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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA521, SENIOR ADVISER SHORTLEY'S MEETING WITH SRSG DOSS AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA521 2008-06-12 14:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO7785
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0521 1641459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121459Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8117
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000521 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG UN
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISER SHORTLEY'S MEETING WITH SRSG DOSS AND 
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE NGWEJ 
 
REF:  A. Kinshasa 463  B. Kinshasa 488 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  SRSG Alan Doss told AF Senior Adviser Tim 
Shortley June 2 that international supervision will be necessary at 
brassage centers for ex-combatants from North and South Kivu.  He 
and Shortley agreed that disarmament and relocation or repatriation 
of FDLR members will be important to pressure Nkunda to send his own 
troops to brassage.  Congolese Ambassador-at-Large Seraphin Ngwej 
cautioned that the GDRC is having difficulties convincing local 
communities to accept relocation of former FDLR combatants. 
Shortley and Doss agreed that that return to Rwanda should be the 
first option.  Shortley suggested that re-establishing diplomatic 
relations between the DRC and Rwanda is critical to accelerate 
cooperation on the FDLR and Nkunda.  End summary 
 
2.  (SBU) A/S Frazer's Senior Adviser Tim Shortley, joined by EU 
Great Lakes Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer, discussed progress in 
the Goma and Nairobi processes with SRSG Alan Doss and GDRC 
Ambassador-at-Large Seraphin Ngwej June 2.  DCM and PolOff 
(notetaker) also participated in the meeting at MONUC headquarters 
in Kinshasa. 
 
3.  (SBU) Prior to Ngwej's arrival, Doss said that international 
supervision will be necessary at brassage centers.  He said this 
should include U.S., EU and MONUC representatives.  He also called 
for lengthening the time each ex-combatant spends in brassage; the 
current process of 45 days does not provide for sufficient training. 
 Shortley and van de Geer noted that Defense Minister Chikez had 
balked at sending ex-CNDP combatants to the brassage center at 
Luberizi in South Kivu (septel). 
 
4.  (SBU) Doss cited the May 26-27 Kisangani conference (reftels) 
and agreed that disarmament and relocation or repatriation of FDLR 
members will be important to pressure Nkunda to send a commensurate 
number of his own troops to brassage.  Shortley noted that 
demilitarized zones and the presence of a non-FARDC force in 
formerly CNDP-controlled areas will be essential points for Nkunda. 
He said the Amani program will have to work out how to return state 
authority to formerly CNDP-controlled areas. 
 
5.  (SBU) With Ngwej joining the meeting, van de Geer outlined a 
proposed agenda for the upcoming Nairobi process Joint Monitoring 
Group (JMG) session in Gisenyi, Rwanda, including a proposal that 
Ngwej present the GDRC's view of the Kisangani conference.  Van de 
Geer stressed that it will be important to highlight the success of 
the conference in promoting FDLR-RUD disarmament and address how to 
convince other FDLR elements to join the process. 
 
6.  (SBU) Ngwej cautioned that the GDRC is having some difficulties 
convincing communities to accept relocation of FDLR combatants and 
their dependents.  He said that financing a 
reinsertion/reintegration strategy could diminish this resistance. 
Shortley and Doss agreed that funding for relocation will be 
important, but that return to Rwanda should be the first option in 
any case.  Doss said that, at the least, FDLR ex-combatants should 
be moved as far away as possible from the Rwandan border, which may 
be enough to reassure the Rwandan government.  Ngwej insisted that 
the primary goal is disarmament.  He said that fewer combatants will 
be willing to do so if relocation is seen as a temporary measure. 
 
7.  (SBU) Participants discussed at length re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda.  Ngwej said that 
holding back diplomatic relations is the only leverage the DRC has 
over Rwanda. He called on the U.S. and EU to facilitate talks 
between Presidents Kabila and Kagame.  Shortley said that the two do 
meet:  the problem is not a lack of meetings, but a lack of trust 
and lack of capacity in Congo to implement what has already been 
agreed. 
 
8.  (SBU) Finally, Ngwej complained about a lack of pressure on 
Nkunda to turn over Bosco Ntaganda, his chief of staff, who was 
recently indicted by the ICC.  Van de Geer noted that Nkunda had 
never stated definitively he would protect Bosco, and that the Goma 
process International Facilitation would raise the issue in 
forthcoming meetings with Nkunda. 
 
9.  (SBU) Comment:  Concerns expressed by Ngwej about financing the 
follow up to Kisangani are serious and will require a serious effort 
to convince donors to contribute to the process.  Ngwej recognized 
the urgent need to improve bilateral relations with Rwanda and was 
open to further U.S. assistance.  End comment. 
 
10. (U) This message has been approved by Senior Adviser Shortley. 
 
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