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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM878, MIXED REVIEWS FROM EL FASHER ON U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY'S VISIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM878 2008-06-12 13:35 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7588 
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV 
DE RUEHKH #0878/01 1641335 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
P 121335Z JUN 08 
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1021 
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE 
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000878 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UNSC AU SU
 
SUBJECT: MIXED REVIEWS FROM EL FASHER ON U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY'S VISIT 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Reviews are mixed in parts of Darfur about Special 
Envoy Williamson's June 3 suspension of bilateral talks with the 
Government of Sudan (GoS). However, most people tend to agree that 
the GoS will use this action as a pretext for further disingenuous 
behavior in its dealings with the international community, 
particularly on issues like UNAMID deployment. END SUMMARY. 
 
REBEL MOVEMENTS REJOICE 
----------------------- 
2. (SBU) Anti-GoS armed opposition groups lauded the Special Envoy's 
action. One JEM field commander, speaking from Tine in West Darfur, 
proclaimed that "Now you are just like us" in our mutual mistrust of 
the GoS. The JEM rep said his movement was happy with the outcome 
of the talks, as they obviously opened the Special Envoy's eyes to 
the disingenuousness of the GoS toward anything other than a 
military solution to solve Sudan's problems. 
 
3. (SBU) An El Fasher-based representative of Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Minni Minawi saw the Special Envoy's "anger" with the GoS 
as leading to positive action by the GoS with regard to Abyei, 
albeit only after the Special Envoy's departure from Sudan. On this 
Abyei agreement signed on June 8 between the NCP and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement, the SLA/MM rep sniffed that as with 
all things the GoS signed up to, the proof would be in the 
implementation. He also pointed out how the media are spinning the 
Special Envoy's suspension, using face-saving techniques to imply 
that talks would re-start between the GoS and the USG and that deals 
would be made. 
 
UNAMID NOTICE NOTHING NOW 
------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Leadership of the United Nations-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) reported that it has neither witnessed nor 
experienced any backlash from the Special Envoy's walk-out. Force 
Commander GEN Agwai predicted that there would likely be more 
reaction in the weeks ahead, and he did not dispute the link between 
the talks' suspension and the expulsion of PAE from Darfur. The 
Chief of Planning agreed that the decision not to renew PAE's 
contract is a by-product of the suspended talks and worried that 
this departure would be disastrous for the peacekeeping mission. 
 
5. (SBU) NOTE: On PAE's departure from Darfur, a lawyer for the UN 
Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) told FieldOff on June 10 that the UN 
Department of Field Support (DFS) wrote a letter on June 5 to UNAMID 
informing that PAE's contract would expire July 14 and that the UN 
has no intention of renewing it. The UNMIS lawyer confirmed that 
the UN has no alternative in place to assume PAE's responsibilities, 
which constitute the only viable engineering capabilities that 
UNAMID has. Further, he reported that Mohamed Yonis as UNAMID 
Director of Administration has done nothing to prepare for this 
eventuality and is not directing the Mission support staff to find 
alternatives. The UNMIS lawyer predicted it would be a year before 
a substitute for PAE could be identified and put in place. Even 
then it would have to start from scratch with regard to super-camp 
construction, since things would have stood still until that point, 
given the "immature" quality of local commercial contractors 
available to do the job on an interim basis. 
 
6. (SBU) The UNMIS lawyer expects UNAMID to appeal to UNMIS for this 
kind of engineering assistance, which UNMIS is both unable and 
unwilling to provide, given its own limited capacities and competing 
mission priorities. He predicted that UNMIS will actively oppose 
any campaign for this kind of assistance, a campaign likely to get 
underway during negotiations for UNAMID's mandate renewal by July 
31. END NOTE. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
----------------- 
7. (SBU) Khaleel Adam Mohammed Bakheet Tukras, spokesman of the 
National Umma party in North Darfur, said that it was "smart" of the 
Special Envoy to walk away from the talks with the GoS. In Tukras' 
estimation, doing so showed the GoS that the U.S. would not accept 
any insincerity or false statements regarding important matters like 
Abyei. 
 
8. (SBU) Ahmed Saeed Uthman, a member of Umma Reform and Renewal, 
said that most fellow party members were disappointed with the 
suspension of the bilateral talks. He said that the USG was always 
criticizing Darfur faction leaders for refusing to negotiate, 
violating as they were the USG's call for resolving disputes through 
negotiations. What the U.S. Special Envoy did on June 3 in Khartoum 
contradicted this stance, according to Uthman. "Leaving the 
negotiation table was not diplomatic behavior," he charged, and 
warned that having done so may create negative repercussions for 
U.S. INGOs and personnel in Sudan. 
 
9. (SBU) Fathiya Abdala Gad Al Kareem, a primary school teacher in 
El Fasher and a member of the Democratic Unionist Party's Women's 
Union, said that Darfurians had had high expectations for the 
Special Envoy's visit, including expediting UNAMID deployment, 
furthering protection of IDPs and civilians, and improving bilateral 
relations. She considered that suspension of talks meant none of 
the expected things is going to happen since the GoS now will "ruin 
the U.S presence in the country", which, she speculated, could 
extend to the closing of the U.S. El Fasher field presence. 
 
10. (SBU) Opposition parties in the North Darfur Legislative Council 
think that in general the U. S. Administration should be very tough 
in dealing with the GoS, particularly with the National Congress 
Party (NCP). They therefore regarded the Special Envoy's suspension 
of talks as a good way to send a message to the GoS that while the 
international community may not seem serious about issues concerning 
Sudan, the U.S. is. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
------------- 
11. (SBU) Imam Umar, the organizer of youth sports activities in El 
Fasher, discussed the issue with the youth in the town, and most of 
the youth agreed that the GoS would consider the Special Envoy's 
suspension of talks as an excuse to return the favor by refusing 
future talks with the U.S. and any calls for the GoS to abide by 
existing agreements which it has signed. Umar noted that 
Presidential Advisor Nafie Al Nafie had already made a statement to 
this effect on the national radio station: that walking away from a 
meeting with senior GoS officials was behavior unbefitting for a 
meeting with GoS officials and that the GoS has the full right to 
respond. Umar predicted that the GoS would tighten regulations for 
U.S staff in Sudan, particularly in Darfur [NOTE: As of this 
writing, FieldOffs have experienced no backlash as a result of the 
suspension of bilateral talks. END NOTE]. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
12. (SBU) Justified or not, there is sentiment in Darfur that the 
Special Envoy's suspension of bilateral talks with the GoS 
contributed to the backlash against PAE, particularly since the 
Sudanese PermRep's announcement of its expulsion came only two days 
after the walk-out. However, it seems that DFS contributed much to 
the decision not to keep PAE on, and an explanation for such a 
poorly timed decision is more than merited. The UNMIS lawyer 
recommended as a possible solution (bearing in mind that he does not 
want UNMIS to assume UNAMID's burden) that the UN quietly allow PAE 
to stay on through the end of the year, with the necessary political 
heavy lifting done by the international community with the GoS to 
convince it to keep quiet about PAE until UN contracting procedures 
kick in. China could potentially be useful in this regard, since it 
will not likely want its 140 under-equipped engineers in Nyala to 
carry the whole engineering burden for the Mission. END COMMENT. 
 
DATTA