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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM857, DARFUR ZAGHAWA PREDICT ANOTHER REBEL ATTACK ON KHARTOUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM857 2008-06-09 11:04 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4605
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0857/01 1611104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091104Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0992
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000857 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS, DRL 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM MOPS KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: DARFUR ZAGHAWA PREDICT ANOTHER REBEL ATTACK ON KHARTOUM 
SOON 
 
REFS: A. Khartoum 842 
 
  B. Khartoum 847 
 
KHARTOUM 00000857  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  While El Fasher Zaghawa report that they have not 
experienced increased harassment or threats against them since the 
May 10 attack on Omdurman, they claim that Khartoum-based Zaghawa 
still are targeted for arbitrary abuse.  Despite the repercussions, 
local Zaghawa civilians support JEM, and expect it to launch 
another, larger offensive against Khartoum before the Darfur rainy 
season begins in late June/early July.  Other factions are joining 
JEM, they claimed, and local government officials are too worried 
about keeping their jobs to alert Khartoum to an impending attack. 
While the Zaghawa optimism may be exaggerated, local Darfuris 
nervously point out that the first attack showed that anything can 
happen, and that JEM has gained rather than lost strength following 
the May 10 assault.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Retribution Against Zaghawa in Khartoum, Not Darfur 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (SBU) In a June 4 meeting, prominent local Zaghawa merchants told 
FieldOff that although conditions for Zaghawa in Darfur have been 
difficult since the start of the conflict five years ago, an 
expected crack down on Zaghawa in Darfur following the May 10 
Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) attack on Omdurman has not 
materialized.  Only three or four people have been arrested in 
Darfur in the past month, they said, which is no more than usual. 
Addressing reports of economic discrimination in Darfur (ref a), the 
merchants said that they have not been subject to any specific 
harassment or threats and are unaware of such incidents in other 
parts of Darfur.  However they did not rule out the possibility, 
noting that "The GoS cannot see Zaghawa without seeing the [armed 
rebel] movements." 
 
3. (SBU) Instead, they said, the government has turned its attention 
to the capital, where Zaghawa citizens have paid a heavy price for 
the JEM attack.  In addition to arbitrary arrests and beatings, the 
El Fasher community leaders claimed that Zaghawa in Khartoum have 
been, and in some cases are still, subjected to house searches as 
often as three times per day.  Although the searches are undertaken 
ostensibly in order to find suspects who may be in hiding, in fact 
the soldiers often use such searches to loot private property and 
possessions, they charged.  The hardest hit population are the 
merchants who keep shops in Khartoum's Libya Market.  There, 
Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers have harassed and intimidated Zaghawa 
vendors, forcing them to pay sums of between $15,000 and $20,000 in 
order to avoid arrest.  Many merchants have been bankrupted paying 
these bribes, they claimed, but those who do not are either arrested 
or disappear. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Factions Uniting for Attack on Khartoum 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (SBU) Despite the repercussions, the Zaghawa community remains 
supportive of JEM's attack.  "Finally someone took the war to 
Khartoum!" one exclaimed triumphantly.  The El Fasher merchants, who 
claimed to be unaffiliated with any armed movement but were clearly 
supportive of JEM's Khalil Ibrahim, claimed that the May 10 attack 
on Omdurman had been a "test run."  According to these Darfuris, to 
test the government's response capabilities JEM only had used a 
small number of troops and trucks to stage the attack.  The next 
attack, which they predicted would occur before the rainy season 
begins (normally in early July), will be much stronger, partly due 
to the possible unification of other factions' forces with those of 
JEM. 
 
5. (SBU) In the absence of disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration activities, they said that some of the factions who 
signed the Declaration of Commitment have no choice but to work with 
JEM, hic can provide salaries, food and other necessities.  In 
addition, JEM has inspired other groups, such as Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Unity faction, which previously thought that such an attack (on 
the capital) could never occur, to potentially combine forces in a 
similar operation.  Rebel groups can also count on considerable 
support on the ground, they claimed, as this time the Darfuris will 
not allow themselves to be subjected to the retribution of the 
Khartoum government.  "What happened to Zaghawa the first time will 
not happen again - we will either fight or die!" one declared. 
 
6. (SBU) The Zaghawa representatives dismissed suggestions that such 
an attack could not occur with the GoS at such a heightened state of 
alert.  They said that reports regarding rebel groups and their 
movements sent from the National Congress Party (NCP) and National 
 
KHARTOUM 00000857  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) functionaries in Darfur to 
Khartoum are routinely inaccurate.  "Everyone is afraid of being 
fired - they say what Khartoum wants to hear, so that they can keep 
their positions," one claimed.   Geographical distance also hampers 
communication and information flow, which works in the rebels' 
favor, they claimed. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
7. (SBU) While Zaghawa optimism is probably exaggerated, JEM's bold 
attack on Khartoum set a new precedent for Darfur rebel movements. 
JEM leaders have repeatedly threatened a second attack, and it is at 
least possible that other factions, fed up with the stalled peace 
process and nonexistent ceasefire, will join forces, either with the 
JEM or among themselves, to make a similar run at the capital or, 
perhaps more likely, other government installations.  JEM's support 
on the ground is stronger than ever, given continued defections from 
SLA/Minni Minawai fighters and alliances of convenience with other 
armed factions.  With the GoS still knocked off balance by the May 
10 surprise attack, the impassable rainy season looming on the 
horizon, and the GoS' preoccupation with Abyei insecurity, this 
could present an opportunity for the JEM to cash in on its post-May 
10 attack popularity by seeking an opening to again hit a high 
visibility target, perhaps even including another bid for Khartoum. 
 
DATTA