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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM896, SURGE IN REBEL ACTIVITY IN DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM896 2008-06-16 11:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0896/01 1681157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161157Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1067
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000896 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC for 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UNSC AU CD SU
SUBJECT: SURGE IN REBEL ACTIVITY IN DARFUR 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Daily Government of Sudan helicopter gunship 
overflights of El Fasher, rebel movements from Tine to Tawilla, and 
a sharp increase in banditry - particularly against international 
non-governmental organizations, all highlight a recent increase in 
rebel activity in Darfur.  Such activity can be traditionally 
attributed to the advent of the rainy season, but with the Justice 
and Equality Movement's pledge to repeat an attack on Khartoum, no 
scenario should be discounted.  The United Nations-African Union 
Mission in Darfur remains largely impotent as a result of 
engineering and equipment deficits, and the expected departure of 
PAE by July 14 will only further delay the Mission's response time. 
Post urges that we use all fora at our disposal to reiterate a 
message of restraint to all parties and to make positive movement 
toward appointing a mediator to get the peace process re-started. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
JEM IN NORTH DARFUR AND THE GOS KNOWS IT 
---------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) On June 13 and 14, Government of Sudan (GoS) helicopter 
gunships (three to four are typically parked at the El Fasher 
Airport on any given day) were flying low over El Fasher beginning 
at approximately 0830.  Later on June 14 a Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) Field Commander called FieldOff to report that he, 
along with other JEM members, were ten kilometers outside Kutum, 
approximately 70 km northwest of El Fasher, North Darfur, to pick up 
vehicles.  He noted that he had moved several days earlier from 
Tine, West Darfur, on the northern part of the border between Sudan 
and Chad, through Jebel Marra, where representatives of several 
armed movements in Darfur have been convening over the past days. 
The JEM commander acknowledged that the GoS gunships had been 
dispatched at news that JEM was in the region.  In response to 
FieldOff's questions about a possible rebel move on El Fasher, given 
JEM's relative proximity to the North Darfur capital, the commander 
said there was nothing to worry about. 
 
3. (SBU) The JEM commander inquired about the recent fighting near 
Um Kadada in North Darfur (reftel) between Sudan Liberation 
Army/Unity and the Sudan Armed Forces.  He had nothing to add on 
casualty figures beyond agreeing with the assessment that each side 
would try to trump the other in the media on this point, per usual 
practice in such clashes.  A Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) 
officer noted that rumors of JEM-SLA/Unity collaboration were rife 
(which would unite the two largest Zaghawa rebel groups) and JEM has 
not ruled out the possibility of joining forces with other Darfur 
rebel factions, at one point telling FieldOff during the week of 
June 9 that there had already been many military defections from SLA 
groups to JEM's ranks and that all were welcome except "the bandit" 
Abdalla Banda, commander of JEM/Collective Leadership. 
 
4. Presidential Assistant Minni Minawi also called CDA Fernandez 
from North Darfur on June 14. Minawi complained of Sudanese 
Government harassment (a government he is still a part of) and 
ambush attempts as he passed near Kutum around June 11. Minni is 
concerned that more of his wavering commanders may defect to 
SLA/Unity or JEM. 
 
5. (SBU) On June 15 the same JEM commander called FieldOff to say he 
had moved and was now in Tawilla, approximately 60 km west of El 
Fasher.  He warned against any travel to this area of North Darfur, 
as "forces are moving everywhere" [NOTE: A member of the JMST had 
contacted FieldOff the evening of June 14 to discuss the possibility 
of a visit to this area of North Darfur during the week of June 15. 
END NOTE].  The JEM commander said he and his entourage would on 
June 16 return to Tine, where JEM political leadership was currently 
stationed.  The commander confirmed reports of the movement of 
Chadian rebels from West Darfur to Chad during the latter part of 
the week of June 9, a movement which precipitated the rebel 
offensive in Goz Beida, eastern Chad, on June 14. 
 
"WHAT IS UNAMID DOING?" 
----------------------- 
6. (SBU) The JEM Field Commander asked what UNAMID was doing to 
address the ceasefire violations and to re-start the Darfur peace 
process, given its perceived bias in favor of the GoS.  FieldOff 
responded that as long as ceasefire violations continued on all 
sides, including by the armed movements, UNAMID's role would likely 
remain limited.  FieldOff also informed of JMST's planned visits 
around Darfur during the week of June 16 (the team is currently in 
El Geneina), and the JEM commander reiterated his plea that the JMST 
and UNAMID stay in touch with all sides, not just the GoS, to 
maintain the perception of impartiality. 
 
7. (SBU) FieldOff informed UNAMID Force Commander GEN Agwai of JEM's 
movements in North Darfur and complaints with regard to UNAMID's 
lack of a response.  GEN Agwai did not see a proactive role for 
UNAMID in enforcing the ceasefire agreement, saying, "If two sides 
want to fight, what can UNAMID do?  Pick one side and join in the 
fight against the other?"  GEN Agwai said he was never adverse to 
talking to any of the armed movements and dismissed charges that 
UNAMID was talking only to the GoS.  He saw rebel consolidation as 
the only way forward for peace talks and expected movement in this 
realm within the coming weeks. 
 
PRE-RAINY SEASON BANDITRY SPIKES IN DARFUR 
------------------------------------------ 
8. (SBU) Along with heightened tensions between the GoS and the 
rebel movements is a sharp increase in the number of incidents of 
car-jackings and banditry throughout Darfur.  Attacks in El Fasher, 
for example, occur on a daily basis and are brazen, usually 
conducted at midday, often at residential compounds, and are more 
often than not aimed exclusively at the INGO community.  FieldOff 
warned the JEM field commander to refrain from such attacks given 
his comments that he and his colleagues were "picking up" vehicles 
in North Darfur [NOTE: JEM has historically been a repeat offender 
in INGO car-jackings, on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. 
Vehicles are either converted to rebel use or sold on the black 
market in Chad. END NOTE]. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT.  These reports point to a recent increase in rebel 
activity in Darfur and may portend a "surge" toward a renewed rebel 
offensive.  It is not out of the ordinary for rebels and government 
forces alike to scramble for positions and assets in the run-up to 
the rainy season, often at the expense of the INGO community.  This 
pretext aside, other conditions make it a favorable time to make a 
move, not least a UNAMID that is distracted by deployment and 
contracting obstacles (it has still not named a replacement for PAE, 
and it just unilaterally terminated its catering contract through 
PAE, which means troops will be without food as of July 14).  The 
international community needs to step in and use all tools/fora at 
its disposal to reiterate a message of restraint to all parties. 
Embassy Khartoum is doing so with both the GOS and UNAMID officials. 
 It also needs to make positive movement toward appointing a 
mediator to get the all too lackadaisical UN/AU led peace process 
re-started, especially if rumors of a rebel consolidation on the 
ground prove true. Such a consolidation, while bad news for the 
Khartoum regime, could lead to even more suffering and displacement 
for Darfur's civilian population. 
 
FERNANDEZ