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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM846, MEDIA REACTION: WHAT'S NEXT FOR U.S.-SUDAN TALKS?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM846 2008-06-05 14:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
R 051426Z JUN 08 
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0976 
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE 
CJTF HOA 
IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000846 
 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/PD, S/CRS, IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO OIIP SU
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: WHAT'S NEXT FOR U.S.-SUDAN TALKS? 
 
1. Several local newspaper commentators added their voices to the 
debate surrounding the U.S. role in trying to help the Sudanese 
political class resolve the country's internal conflicts - Darfur 
and the North/South dispute over the oil-rich Abyei region. 
Meanwhile, the local press increasingly turned its attention to the 
visit of a UN Security Council delegation, which arrived in Khartoum 
this week to hold discussions with officials about Darfur and the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). There 
was also considerable reporting and commentary on the appointment of 
a new AU/UN mediator for the Darfur conflict. 
 
Normalizing relations a "mirage" 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. The pro-government "Sudan Vision" published a column by Alfatih 
Ziada, entitled "Clarifying the Obvious," in which the author 
disparaged U.S. Special Envoy Richard Williamson for saying that he 
did not want to be part of a peace treaty on paper without tangible 
results on the ground. Addressing himself to the Special Envoy, 
Ziada said Sudan needs "no American participation in implementation 
of the CPA, since your goal is to wedge a peg between the CPA 
signatories. Resolution of Abyei conflict is part of Sudan 
Constitution, so why shall we negotiate an issue already agreed 
upon?" Asserting that what the U.S. really wants is "regime 
change," Ziada added, "We quite understand that the American 
Christian Right and the Jewish lobby largely influence the American 
decision-making process." He concluded that the U.S. cannot 
normalize relations with Sudan until it "fends off pressures by 
these parties." U.S. foreign policy, Ziada said, "lacks candor, 
justice, frankness, sincerity of expressions, openness, freedom from 
prejudice, impartiality and fairness. Normalizing relations with 
American is [a] mirage." 
 
Why all the concessions? 
------------------------ 
 
3. The pro-government and anti-U.S. "Al-Wifaq" took the Government 
of Sudan (GOS) to task for being too flexible with Williamson. It 
questioned why Sudan should extend friendly hands to the U.S. 
knowing that the U.S. would "bite them." The daily was incensed 
that the GOS sat idly by while Williamson "accused a Sudanese tribe 
of looting and ruining their hometown." The GOS should have at 
least refuted the Special Envoy's statement, the editorial said. 
"Al-Wifaq" recalled that Williamson had previously characterized the 
GOS as a "fox" and "elusive," so in the newspaper's opinion, the GOS 
did not deserve to sit and meet with him. The daily further noted 
that President Omar El-Bashir had announced a week earlier that the 
talks about normalization would not succeed, yet the GOS entered 
into a dialogue with the U.S. "Why all these concessions?" the 
newspaper asked. 
 
4. Kamal Bakheit, editor-in-chief of the pro-government "Al-Rai 
Al-Aam," portrayed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as 
being very capable of producing crisis after crisis, including 
Abyei. He also accused the U.S. of not being neutral and of 
insisting that the GOS respond to all of the SPLM's demands. 
Bakheit called on the SPLM leadership to "think about the future of 
their country" without taking the U.S. agenda into consideration, 
and he urged the NCP and SPLM to resolve the Abyei problem as 
partners. He asserted that the GOS has "proved its flexibility 
through declaring its readiness to resume talks whenever the U.S. 
side decides." 
 
GOS should have implemented CPA 
------------------------------- 
 
5. Faiez Al-Sheikh Al-Selek, a columnist with the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement-backed daily "Ajrass Al-Hurrya" ("Freedom 
Bells"), argued that the GOS should have implemented the CPA instead 
of pursuing normalization talks with Washington. "Having the 
political will power to fulfill the requirements of peace, working 
for self-reconciliation, and strengthening ties of partnership and 
normalization with the Sudanese people are more useful," the author 
maintained. 
 
No alternative to dialogue with the U.S. 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. The independent "Al-Watan" published a commentary by Mohamed 
Hamid Al-Hamari in which he maintained that "there is no alternative 
to Sudanese-U.S. dialogue and understanding even though the U.S. 
links relations, understanding, and major common interests in our 
country to internal positions and controversial issues connected to 
the influential lobbies in addition to Zionist pressure groups." 
The author continued, "In spite of the black cloud, we reiterate 
that we sense that Washington has started seriously to alter the 
method of its thinking and is looking after its strategic interests, 
which are represented in a good relationship with Sudan, one of its 
influential regional pillars." 
 
Sudan's future "gloomy" 
----------------------- 
 
7. The editorial in the independent South-oriented daily "Khartoum 
Monitor" offered a gloomy outlook for Sudan. The "tomorrow that 
never comes is the ongoing story of Abyei," the editorial began, 
referring to Shakespeare's "Macbeth." "The chance for a true 
process of nation building looks remote at this moment simply 
because the differences are steep." The U.S., the editorial 
continued, "should in such situations understand the facts as they 
are on the ground; it should not inherit the British-African dead 
policies. The British political history in Africa is tragic and 
painful. The Northern elites condemned it because according to them 
it prevented them from conquering Southern Sudan. The Southern 
elites condemned it because it made them subjects to the subsequent 
governments that inherited their power in the Sudan." 
 
Darfur and the international community 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. The pro-government "Sudan Vision" editorial on June 5, entitled 
"Can the New Mediator Deliver," was skeptical about the ability of a 
new AU/UN mediator to make inroads on the Darfur conflict. The 
editorial credited Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson, respectively 
the AU and UN special envoys to Sudan, for sparing "no effort to 
pave the way for peace talks that will end the conflict in Darfur." 
However, their efforts were blocked by rebel intransigence, the 
editorial asserted. "Unless these parties stand behind the new 
mediator, he, too, would be unable to carry out his mission." 
 
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