weapons 
systems have not been utilized in Kenya before, but the 
number of personnel required will be small.  We are 
expecting that a small initial cadre will be required to 
teach the use and employment of the weapons as well as an 
initial cadre for maintenance of the weapons systems.  Once 
the initial groups of Kenyan military are trained, we 
expect that the Kenyans will be able to continue training 
the remainder of their forces on their own. 
 
13. The Kenyans have a maintenance program in place for 
their existing small arms inventory, and they will 
institute similar procedures to properly maintain U.S.- 
manufactured weapons.  The Kenyans have expressed an 
interest in developing their own capability to manufacture 
spare parts, which, in close coordination with the U.S., 
could make for a sustainable long-term weapons maintenance 
program. 
 
----------------------------- 
Kenyan Military Can Safeguard 
and Account For Small Arms 
----------------------------- 
 
14. The proliferation of small arms is a definite problem 
in the region, and Kenya is no exception.  There is a 
vigorous black market for AK-47s reportedly coming from 
Uganda, Southern Sudan, South Ethiopia, and Somalia. 
Traditionally, illegal arms have been used by pastoralists 
to protect their herds from cattle raiders.  Since the 
post-election crisis, we have heard reports of a surge in 
the illegal small arms trade for militias and internally 
displaced persons. 
 
15. We have heard no reports, however, that small arms from 
the Kenyan military have found their way to the black 
market, and the military successfully resisted attempts 
during the post-election crisis to divert their weapons 
stocks to militias.  The Kenyan Army provides excellent 
security at facilities where weapons are stored, and their 
100 percent weapons accountability policy includes field 
checks during operational maneuvers.  Kenya is an active 
member of The Regional Center for Small Arms (RECSA), which 
is headquartered in Nairobi and was formed to prevent, 
combat and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in 
small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and 
Horn of Africa.  At a recent RECSA conference, the 
Government of Kenya committed to labeling all small arms 
owned by the police and military forces to prevent 
proliferation. 
 
16. The black market for weapons in Africa centers on 
7.62x39mm weapons like the AK-47, because they (and 
ammunition for them) are available in abundance.  The 
Kenyan military's use of the G3 rifle (which uses 7.62x51mm 
NATO ammunition) is a poor sell on the black market, as the 
only ammunition available for it is manufactured in a 
government-run ammunition factory in Eldoret (where 
ammunition does not have a history of being "leaked.") 
Nevertheless, we would encourage the Kenyans to phase out 
the G3 in a responsible manner: once the military no longer 
needs them, they could be transferred to the police forces 
that use both G3s and AK-47s, and sponsor a destruction or 
U.S. Government buy-back program so that old AK-47s do not 
 
end up on the black market.  If we were to eventually allow 
the Kenyans to develop the capacity to manufacture M16A4/M4 
weapons in Kenya for sale to other regional military forces 
(many of whom still do use AK-47s, which no doubt do 
contribute to the black market problem), the U.S. would 
retain control of the sale of those weapons and could 
leverage it to encourage further AK-47 destruction or buy- 
back programs. 
 
--------------------------- 
Human Rights Considerations 
--------------------------- 
 
17. While human rights considerations are important when 
contemplating any weapons sale, we believe that there would 
be no adverse consequences that will come from the 
modernization of existing small arms inventories.  On the 
contrary, there is a potential benefit if the responsible 
weapons conversion of regional military forces results in a 
smaller black market for the now-ubiquitous AK-47.  Should 
the Kenyans choose to modernize to 5.56mm weapons but 
instead buy Chinese, we will lose the ability over the long 
term to influence the destruction on proliferation- 
sensitive weapons in regional military arsenals. 
 
18. The African continent has become a dumping ground for 
the world's small arms, and the easy availability of 
weapons has worsened the human toll of violent conflicts 
and crime across Africa.  Our advocacy for this sale 
signals the recognition of our dual responsibility to 
protect human rights and to build the capacity of the 
Kenyan military to fulfill its legitimate mission (which 
includes peacekeeping -- Kenya is a leading contributor to 
them and hosts the International Peace Support Training 
Center).  By providing low proliferation-risk weapons to a 
responsible military force, we meet both obligations. 
Should we move forward with other potential sales in the 
region, it will become even more important to ensure the 
reduction of black-market-friendly weapons and to prevent 
the creation of a new 5.56mm-based black market.  This will 
require careful consideration of each potential partner 
military force. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Financing Would Not Break Kenya's Bank 
-------------------------------------- 
 
19. Kenya will be using a combination of Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) and national funds to purchase this 
equipment.  Kenya's weapons modernization program has been 
planned and budgeted for several years, and the small arms 
sale is one of many taking place. (Note: Other sales 
include major systems, such as helicopters, unmanned aerial 
vehicles and artillery systems from multiple companies in 
multiple nations, including South Africa and China.  End 
Note.)  The sale of U.S.-manufactured small arms under 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) opens the door to the use of 
FMF grant aid to fund a portion of the purchase, which will 
actually lessen the burden on the Kenyan budget by reducing 
the amount of national funds required to complete the 
purchase. 
 
20. The total expected value over the course of the 
complete sale could reach USD80 million over the next three 
to five years, or approximately USD20 million per year on 
average (assuming that the entire military is equipped with 
new weapons).  The GoK's FY 2007/08 budget (July-June) 
planned expenditures of Ksh 693.6 billion (USD 9.9 
billion), and revenues of Ksh 428.8 billion (USD 6.1 
billion), left a Ksh 264.8 billion (USD 3.8 billion) 
deficit, equivalent to 5.3 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product, which was covered by the proceeds from 
privatizations of state-owned corporations and Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) receipts.  A USD 20 million small 
arms sale would represent approximately two percent of the 
annual budget. 
 
21. On the other hand, the security and economic impact for 
U.S. interests has the potential to be significant.  The 
Kenyan military is planning to cancel purchases of other 
equipment to fund the purchase of the initial allotment of 
the U.S.-manufactured weapon systems.  If a licensing 
agreement is eventually granted for Kenyan manufacture of 
these systems and neighboring countries join in the 
procurement (with proper USG permissions in place), the 
total monetary value might be expected to climb into the 
hundreds of millions, possibly billions of dollars over the 
next 15 years.  Because of the proliferation-sensitive 
small arms inventories of many of the region's military 
forces, it is entirely feasible that we have the 
opportunity to positively influence the small arms 
landscape and culture in Northeast Africa through this 
watershed initiative. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Fast Track Delivery Needed to Ensure Sale 
----------------------------------------- 
 
22. In light of these facts, Embassy Nairobi strongly 
recommends that the USG rapidly facilitate the purchase of 
the M-16A4/M-4s as well as MK-19s.  The Kenyans have 
expressed to us that, as much as they prefer U.S.- 
manufactured equipment, any significant delay in 
manufacturing or delivering these items would force them to 
reconsider their request.  Post asks that this initiative 
be fast-tracked to the best of our capabilities.  We do not 
want the Kenyans to re-initiate their dealings with the 
Chinese or any other nations to obtain small arms due to 
delays in U.S. procurement. 
Ranneberger