Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM924, JEM-CHAD UPDATE FROM DARFUR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM924.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM924 2008-06-22 13:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0477 
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV 
DE RUEHKH #0924/01 1741357 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
P 221357Z JUN 08 ZDK 
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1116 
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE 
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0243 
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000924 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: JEM-CHAD UPDATE FROM DARFUR 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 908 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel 
group has been active over the past week in Darfur, as well as in 
eastern Chad supporting the GOC. The United Nations-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has attempted to confirm reports of 
cross-border military movements between Sudan and Chad but has not 
been proactive enough in fulfilling its mandate under UNSCR 1769 to 
monitor these movements. More initiative on the part of UNAMID 
commanders and additional dialogue with the rebel groups in the 
region could go a long way toward breaking the current cycle of 
Chad-Sudan violence and improve the credibility of both UNAMID and 
the international community. END SUMMARY. 
 
JEM SAYS JULY WILL SEE NEW RUN ON KHARTOUM 
------------------------------------------ 
2. (SBU) Over the course of the week of June 15, JEM rebel military 
commanders were on the move across North Darfur to re-supply before 
returning to the western border with Chad. One commander told 
FieldOff via satellite phone that the reason Government of Sudan 
(GoS) helicopter gunships were circling El Fasher at this time was 
due to their intelligence that JEM was in Kutum and Tawilla, both 
within relatively close proximity to the North Darfur capital (the 
JEM member was in fact calling from Kutum at the time). The 
commander said he was getting new vehicles to move back to Tine, on 
the northern part of West Darfur's border with Chad and a JEM 
stronghold (where JEM political leadership were rumored to be holed 
up). 
 
3. (SBU) The JEM commander claimed to FieldOff on June 19 that JEM 
had been actively involved in routing Chadian rebels in Am Zouer, 
north of Guereda in eastern Chad, o/a June 17. He boasted that JEM 
was now in possession of "many" new vehicles and weapons as a result 
of this fighting, and that the Chadian rebels had been forced to 
retreat across the Sudanese border into El Geneina and a location in 
Darfur 40km north of El Geneina, where the wounded were reportedly 
being treated. According to JEM intelligence on the border, he 
continued, the Chadian rebels had originally crossed the border to 
Goz Beida earlier in the week with 300 vehicles only to return back 
to Darfur at the end of the week with 71. "This is very good news 
for us," the JEM commander declared. "Now the Chadian rebels no 
longer pose any threat in Chad." (Note: This information 
contradicts what the Chadian rebels had earlier told us, that the 
Chadian rebels had routed JEM in Am Zouer, only to later be defeated 
by the Chadian army later the same day. End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) According to information from the JEM commander, JEM now 
intends to refocus its energies deep within Sudan. He told FieldOff 
June 19 that JEM intends to make another run on Khartoum/Omdurman in 
July but suggested that no such attack would occur in Darfur. "It 
is much easier to take Khartoum [a city] than locations in Darfur, 
which is too decentralized," he explained. (Comment: This could be 
true or could be JEM disinformation. End comment.) 
 
UNAMID HAS LITTLE VISIBILITY ON CHADIAN REBELS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
5. (SBU) UNAMID reporting from Sector West on the happenings in 
western Darfur/eastern Chad during the week of June 15 was patchy 
and lacked specificity, and was based on information from other 
sources. UNAMID provided unconfirmed reports of a movement of 300 
armed men, suspected to be Chadian rebels, through El Geneina toward 
Chad on June 15 and of a build-up of JEM forces in Abeche on the 
same day (rumors which JEM later confirmed). It provided 
unconfirmed reports on June 16 of a Chadian rebel advance on Am Dam 
(120 km northwest of Goz Beida, Eastern Chad), as well as of an 
alliance between the Chadian Armed Opposition Groups and the UFDD 
rebels of Mahamat Nouri on June 16. UNAMID reported that on June 17 
Chadian rebels captured Biltine (90 km north of Abeche), claiming 
the support of 500-600 vehicles and 700-800 troops. Finally on June 
19 UNAMID gave unconfirmed reports that Chadian rebels supported by 
GoS helicopter gunships succeeded in capturing the strategic border 
stronghold of Adre on June 18. 
 
6. (SBU) UNAMID J3 admitted to FieldOff that Sector West had limited 
visibility on issues related to movement of Chadian rebels across 
the Chad-Sudan border or to GoS military movements in the same 
region, claiming that the Mission was prevented from doing so by 
UNSCR 1769. In response to a question about how much monitoring 
UNAMID itself was conducting in Sector West, given the spike in 
activity there over the past week, the J3 officer replied that 
UNAMID relied on its own credible sources on the border to provide 
it with this type of information. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
7. (SBU) The persistent misunderstanding by UNAMID of its own 
mandate with regard to use of force and ability to intervene in 
conflicts and monitor events on the ground in Darfur must be 
addressed by DPKO and member states. It should be pushed to more 
effectively undertake its responsibilities per OP15(a)(ii) of 1769, 
which, under Chapter VII, authorizes the Mission to "take the 
necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces . . . in 
order to . . . prevent . . . armed attacks . . . and protect 
civilians." Moreover, UNAMID needs to be more pro-active in 
monitoring troop movements in areas where it is deployed including 
Sector West, where Chadian Armed Opposition Groups around El Geneina 
are active. When UNAMID's mandate comes up for renewal in July, the 
Council should focus on getting UNAMID to do what it was already 
empowered to do under 1769. The objective should be to push UNAMID 
military leadership and the Sector West commander to be more 
proactive in monitoring, verifying and intervening in incidents and 
cross-border troop movements. Getting UNAMID to be more pro-active 
throughout Darfur, while addressing their very real needs and 
deficiencies, remains a constant need. 
 
8. (SBU) JEM also needs to be called on for its own hypocrisy -- 
castigating the GoS for ceasefire violations while JEM itself is 
crossing the border and engaging the Chadian opposition with 
impunity while preparing for additional military action inside 
Sudan. 
 
FERNANDEZ